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Abstract 
The thesis is concerned with the problem of wage and 
employment determination in the (casual) agricultural labour markets 
of India. It is argued that the extant theories of wage determination 
poorly accord with the stylized facts of the Indian situation. An 
alternative perspective on agricultural labour markets is developed, 
where wage determination at the village level is interpreted as the 
outcome of tacit collective bargaining between village labourers and 
employers. It is argued that cooperative behaviour, necessary to 
support such collective bargaining, can often be sustained through 
the operation of certain informal social sanctions against wage cutting 
behaviour. 
With an asymmetric Nash framework, a theoretical model of 
the village-level market for agricultural labour is developed, which 
simultaneously determines the agricultural wage rate, the level of 
employment and the employers' profits. The model is consistent with 
the existence of involuntary unemployment, while also explaining 
variability of wages. In the extended version of the model, male and 
female labourers are introduced as separate bargaining parties. The 
extended model provides a possible explanation for the existence of 
gender wage (and employment) disparities. 
Both the basic and extended models are econometrically 
estimated for ten villages in central, south and west India, using data 
collected by the International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid 
Tropics (Hyderabad). 
Bargaining powers of employers', male and female labourers 
(interpreted as the coefficients on their net gains from agreement) 
are estimated. The results show significant inequalities of bargaining 
power between employers and labourers, and between male and 
female labourers. Simulations based on the estimated models indicate 
that the observed inequalities of bargaining power are a quantity 
decisive influence on wage, employment and profit outcomes in the 
village labour markets. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
This is a study of agricultural labour markets in 
contemporary India. The importance of the subject need not be 
belaboured. Suffice it to note that agricultural labour households 
constitute about 30 percent of all rural households in India, account 
for 44 percent of all rural households in absolute poverty and 61 
percent of total unemployed person-days in rural India. The 
incidence of poverty amongst the agricultural labour households is 
about 60 percent. I For anyone concerned with poverty and 
unemployment in India, the importance of the subject is more than 
obvious. 
Equally obvious is the central question pertaining to the 
operation of agricultural labour markets in India, viz., how are wage 
and employment outcomes determined in these markets. In 
particular, there is the key puzzle of agricultural wage determination, 
that is, explaining the coexistence of involuntary unemployment with 
substantial wage variability. A very large body of evidence on both 
these aspects has accumulated over the years. While recognition of 
the latter feature has encouraged researchers to look for explanations 
in supply-demand models of wage determination, the former aspect 
has invited theoretical attention on models incorporating some form 
of wage inflexibility. Yet, it would be a fair assessment of the state of 
the subject to say that we do not yet have a satisfactory working 
hypothesis on this issue. What seems to be required is a theoretical 
1 Sundaram and Tendulkar (1985). The reported figures relate to the year 1977-78 and 
are based on data collected by the National Sample Survey (32nd round). Agricultural 
labour households are defined as those whose major source of income in the year 
preceding the date of the survey was agricultural labour. 
2 
framework which does not depend on market clearance as an 
equilibrium concept and yet allows wages to be responsive to labour 
market conditions, particularly on the demand side. 
1.2 The Point of Departure 
It is this basic issue of wage and employment determination 
that defines the central focus of the present study. The point of 
departure for this study is an alternative characterization of the 
'ideal-type' agricultural labour market in India, which, in essence, is 
based on the following three related propositions: 
(1) The unit of analysis needs to be the village, since the latter, for all 
practical purposes, defines the (spatial) domain of agricultural labour 
markets. 
(2) Within village-level labour markets, agricultural wage 
determination can be viewed as the outcome of implicit collective 
bargaining between the groups of village employers and labourers. 
(3) The wage, employment and profit outcomes of such implicit 
bargaining critically depend on the relative bargaining powers of 
employers and labourers. 
The choice of the unit of analysis must of course be a 
function of the problem to be analyzed and its particular empirical 
context. Ultimately, the unit of analysis should be the locus where the 
main 'determining forces', relevant to the problem at hand, coalesce. 
Well-known features of Indian rural labour markets, such as intra-
village uniformity and inter-village variation of the wage rate (for a 
given operation and sex), strongly suggest that the locus of 
'determining forces' is the village, rather than the household or the 
district or the state. It is an implicit contention of this study that 
an~yses pitched at more or less aggregative levels than the village, 
tend to miss out some of the essential elements of the agricultural 
wage formation process in the Indian setting. 
3 
The idea that there exists some form of tacit collective 
bargaining for the wage rate is a stylization of the village labour 
market environment. Village-level studies have frequently noted the 
phenomenon of a 'going' wage rate in the village, which participants 
in the village labour market abide by, irrespective of known 
differences in the productive abilities of workers, and which is not 
bid down inspite of unemployment. Yet, the 'going' wage rate is not 
invariant over time and appears sensitive to parametric shifts in 
labour demand and supply, particularly the former. The present study 
argues that this 'going' wage can be interpreted as the 'agreed' wage, 
i.e., the wage rate mutually agreed upon by village employers and 
labourers. The 'agreement' is nevertheless tacit; in the typical village 
situation, there are no formal agencies to enforce such agreement. 
Hence, the notion of implicit collective bargaining. 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on data 
collected by the International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT, Hyderabad, India) as part of its Village-Level 
Studies (VLS) program. The ICRISAT data set relates to ten villages 
in central, south and west India, representing five distinct 
agroeconomic zones within India's semi-arid tropics.2 ICRISAT 
initiated its VLS program at six villages in Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra in May 1975. The VLS coverage was extended to two 
more villages in Gujarat in 1980 and a further two villages in Madhya 
Pradesh in 1981. Altogether, the data set spans the period 1975-76 
to 1984-85 covering a varying number of years for the ten villages.3 
The decision to use the ICRISAT data set was based on the 
need (as noted above) to focus research at the village level. This data 
set appeared well-suited to the aims of the present study mainly in 
view of its large sample size per selected village (40 sample 
households from different farm size categories were selected from 
2 For further details on the selection of villages and ICRISAT's data collection 
procedures, see ICRISAT (1987). 
3 See section 3.2 below for more details on the study villages. 
4 
each village) and its richness of detail on a wide range of aspects of 
the village agricultural economy. The data. having been collected at 
regular 2-4 week intervals. also provides year-round information. 
1.3 Overview of the Study 
Chapter 2 is a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature. It is different from the usual 'literature review' chapter 
insofar as it focuses sharply on the key issue of agricultural wage 
determination. addressing in particular the question of how well the 
received theories of wage determination accord with the (stylized) 
facts of the Indian agricultural labour market situation. 
Chapter 3 considers to what extent the features emerging 
from the review of chapter 2 also obtain in the ten study villages of 
the present study. The latter part of the chapter discusses the 
theoretical implications of the observed features. In particular. the 
argument is developed as to how quasi-cooperative forms of behaviour 
can arise in village-level labour markets even in a setting where 
formal unions or other forms of explicit collusion are absent on either 
side of the market. 
Chapter 4 goes on to model the village labour market within 
an asymmetric Nash bargaining framework. which explicitly allows 
for possible differences in the relative bargaining powers of village 
employers and labourers. The proposed model simultaneously 
determines the agricultural wage rate. the level of employment and 
the employers' profits. An extended version of the model introduces 
male and female labourers as separate bargaining entities, and 
analyses the joint determination of male and female wage rates and 
levels of employment along with the profits of the employers hiring 
them. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the empirical 
estimation of the basic and extended models respectively, using the 
ICRISAT data for the ten study villages. A major aim of the empirical 
analysis is to estimate the relative bargaining powers of employers 
and labourers, and amongst the labourers, of male and female 
5 
labourers. And to test if the estimate provide any significant evidence 
of inequality of bargaining powers. 
In chapter 7. I deal with some further aspects of agricultural 
labour markets within the framework of the estimated bargaining 
models. The first part of the chapter examines seasonal and regional 
variations in the relative bargaining positions of employers and 
labourers. The second part of the chapter addresses the question 
whether the observed differences in bargaining powers are a 
significant quantitative influence on distributional outcomes in the 
village economy. 
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes. 
6 
CHAPTER2 
Agricultural Wage and Employment Determination in India: A Review 
of Theory and Evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the vast and growing body of literature on the operation 
of labour markets in the rural societies of less developed countries 
(LDCs), our understanding of the key processes of wage (and 
employment) determination in these orbits of labour exchange 
remains fragmentary. This chapter undertakes a critical review of the 
existing literature, focussing on the particular context of agricultural 
labour markets in India. The review is schematically organized in 
terms of the main theoretical approaches to the central issue of 
rural/agricultural wage determination, viz., (i) subsistence or 
institutional wage theories (section 2.2), (ii) efficiency wage 
hypothesis (section 2.3), (iii) labour turnover models (section 2.4), 
(iv) supply-demand models (section 2.5), and (v) the interlinked 
markets theory (section 2.6). A major motivation for adopting this 
schematic framework has been to examine the extent to which the 
different paradigms of wage formation are compatible with the 
contemporary empirical reality of agricultural labour markets in 
India. 
2.2 'Subsistence' Wage Theories 
The idea that real wages in the LDCs are set at the 
'subsistence level' has frequently appeared in development theory, 
the notion of 'subsistence wage' often serving as an assumption in 
analyses addressing other issues. However, the subsistence wage 
theory itself can be traced to the classical political economists, 
notably, Malthus, Ricardo and Mill. While these political economists 
differed somewhat. in their characterization of the secular path of 
7 
wages, I the basic elements of the classical wage theory may be listed 
as follows2: 
(i) Subsistence level is defined in terms of the real wage 
which supports zero population growth, where the rate of population 
growth is deemed to be an increasing function of the real wage. 
(ii) There is a long-run tendency for real wages to conform 
to the subsistence level, the latter identified as the 'natural' price of 
labour. 
(iii) The subsistence wage is, however, not a physiological 
datum, but also includes a cultural-historical element.3 
(iv) The 'market' price for labour (the wages actually paid) 
usually differs from the 'natural' price (the long-run subsistence 
wage) depending on the supply and demand for labour.4 
1 See Hollander ( 1984) for an exposition, and Samuelson's ( 1978) canonical classical 
model. Also see Booth and Sundrum ( 1984) for a somewhat different interpretation of 
Ricardian wage dynamics. 
2This enumeration is based on a reading of Ricardo's (1911) chapter On Wages in The 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
3 Even though Ricardo was quite explicit on this (in the chapter On Wages in the 
Principles), the point remains contentious in view of the debate about whether real 
wages were assumed to influence population growth primarily through physiological 
factors related to mortality (O'Brien, 1981), or through psychological factors related to 
fertility (Hollander, 1979). Whatever be the historiographical significance of this 
exegetical problem, from the contemporary LDCs perspective the real issue (as 
mentioned below) is that the assumed link between real wages and population growth 
is itself largely inoperative in the present-day context, and cannot be invoked as a 
wage-regulation mechanism. 
4 Bharadwaj (1978) and Garegnani (1983) argue that the role of demand (and supply) in 
the classical theories is to explain the tendency of the actual or 'market' price towards 
8 
Later, as demographic evidence burgeoned to show that 
there existed no straightforward monotonic relation between the rate 
of population growth and the real wage rate (or even real earnings), 
element (i) of the theory came to be disregarded. However, 
dispensing with the demographic link implies that what remains of 
the 'subsistence' theory is simply the notion of general stability of real 
wages at some culturally and/or historically determined levels. The 
latter-day versions of the theory, which for the purposes of this 
discussion may be taken to include the so-called institutioned wage 
theories, can be broadly grouped into two categories. (1) The strong 
versions can be identified with fix-wage theories, where the wage 
refers to the real wage, and the wages are fixed not in the sense that 
they do not change but in the Hicksian sense that they are 
independent of supply and demand. Included here are the 
formulations which specify a perfectly elastic labour supply curve, the 
vertical height of the curve being exogenously determined.5 (2) The 
weak versions can be understood as postulating a long-term fixity of 
the real wage at the levels governed by some non-market forces, while 
permitting short-run influence of market forces of demand and 
supply. The non-market forces may take the form of physiological 
and/ or sociological norms. 6, 7 
the normal price not that of determining the latter, and that the market price is 
determinate only in its order relative to the normal price. 
5 For such a view of subsistence theories, see, for instance, Hansen (1966). Squire 
(1981), Rakshit (1982) and Bardhan (1984a). 
6 This interpretation is suggested by Lipton (1983), Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), 
Rodgers (1986) and Dreze and Mukherjee (1987). 
7 It is worth noting that both the strong and the weak versions are compatible with 
the post-Sraffian view of the classical wage theory:" ... what all these authors [Smith, 
Malthus, Ricardo] had in common was not, as is often held, the idea of a wage 
determined by subsistence (even less that of a subsistence constant over time). It was 
the more general notion of a real wage governed by conditions (of a conventional or 
9 
In the context of the LDCs, most of the empirical evidence 
presented against the subsistence theory has been targeted at the 
strong version. The critical thrust of this evidence has been the 
demonstration that the observed variation in the real wages is 
attributable, in greater or smaller measure, to the supply and demand 
factors. See, for instance, Hansen (1966, 1969), K Bardhan (1973). 
Rosenzweig (1978), Bardhan (1979a,1984a,1984b), Squire (1981) 
and Lal ( 1986). 
However, the weak version of the theory is not easily 
refuted. (By the same token, it is not easily verified either.) Like the 
strong version, it is not simply refuted by temporal or spatial 
variation of real wages. But unlike the strong version, nor is it 
necessarily refuted by the responsiveness of real wages to supply and 
demand factors. While the latter could be dismissed as ephemeral 
(short-term) phenomena, the former could be 'explained' in terms of 
temporal/spatial variability of non-market norms. However, in the 
absence of a supplementary theory of the determination and evolution 
of non-market norms, or additional structure linking short-term 
variation of real wages with their long-term constancy, it must be 
concluded that the subsistence theory performs poorly on the 
criterion of falsifiability, and therefore, has very limited predictive 
power.s 
The only prediction the weak version of the theory offers is 
regarding a long-term stability of real wages within reasonably 
'homogeneous' spatial domains. Even here, it is not obvious just how 
long should the 'long-term' be. Nor is it altogether clear whether the 
institutional kind) that are distinct from those affecting the social product and other 
shares in it, and are therefore best studied separately from them." (Garegnani, 1984, 
p. 295; Garegnani, 1983, p.311). 
8 This line of criticism has also been offered by Dreze and Mukherjee (1987). 
10 
real wage rate or the real wage earnings of a labourer are relevant.9 
The latter issue is clearly important insofar as unemployment is a 
widespread feature of rural labour markets in the LDCs. In the Indian 
agricultural labour market context, however, whether one considers 
the time-pattern of the real wage rates or real wage earnings, the 
evidence generally points against the subsistence/institutional wage 
theory. 
Beginning with the evidence on real wage rates in 
agriculture, first it ought to be recognized that studies using all-India 
averages (e.g. Lal, 1988) are not very meaningful, given India's 
extreme regional heterogeneity. A minimal disaggregation would lead 
us to consider trends at the state level, for which there have been a 
large number of studies including Bardhan (1970), Krishnaji (1971), 
Hirway (1973), Jose (1974, 1984a, 1984b, 1988), Lal (1976a), 
Nayyar (1976, 1977), Bhalla (1979), Ghose (1980), Kurien (1980), 
Parthasarthy and Adiseshu (1982), Kumar and Sharma (1983), Dey 
(1984), Mundie (1984a, 1984b) and Unni (1988). It is difficult to 
summarize the findings of these diverse studies insofar as they differ 
in their regional coverage, cover different time periods (though all of 
them relate to the post-independence period), and use different data 
sources. However, a detailed review of these studies is not presently 
contextual. The point I wish to emphasize is that (a) with a few 
exceptions.IO these studies provide substantial evidence of significant 
(though diverse) regional trends in real agricultural wage rates, and 
(b) even in regions where unidirectional movements in real wage 
9 Ricardo's own numerical example involved annual wages of a labourer (Ricardo, 
1911, p. 58). However, since Ricardo generally thought in terms of full employment 
(except for his chapter On Machinery), it mattered little whether wage earnings or the 
wage rate were considered. 
10 The studies which note the absence of any significant trend include Nayyar (1977) 
for Bihar (1957-58 to 1971-72), Bhalla (1979) for Punjab (1961-62 to 1976-77). 
Parthasarthy and Adiseshu ( 1982) for Andhra Pradesh ( 1958-59 to 1978-79), and 
Kumar and Sharma (1983) for Harayana (1960-61to1979-80). Even among these 
studies, Nayyar, Bhalla, and Kumar and Sharma obsexved significant intra-period 
and/or intra-state movements in real wage rates. 
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rates are not sustained long enough to be interpreted as 'trends', the 
observed variations seem scarcely compatible with the notion of real 
wage rate stability. This is at least partially corroborated by the 
figures in Table 2.1, based on the data source considered most 
Table 2.1: Indices of Real Wage Rates for Male Agricultural Labourers 
Based on the Agricultural/Rural Labour Enquiries and the National 
Sample Survey Data 
State 1950-51 1956-57 1964-65 1974.75a 1977-78 
Andhra Pradesh 110 100 101 86 120 
Assam 133 100 101 71 na 
Bihar 115 100 101 89 111 
Gujarat * 100 124 83 118 
Harayana ** 100 ** 72 ** 
Kerala 94 100 118 156 217 
Madhya Pradesh 102 100 116 79 108 
Maharashtra na 100 110 81 112 
Karnataka 101 100 98 88 106 
Orissa 83 100 110 79 106 
Punjab 86 100 77 95 113 
Rajasthan 103 100 132 97 128 
Tamil Nadu na 100 118 105 146 
Uttar Pradesh na 100 74 93 117 
West Bengal 114 100 93 72 93 
All-India 108 100 102 96 118 
* included under Maharashtra 
** included under Punjab 
na. Not available. 
a. 1974-75 was not a good agricultural year. But as Bardhan (1985) observed, between 
1964-65 and 1974-75, net foodgrain production increased by 20 percent and real NDP 
from agriculture increased by 11 percent. 
SOURCE: Lal (1988) for the years 1950-51to1974-75; the indices for 1977-
78 are calculated from figures reported in Unni (1988). 
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reliable by researchers, 11 viz., the Agricultural and Rural Labour 
Enquiries and the National Sample Survey (NSS), even though it 
provides observations at only a few discrete points. 
As for wage earnings of agricultural labour households in 
different regions, no time-series data are available. There are studies 
such as Jose (1978), Ghose (1980), Bardhan (1985) and Unni (1988) 
based on a few data points (spread over the period 1950-51 to 
1977-78) provided by Agricultural and Rural Labour Enquiries and 
the NSS. Of course, no conclusions regarding trends can be drawn 
from these studies. However, they do suggest that (real) annual wage 
earnings per agricultural labour household (or per agricultural 
labourer) have not remained constant in most regions.12 If anything, 
the evidence suggests a decline in most areas upto the mid-70s (in 
some cases after an initial period of growth upto the mid-60s), 
followed by some increase later. 
2.3 Efficiency Wage Theory 
It was noted that the subsistence/institutional wage theory 
(except in its classical incarnation) postulated rather than explained 
wage rigidity. The class of models that we consider in this section, 
viz., the efficiency wage models, have sought to provide explanations 
for wage rigidities (strictly speaking, downward rigidity of real 
wages) and the concomitant existence of involuntary unemployment. 
Following the original suggestion of Leibenstein (1957), the efficiency 
wage models were elaborated by Mirrlees (1975), Rodgers (1975). 
Stiglitz (1976, 1982), Bliss and Stern (1978a, b), Basu (1984, 1987a) 
11 For a discussion of the relative merits of alternative data sources, see Rao ( 1972). 
P Bardhan (1973), Lal (1976a), K Bardhan (1977) and Jose (1978). 
12 This limited inference is certainly plausible unless it can be somehow argued that 
the six data points covered in these studies (viz. 1950-51, 1956-57, 1963-64/ 1964-65, 
1970-71, 1974-75 and 1977-78) relate to atypical agricultural years. 
13 
and Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987).13 The basic axiom underlying 
these models states that labour productivity or the effort per labourer 
(or per unit of time) positively depends on the real wage received by 
labourers.14 Given this basic relation, the efficiency wage models 
demonstrate that sufficient conditions are provided for employers 
wanting to pay more than the market-clearing wage, thereby 
inducing involuntary unemployment. The argument, in nutshell, is as 
follows. 
Given the effort-wage relation, there exists a unique15 real 
wage, the efficiency wage, we, which maximizes profits for an 
employer or employers. (This is also the wage which minimizes the 
cost per unit of labour effort.) If we is less than the market-clearing 
wage, w5 (which also measures the supply price of labour), the 
employers must pay w5 since no labourers will be willing to work for 
an employer offering less than the market-clearing wage. However, if 
we exceeds w5, profit maximizing employers will clearly prefer to pay 
we, 16 Though labourers are willing to work for less, their supply price 
13 See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) for a recent lucid survey of efficiency wage models, 
though oriented more to the context of labour markets in the developed countries. In 
contrast, the works mentioned above have been quite explicit in their contextual 
reference to the low-income countries. 
14 Basu (1987a) has recently emphasized that in conjunction with this basic axiom, 
the efficiency wage models use another perception axiom whereby the positive wage-
productivity link (or the basic axiom) is assumed to be fully perceived by each 
employer. 
15 Uniqueness. though not essential to the argument, is ensured by certain weak 
conditions on the effort-wage relation. See Bliss and Stem (1978a, p.334) and 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986,p.1018). 
16 This does not necessarily conflict with competitive behaviour, for even under 
competitive conditions, employers always have the option of paying more than supply 
price oflabour. It is of course true that in the absence of the effort-wage relation there 
will be no reason for them to do so, their profits being strictly non-increasing in the 
real wage. 
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ceases to be relevant for the employers. The equilibrium wage is thus 
given 
w*= max (we, ws), 
and the efficiency wage sets a floor to the market wage (as also an 
upper bound to employment), which becomes operative whenever 
we~ w5 • If the labour supply curve has the usual non-negative slope, 
this saddles the system with involuntary unemployment which cannot 
be eliminated (through underbidding of the real wage) because 
employers would only reduce their profits if they chose to pay 
anything less than we. 
Various microtheoretic justifications have been offered for 
the existence of a positive effort-wage relation, and it is indeed 
possible to develop a typology of efficiency wage models on that 
basis.17 However, in the context of developing countries, prime 
importance has been accorded to the nutritional determinants of 
labour effort; the nutrition-productivity linkage is presumed to be 
significant at low levels of consumption typical of these countries. 
The ensuing discussion is thus primarily geared to this latter class of 
nutritionally-based efficiency wage models. 
The efficiency wage argument summarized above implicitly 
assumed a homogeneous set of labourers. It has, however, been 
elaborated to consider one obvious dimension of heterogeneity among 
labourers, viz., their non-wage income based on their differing 
17 For instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1986) use this approach to distinguish four 
broad types of efficiency wage models: (i) shirking models (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984) which emphasize that higher wages reduce shirking by employees due to a 
higher cost of job loss; (ii) adverse selection models (e.g. Weiss, 1980) focussing on the 
potential screening effect of higher wages in improving the average quality of job 
applicants; (iii) sociological models (e.g. Akerlof, 1982) which highlight the positive 
effect of higher wages on the morale or the loyalty of the workers to the firm; and (iv) 
labour turnover models (e.g. Stiglitz, 1974) which hypothesize that higher wages 
reduce labour turnover costs. With the exception of labour turnover models, discussed 
separately in section 2.4, the relevance of these approaches has been mainly argued 
for labour markets in developed industrial economies. 
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(though limited) ownership of land. The basic distinction thus 
projected is between landless labourers and labourers with some 
land.18 The literature discusses both the competitive and 
monopsonistic cases.19 Both cases may induce involuntary 
unemployment in equilibrium, but they carry different implications 
for landed and landless labourers. 
The non-competitive case turns on the familiar idea of 
discriminating monopsony, and shows that the landed labourers will 
be paid a lower wage than the landless as the employer seeks to 
equate the marginal cost of labour effort from the two sources (see 
Bliss and Stern, l 978a). This prediction is reversed in the 
competitive case.20 It is shown that while the market for labour-effort 
clears, there may be considerable invoiuntary unemployment of 
labour-time (regimes 1 and 2 in Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). Also, while 
everyone employed earns the same (market-clearing) rate per unit of 
labour effort, those with non-wage income (viz. the landed labourers) 
earn a higher wage per unit of time. This is because labourers with 
non-wage income are potentially more attractive for the employers 
insofar as they can supply more effort than the landless labourers for 
the same time-wage. However, as employers compete for the services 
of such landed labourers, the time-wage for the latter is bid up. It is 
notable that the landed labourers enjoy an employment advantage 
over the landless in both the competitive and non-competitive cases. 
The empirically attractive feature of the efficiency wage 
models lies in their ability to explain involuntary unemployment 
while also permitting (when the efficiency wage is not binding), 
18 Though the literature concentrates on the landed-landless dichotomy, the 
arguments also apply mutatis mutandis to other aspects of labour heterogeneity, such 
as differential dependency ratios. 
19 The distinction between competitive and non-competitive market environments 
becomes analytically significant once labour heterogeneity in terms of additional 
sources of consumption is introduced. 
20 See theorem 3 in Dasgupta and Ray (1986). 
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responsiveness of wages to supply and demand forces.21 However, 
the mere existence of involuntary unemployment (and malnutrition) 
in rural labour milieus of LDCs can hardly be claimed a vindication of 
the efficiency wage hypothesis, as other explanations can be offered 
for these phenomena. We need to focus on specific assumptions and 
predictions of the theory to examine its empirical relevance. 
The first point to be made is that the consumption-
productivity link is far from instantaneous. And hence, if the 
efficiency wage theory is to be considered a significant explanation of 
wage formation in rural labour markets, one would expect it to be 
supported by the prevalence of long-term employment contracts, 
which allow sufficient time for employers to capture the productivity 
benefits of paying higher wages. However, a striking feature of Indian 
agriculture is the preponderance of casual labour contracts, mostly on 
a daily wage basis.22 As shown in Table 2.2, for male labourers, casual 
employment accounts for nearly three-fourths of all wage 
employment in rural India. The proportions for females (not reported 
in the table) are even higher since their participation in the regular 
or attached labour market is more limited. The NSS, 32nd Round 
data for 1977-78, indicate that the share of casual in total wage 
employment for male and female agricultural labourers were 76 and 
21 For instance, seasonal variation of wages is quite consistent with the efficiency 
wage theory. A point overlooked by Hart (1986a, chapter 7) in her criticism of the 
theory in the Indonesian context. 
22 It could be argued that the daily wage contracts may conceal de facto long-term 
arrangements if employers renew the daily contracts with the same labourers over a 
longer period. The available evidence, however, does not support such a view. For 
instance, for villages in central and south India, Binswanger et. al. (1984) noted that 
labourers in the daily-rated market worked for twenty employers or more in the 
course of a single agricultural year. Also see Rudra (1982b, pp. 332-333) and Bliss and 
Stem (1982, p. 97) for similar evidence. 
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94 percent respectively.23 Furthermore, figures in Table 2.2 are 
indicative of not just a high but an increasing rate of casualization of 
labour contracts. It should also be stressed that casualization is a 
country-wide phenomenon: all states show an increase in the 
proportion of casual labour over the 10-year period. If, thus, the 
efficiency wage 
Table 2.2: Pattern of Male Employment in Rural India: 
1972-73 and 1982-83 
Wage labour as Casual labour as 
percentage percentage 
of total employment of wage labour 
State 1972-73 1982-83 1972-73 1982-83 
Andhra Pradesh 40.0 46.6 68.6 74.2 
Assam 23.8 35.9 40.0 49.0 
Bihar 39.5 42.8 60.9 82.2 
Gujarat 34.4 40.4 64.6 81.5 
Harayana 24.0 30.0 40.3 52.3 
Kerala 54.3 54.5 72.1 76.7 
Madhya Pradesh 27.3 33.7 56.8 72.0 
Maharashtra 53.5 47.4 70.3 71.5 
Karnataka 37.8 41.5 72.1 87.3 
Orissa 39.9 43.7 68.3 76.8 
Punjab 30.7 33.6 52.3 61.7 
Rajasthan 10.2 20.5 53.5 63.1 
Tamil Nadu 42.4 54.2 60.0 75.1 
Uttar Pradesh 21.6 24.1 66.7 73.6 
West Bengal 48.1 50.4 na 75.4 
All-India 34.1 39.6 64.6 72.8 
na. Not available. 
SOURCE: Parthasarthy (1987), based on NSS, 27th Round, Sarvekshna, 
October 1977 and NSS, 38th Round, Report No. 315. 
23 See Vaidyanathan (1986, 1988). Also see Binswanger et. al. (1984) who reported that 
the regular farm servant market in central and south Indian villages is almost 
exclusively male. 
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theory is considered applicable primarily to the category of 
regular or attached farm labourers, then it must be admitted that its 
relevance is limited to a small and shrinking segment of the agrarian 
labour market in India. 24 
Basu (1987 a) has recently sought to restate the efficiency 
wage hypothesis for a casual labour market where the productivity-
augmenting effects of wages paid by individual employers are allowed 
to enter their respective profit calculations only to the extent they 
are able to retain labourers with them. The model does exhibit the 
possibility of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. However, if 
the rate of employee retention per period is rather small, as seems 
highly plausible in the daily-rated market (see note 22), the model 
collapses to the competitive supply-demand framework with 
involuntary unemployment tending to disappear from the model 
altogether. 
As suggested above, once labour heterogeneity is admitted 
into analysis, the efficiency wage theory offers more concrete 
predictions, viz., (i) landed labourers (or those with some additional 
source of consumption) have a higher probability of finding 
employment in the wage labour market than the landless, 25 and (ii) 
wage rates for the two categories are different, being higher (lower) 
for labourers with land if the labour market is competitive 
(monopsonistic). However, these predictions accord poorly with the 
Indian situation. As for (i), the Rural Labour Enquiry (1974-75) data 
24 The above evidence contrasts with Rodgers' (1975) findings for the Kosi region of 
Bihar that " a proportion, ranging upto nearly a half, of the labourers were 'tied' to 
some extent". The Kosi area could well be a somewhat special case. However, a closer 
look at Table 1 in Rodgers (1975) shows the proportions of 'tied' labourers in the 5 
surveyed villages were 33, 46, 22, 20 and zero percent respectively, with a simple 
average of 24.2 and a high standard deviation of 15.2. The latter set offigures are much 
less propitious for the efficiency wage theory. 
25 Notice the strong result in Dasgupta and Ray(l986) that under regime 1, none of the 
landless succeed in obtaining any employment, and in regime 2 involuntary 
unemployment is strictly confined to landless labourers only. 
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show that both male and female agricultural labourers from landed 
households faced a lower average probability of wage employment 
than those from landless households: 
PROBABLITY OF WAGE AGRICULTURAL LABOUR 
EMPLOYMENT IN HOUSEHOLDS 
AGRICULTURE 26 WITHOUT LAND 
for men 0.733 
for women 0.569 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR 
HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH LAND 
0.693 
0.498 
A similar finding was also reported by Sinha (1981).27 
Table 2.3 presents further evidence at a more micro-level 
for villages in the semi-arid tropics of Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra. It shows a mixed picture. The differences between the 
probability of market employment for landless and cultivator 
households are as often positive as they are negative. They are 
significant in only about half the cases. Among the significant cases, 
higher probability for cultivator households is borne out for females 
only; for males the reverse appears to be true. 
As for wage differences, Table 2.3 shows these to be mostly 
insignificant for females; for males, it suggests higher wage rates for 
cultivator households in accordance with the competitive version of 
the efficiency wage theory.28 In contrast, the wage functions 
estimated by Rajaraman (1986) for two Karnataka villages found the 
land operated variable positive and significant for females, but 
26 The probability of wage employment is calculated as the number of days in wage 
employment as a proportion of the sum of days in wage employment and days 
unemployed due to want of work. 
27 See the evidence on unemployment cited in section 2. 5 below. 
28 A disquieting feature of Table 2.3 is that wage differences often go in the opposite 
directions for male and females in the same village. It is, indeed, hard to believe that 
while competitive efficiency wages prevail in the male segment of the village labour 
market, monopsonistic conditions characterize the female segment, or vice versa. 
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insignificant for males in one village and negative and "not 
insignificant" in the other. Bardhan (1979a) also reported a 
significant negative coefficient for land in the daily farm wage 
function estimated for West Bengal, in line with the non-competitive 
version of the efficiency wage theory though he himself favoured an 
alternative 
Table 2.3: Paired t-tests of Mean Differences between Probabilities of 
Employment and Wage Rates for Labourers from Landless, Small and 
Medium Farm Households 
Landless - Small Farm 
Village Probability of market employment Wage Rate 
male female male female 
Aurepalle -0.23 0.49 -2.16* -4.21 ** 
Dokur 0.33 1.45 0.60 -0.93 
Shirapur -2.42* -8.21 * -2.18* -0.09 
Kalman 2.97** -3.35** -5.79** 0.51 
Kanzara 0.41 2.06* -6.33** 1.89 
Kinkheda -6.79** -2.15* 1.52 1.68 
Landless - Medium Farm 
Village Probability of market employment Wage Rate 
male 
Aurepalle 2.05 
Dokur -0.64 
Shirapur 2.14* 
Kalman 2.85** 
Kanzara 1.61 
Kinkheda 4.01 ** 
* significant at the 5% level: 
** significant at the 1 %. 
female male female 
0.64 -0.58 -1.12 
-3.17** 1.59 0.48 
-3.95** -0.98 -1.99 
-5.57** -1.46 3.87** 
1.22 -4.13** -0.14 
0.03 3.04** -1.46 
Note: Probability of market employment is defined as the number of days a person 
was successful in obtaining wage employment as a proportion of the number of days 
(s)he tried. 
SOURCE: Ryan, Ghodke and Sarin (1980), appendix Tables 2 and 3. 
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explanation.29 Rosenzweig (1984), on the other hand, using national 
survey data of the National Council for Applied Economics Research 
(1970-71), found the amount of land owned by the worker to be 
insignificant in both the male and female wage equations. 
It may be tempting to suggest that these diverse results are 
all consistent with the efficiency wage theory, and simply reflect 
competitive or monopsonistic market conditions obtaining in 
different regions. However, in the absence of an independent study of 
the market structures in these regions, such ex post deduction would 
be clearly tautological. In my view, not much can be concluded on the 
basis of the reported wage differences among individual labourers 
since they are likely to reflect mainly non-individualistic aspects of 
wage variation, such as, inter-village differences or different rates for 
different agricultural operations. This is indeed what is suggested by 
the widely-documented evidence for intra-village uniformity of wage 
rate (for a given operation and labourers of the same sex).30 That, 
however, still leaves an unresolved problem for the efficiency wage 
theory, viz., how are uniform wages to be explained when sharp and 
readily observed productivity differences are known to exist among 
individual labourers in the same village labour market. 
There has been little direct econometric testing of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis, presumably in view of the difficulties 
emphasized by Bliss and Stem (1978b).31 For India, the only attempt 
29 This is discussed in greater detail in section 2.4. It is also noteworthy that in a 
similar regression for the monthly salary of regular farm labourers, Bardhan found a 
significant positive coefficient for the land variable. 
30 See, for instance, Bardhan and Rudra (1981), Rudra (1982a,b, 1984), Bliss and Stern 
(1982), Rodgers (1975), Rao (1984), Rodgers and Rodgers (1984), Ryan and Walker 
(1988), Dreze and Mukherjee (1987). Also see chapter 3. 
31 Strauss (1986) tested the theory for Sierra Leone and found current nutrient intake 
to bear a significant positive effect on farm labour productivity. 
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in this direction, to my knowledge, is by Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1986). They concluded: 
Our results ... indicate significant support for the "Wage Efficiency 
hypothesis" for males within the rural SAT [semi-arid tropics] Indian 
context of this study, with significant differences between the peak 
and slack seasons. 
However, a critical look at their results raises strong doubts whether 
any support at all can be claimed therefrom for the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. 
To capture the efficiency-wage effects, Behrman and 
Deolalikar included a weight-for-height measure and calorie intake as 
(instrumented) explanatory variables in the semilog wage equations 
estimated for male and female casual labourers.32 They also allowed 
peak season slope dummies for these two variables to capture inter-
seasonal effects. However, in the estimated equation for female 
participants, none of the four efficiency-wage variables were found to 
be significant. For males, only weight-for-height was found 
significant, while calorie intake infact had a negative sign.33 Thus, 
even for males the case for efficiency wages rests on rather weak 
foundations. Further, the Behrman-Deolalikar explanation for the 
non-significance of efficiency-wage considerations for female 
labourers, in terms of male labour generally performing more 
physically-demanding tasks, also appears to be off the mark. 
Particularly, when it is noted that women account for 50-88 percent 
of total hired labour in this region (see Ryan and Ghodke, 1984), and 
among the nine predominantly male operations are tasks such as 
watching, irrigating, plant protection and supervision (see Ryan and 
Walker, 1988, chapter 4). 
Finally, as perceptively argued by Dreze and Mukherjee 
32 I concentrate on the male and female wage equations rather than the combined 
one for all participants as the reported residual sums of squares would convincingly 
reject a Chow test on structural stability. 
33 Weight-for-height for females also had a negative sign. 
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( 1987), efficiency wage models are flawed in a basic sense as a 
relevant paradigm in the Indian context insofar as they attribute the 
resistance to wage cuts solely to the employers. There is considerable 
field-based evidence to suggest that the resistance to undercutting 
comes typically from .the labourers' camp.34 Among the employers, on 
the contrary, there is some evidence of resistance to overbidding of 
the wage rate (see Bliss and Stern, 1982).35 
2.4 Labour Turnover Models 
Labour turnover (hereafter L-T) models have the same basic 
structure as the efficiency wage models considered in section 2.3. 
Like the latter, they show that under certain circumstances 
employers find it profitable to pay wages above the market clearing 
level. Such employer behaviour is, however, based, not on a positive 
effort-wage relation, but on an inverse relation between wages and 
the costs of labour turnover. Higher wages, it is argued, reduce 
turnover costs either through a direct reduction in the workers' quit 
rate or by way of lowering the per worker replacement cost. In the 
context of LDCs, the original formulations of the L-T model, such as 
Stiglitz (1974), were intended as an explanation of the rural-urban 
wage gap (and urban unemployment). Later work, notably by Bardhan 
(1979a), emphasized that L-T considerations were equally important 
for agricultural wage determination. Since Bardhan's work is 
particularly addressed to the Indian context, it is considered in some 
detail below. 
Bardhan (1979a) modeled36 a monopsonistic labour market 
34This is most clearly documented by Rudra (1982a) and Bardhan and Rudra (1981). 
Bliss and Stern (1982) and Dreze and Mukherjee (1987) also obseived this 
phenomenon for Palanpur. 
35 This phenomenon has critical implications not just for the efficiency wage theory, 
and will be taken up again in section 2.5 as also in chapter 3. 
36 Bardhan presented two versions of the L-T model, the second version incorporating 
interseasonal effects within a two-period framework. Though the following 
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situation where the employer faces an exogenously given quit rate by 
workers.37 As existing labourers quit, the employer hires 'new' 
labourers incurring in the process an average recruitment cost, c, 
over and above the usual wage cost. In particular, Bardhan introduced 
the following recruitment cost function 
c = c(u, v), 
decreasing in u '8.nd increasing in v, where u is the extent of 
unemployment in the village and v represents "any factor 
constraining, and hence raising the average cost of recruitment on 
the part of the employer" (p. 492). Given this, the employer adjusts 
wages and employment to maximize profits. It is easily shown that 
involuntary unemployment typically characterizes the resultant 
equilibrium, and labourers cannot secure additional employment by 
bidding down the wage rate since a lower wage rate only serves to 
raise recruitment costs of the employer. 
Bardhan also derived some comparative static propositions 
from the L-T model which indicate that (i) an exogenous increase in 
labour demand (due to such factors as improved agricultural 
practices, a higher cropping intensity, better irrigation or rainfall, or 
simply a seasonal shift in demand for labour) increases the wage rate 
and lowers the unemployment, (ii) recruitment-constraining factors 
(such as those encumbering the supply of labour by landed labourers 
or those with low dependency ratios38) lower the wage rate and 
increase unemployment, and (iii) labourers with less elastic labour 
discussion is confined to the first version, many of the remarks carry over to the 
second model as well. 
37 This is in contrast to the L-T models proposed by Stiglitz (1974) and Salop (1979), 
where the quit rate is endogenously determined. The difference, however, is not 
analytically significant since Bardhan makes the average turnover cost endogenous, 
while the other formulations take the latter to be exogenous. 
38 Bardhan also explains male-female differences in such terms. 
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supply get lower wages, while those with higher quit rates face 
greater unemployment. A measure of the empirical support is 
claimed for these predictions. However, as observed in section 2.3, 
the evidence for (ii),39 implying inter-worker wage differences in the 
same labour market, is generally inconclusive, and can sometimes be 
quite misleading. 
The point also needs to be made that the comparative static 
results of Bardhan's model are contingent on some rather stringent 
assumptions on the recruitment cost function, viz., Cuu>O and Cuv=O. 
While there may be some intuition for the first derivatives of the 
recruitment cost function, 40 it is far from obvious what sort of 
intuitive (or indeed empirical) support justifies the assumed signs of 
the second derivatives.41 
A more fundamental problem with Bardhan's analysis in the 
Indian context relates to the concept of recruitment cost itself. A 
widely-observed feature of agricultural labour markets in India is that 
their territorial domain is essentially the village. 42 And within the 
village labour market, employers possess a higher degree of 
knowledge of individual worker characteristics, including conditions 
of their labour supply. Labourers, on their part, are equally well-
informed of employers' labour requirements. Over the years, even 
39 Bardhan cited evidence for West Bengal where he found a significant negative 
coefficient for land and a positive coefficient for dependency ratio in his estimates of 
wage function for casual labourers. See section 2.3 for relevant discussion. 
40 For instance, it may be supposed that recruitment is more costly in tighter labour 
market conditions. 
4l Yet IIlC!StJ>fBardhan's result~crittca1ly depend on the.aE;S!J.Il1e<:l signs. For exafi1ple,_ 
if Cuu< or =0 (which is a priori as plausible as Cuu>O) then exogenous increases in 
labour demand either have no effect or cause afaU in the wage rate. See Bardhan 
(1979a), p. 491. 
42 See, for instance, Rudra (1982a), Bardhan and Rudra (1985, 1986), Sundari (1985) 
and Dreze and Mukherjee (1987). 
26 
seasonal fluctuations in labour use become a matter of common 
knowledge. In such a village environment, it is indeed hard to 
visualize the kind of imperfections of information that could possibly 
form the basis of recruitment costs of L-T models.43 
2.5 Supply-Demand Models 
As discussed earlier (see section 2.2), contrary to the 
supposition of fix-wage theories, a large body of empirical evidence 
for rural labour markets in LDCs (including India) showed wages to be 
responsive to the varying conditions of demand for and supply of 
labour. Presumably on the strength of such evidence, research on 
rural labour markets witnessed, in contrast to the development 
literature of the 1950s and 60s, a renewed interest in supply-
demand models, which (partially or fully) restored to wages (and 
prices) their Walrasian role of ensuring market clearance. For India, 
this is indicated by a number of studies including K. Bardhan (1970, 
1973, 1977), Pandey (1973), Lal (1976b, 1988), Rosenzweig (1978, 
1984), Vyas (1979), Papola and Misra (1980), Ryan (1982), Bardhan 
(1984a, b), Ryan and Wallace (1987).44 One could possibly distinguish 
on conventional lines between competitive and non-competitive 
models; though it is the former that have been the focus of special 
attention.45 
However, a characterization of India's agricultural labour 
43 Bardhan himself comes close to admitting this in the concluding paragraph of his 
paper. See Bardhan (1979a), p. 499. 
44 Kalpana and Pranab Bardhan's work does not strictly belong to this class in view 
of their somewhat eclectic theoretical stance. 
45 While monopsonistic labour market conditions have often been proposed in the 
literature, they have invariably appeared in conjunction with other theoretical 
postulates such as those pertaining to efficiency wages or labour turnover. It is not an 
accident that it is these additional theoretical axioms which generate unemployment 
as an equilibrium phenomenon in these models. (There is no unemployment in the 
orthodox monopsony model.) 
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markets in terms of the competitive supply-demand framework is 
problematic on a number of counts. There is, first, the problem of the 
unit of analysis itself. This relates to the aforementioned village-level 
isolation of the labour market (see section 2.4), the clearest 
manifestation of which is to be found in the persistent and significant 
differences in wage rates (for given operation and sex) even across 
adjacent villages. This is not to deny the existence of intra-rural 
labour migration, especially of a temporary seasonal type. However, 
while the phenomenon deserves further research, available evidence, 
such as Rudra (1982a), Breman (1985, particularly chapters 7 and 
10) and Bardhan and Rudra (1986), indicates that rural circulation of 
labour is mostly across distant areas, is highly particularistic in being 
structured on personal ties, and is sometimes in 'perverse' direction 
from high to low-wage areas. 46 These features substantially inhibit the 
potential market-integrating effects of such movement even in 
regions where it is quantitatively significant. 
From the competitive theoretical perspective, however, 
territorial segmentation of the labour market per se need not be a 
problem, even as it implies the existence of (territorial) wage 
differentials for similar work. There is indeed the view that "India is 
composed of a large number of geographically distinct, competitive 
rural labour markets" (see Rosenzweig, 1984, p.212). What is 
problematic, though, is the situation that market segmentation 
permeates right down to village level, where the rather small number 
of participants on either side of the market puts a heavy strain on the 
competitive assumption of price-taking behaviour (Rudra, 1984). This 
is further accentuated when we allow for elements of non-
substitutability between different types of labourers within the same 
village market, notably between attached and casual labourers, and 
among casual labourers between male and female labourers (Rudra, 
1982b, chapter 15). 
46 Bardhan and Rudra (1986) noted that 'pexverse' movement is not easily explained 
but suggested that "in most of these cases ties of familiarity, personal connections and 
trust, apart from the related credit nexus, may have been stronger than wage 
differences in influencing the direction of labour movement" (p.106). 
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A related problem stems from the observed within-village 
uniformity of the (task-specific) wage rate for casual labourers of the 
same sex, inspite of their widely-varying abilities which are also well-
known in the village (see section 2.3). In the Arrow-Debreu 
framework, labourers with different productive abilities would be 
treated as different commodities, but then there is no reason to 
expect identical equilibrium prices for these different 
commodities.47 One may also question, in this context, the kind of 
empirical support for competitive wage determination that has 
sometimes been based on estimates of Mincer-type wage equations, 
for instance, by Ryan (1982), Ryan and Wallace (1987). The standard 
approach here is to regress wages (usually, natural logarithm of 
individual wages per period) on a vector of worker attributes. It is 
also common to add a few regressors to capture the effects of 
demand-side factors. The underlying theory is that the (hedonic) 
wage function reflects an equilibrium of supply and demand for labour 
at each level of worker attributes.48 Estimates of such wage equations 
for agricultural labourers in India have sometimes reported certain 
personal attributes to be significant,49 but not always so (see, for 
instance, Rosenzweig, 1984). It is hardly surprising that these 
exercises have found inter-village wage variation to be more 
important. 
47 I thank Ashok Rudra for emphasizing to me the significance of this point. Also see 
Rudra (1984). 
48 See the recent survey article by Willis (1986). 
49 For instance, Ryan (1982) found years of schooling, age (proxy for experience) and 
indicators of physical and nutritional well-being to be important explanatory 
variables in wage equations for male day-labourers in six villages of Andhra Pradesh 
and Maharashtra; these variables were insignificant in female wage equations. Using 
the same data set, Ryan and Wallace (1987) reestimated the wage equations correcting 
for the sample selectivity bias (discussed by Heckman 1974,1979) resulting from the 
fact that wage rates are observed only for those who worked. They obtained essentially 
the same results, with the exception of schooling which now appeared to have no 
significant effect on either male or female wages. 
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"In all equations it is clear that the village x agricultural year 
dummies are explaining a substantial portion of the variation in wages 
of these participants" .so 
To the limited extent that the estimated wage equations do show 
intra-village wage variation, it is likely that a large part of it is simply 
task-wise variation, and the observed significant coefficients on 
worker attributes mainly reflect features of some employment-
rationing scheme whereby different agricultural tasks get allocated 
among village labourers in different proportions.SI 
A somewhat different empirical approach has been to 
estimate wage equations which are derived (explicitly or otherwise) 
as reduced-form specifications of the competitive market-clearing 
model, but do not necessarily include individual worker 
characteristics among the set of regressors.S2 However, the basic 
point to emphasize about all these wage function studies (both 
Mincer-type and others) is that, at most, they establish a certain 
degree of sensitivity of wages to an exogenous set of supply and 
demand factors. To assert that they also thereby validate the 
competitive (supply-demand) model of wage determination is a non-
sequitur; the reduced-form wage equations of these studies tell us 
absolutely nothing about whether the labour market clears or not. 
Other studies which jointly estimate labour supply and 
demand functions within a simultaneous equation framework scarcely 
do any better. Rosenzweig (1984),S3 for instance, used district level 
SO Ryan (1982), p. 33. The same also noted by Ryan and Wallace (1987). 
Sl That such employment-rationing schemes do infact exist in village situations is, 
perhaps, best exemplified by the widely-observed gender-based division of 
agricultural tasks. See for instance, Gulati (1978), Mencher and Sardamoni (1982), 
Agarwal (1984), Rudra (1982b), Rao (1984), Banerjee (1985), Bhati and Singh (1987) and 
Ryan and Walker (1988). 
S2 See, for instance, Pandey (1973), Papola and Misra (1980) and Lal (1988). 
S3 Also see Rosenzweig (1978). 
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data (of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, and the Census 
of India, 1961) to estimate labour supply and demand functions 
derived from a detailed competitive model of the rural labour market. 
It is claimed that the "empirical results ... were generally consistent 
with this framework" (p. 240). Scanning through the results, one 
finds that the only basis of this claim are the correct 'negative' signs 
on labour-supply variables in the wage equations (estimated 
simultaneously with labour demand equations using full-information 
maximum-likelihood methods). Even here, "the negative supply 
effects of males and children on their respective wages [were] not 
statistically significant" (p. 229). However, the basic shortcoming of 
the exercise (as a test of the supply-demand model) is that the 
estimation framework imposes competitive market clearance rather 
than testing it.54 The issue of unemployment is completely ignored.55 
It can be argued that even the results that Rosenzweig does present 
are vitiated by the measurement error in labour supply variables on 
account of their being axiomatically equated with the observed levels 
of employment. 
Bardhan's (1984) study for West Bengal adopted a more 
unusual approach in proposing the following simultaneous system for 
estimation: 
(1) Ls = Ls (w, X) 
(2) Ld = Ld (w, Z) 
where Ls, Ld, w have their usual meaning, and X and Z are vectors of 
exogenous variables. However, instead of the standard market 
54 It cannot be overemphasized that the distinguishing feature of the competitive 
model is not that labour supply and demand are functions of the wage rate, but that the 
wage rate adjusts more or less rapidly to clear the market. What is indeed subjected to 
some detailed testing in Rosenzweig (1978, 1984) are the properties of neoclassical 
labour supply functions, but that is hardly the same as testing the competitive model 
of the labour market. 
55 This could be justified if it were shown that all unemployment is leisure preference, 
but that is precisely what is assumed in this study. 
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clearing condition (Ls= Ld), Bardhan used the following wage 
equation to close the system 
(3) w = w (u, R) 
u being the weighted average village unemployment rate and R some 
exogenous factors (X, Z and R are not mutually exclusive). Linear 
specifications of Ls and Ld functions were estimated by two-stage 
least squares method, using (3) as the first-stage equation. The 
procedure involves the assumption that the rate of unemployment (u) 
is exogenously determined, which is indeed hard to sustain given 
that unemployment, by definition, is the difference betWeen Ls and 
Ld.56 The obvious conclusion is that the resulting estimates [of (1) 
and (2)] are not free of simultaneity bias. It seems more appropriate 
to treat (1), (2) and (3) together as simultaneous system, rather than 
use (3) as the first-stage equation, as Bardhan does. But if that were 
done, then we would be operating with a very different model of the 
labour market. 
The above discussion highlights the central problem in 
applying the competitive model to agricultural labour markets in 
India, viz., the existence of widespread unemployment. According to 
the NSS, 32nd Round (1977-78) data, agricultural labour households 
had the highest incidence of person-day unemployment in rural areas 
of about 16 percent, accounting for more than 60 percent of the total 
rural unemployed person-days. The person-day unemployment rates 
for males and females (from agricultural labour households) were 
about 15 and 18 percent respectively.57 For rural Gujarat and 
Maharashtra (1972-73, NSS data), Visaria (1981) reported the 
following rates of unemployment58 among casual labourers. 
56 Bardhan hlll1selfnoted this problem (p. 254), but nevertheless chose to proceed 
with the estimation. 
57 See Sundaram and Tendulkar (1985, 1988). Also see Krishnamurthy (1988). 
58 Calculated as the unemployed person-days as percent of person-days in the labour 
force during the reference week. For more details, see Visaria (1981). 
Rural Gujarat 
Rural Maharashtra 
Males 
15.86 
17.37 
Females 
22.08 
21.06 
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Persons 
18.66 
19.27 
Similarly, Sinha (1981) reported the person-day unemployment rates 
among the landless and near-landless in rural India (1972-73, NSS 
data) as below: 
Land ownership class Males 
Landless 1 0.1 
0.01-0.99 acres 12. 7 
Females 
16.0 
18.2 
Persons 
12.5 
14.6 
Comparable village-level evidence59 for Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra is provided in Table 2.4. 
The competitive model reckons with unemployment in 
either of the following two ways, by postulating that (i) the observed 
unemployment is voluntary unemployment, and (ii) the observed 
wage rate is held above the equilibrium wage rate, either on account 
of exogenous constraints such as government legislation60 or because 
the process of wage adjustment (towards its equilibrium value) is not 
instantaneous. As for (i), it seems near-impossible to discuss the issue 
without getting into semantics.61 However, in the context of 
59 Also see Dantwala (1975) who reported similar rates of unemployment for villages 
in Bihar and South Gujarat. 
60 The existence of exogenous constraints, of course, implies that we no longer have a 
perfectly competitive situation. 
61 By voluntary unemployment, economists usually refer to a situation where at the 
obseived levels of employment, the workers are on their supply cuive (Patinkin, 
1956). This may appear clear enough, but the catch is that empirically it is very hard 
to establish conclusively whether the workers are on or off their supply cuive. As 
recently suggested by Solow (1980), the matter might finally have to be decided by "the 
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agricultural labour markets in India, the following considerations 
make the case for involuntary unemployment more credible: (a) 
unemployment among agricultural labourers is both persistent and 
substantial, the rates ranging (as Table 2.4 shows) upto 50 percent in 
Table 2.4: Incidence of Unemployment in Daily Hired Labour Markets 
of Six Villages in Central and South India, 1975-76. 
Village Probability of Involuntary Market Unemploymenta 
Aurepalle 
Dokur 
Shirapur 
Kalman 
Kanzara 
Kinkheda 
Average for all villages 
Peak periods 
Slack periods 
0.29 
0.24 
0.30 
0.08 
0.18 
0.12 
0.19 
0.12 
0.39 
Male 
(0.07)b 
(0.14) 
(0.25) 
(0.06) 
(0.16) 
(0.10) 
(0.14) 
Female 
0.31 
0.18 
0.51 
0.23 
0.23 
0.09 
0.23 
0.11 
0.50 
(0.28) 
(0.17) 
(0.43) 
(0.19) 
(0.21) 
(0.09) 
(0.21) 
a Probability of involuntary market unemployment is defmed as the number of days 
a person was unsuccessful in obtaining wage employment as a proportion of the 
number of days in the period (s)he tried. 
b Figures in parentheses show the unemployment probabilities obtained by including 
days of own-farm work in the denominator. 
SOURCE: Ryan and Ghodke (1984), Tables 9.1, 9.2 and text. 
slack seasons ; (b) with about 60 percent of agricultural labour 
households living below the poverty line (Sundaram and Tendulkar, 
1985), indulgence in voluntary leisure appears a far-fetched 
possibility; and (c) if leisure were being readily substituted for 
income, one would expect it to be reflected in relatively high 
elasticities of supply of labour, yet most estimates show extremely 
apparent evidence of one's senses" that "what looks like involuntary unemployment 
is involuntary unemployment". Also see, Standing (1981). 
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low figures. 62 
As for (ii), one can straightaway rule out any wage rigidity 
due to the operation of minimum wage laws. While such laws have 
been enacted and periodically revised by most state governments in 
India, they have been grossly flouted throughout the country.63 
However, the possibility of sluggish adjustment of wages toward 
market-clearing equilibrium cannot be readily dismissed. 64 But given 
the persistence of unemployment, this is, in a (non-trivial) sense, 
only a restatement of the essential problem, which is to explain why 
wages are not observed to move quickly to clear the labour market. 
2.6 Interlinked Markets Theory 
It has been frequently emphasized that rural labour markets 
in India (and elsewhere in the developing world) are interlinked. 65 
The phenomenon usually referred to involves multiplex contractual 
arrangements where the terms and conditions of exchange in two or 
more resources are simultaneously negotiated. In particular, it has 
been argued that transactions in the labour market are thus linked 
with those in the land or credit markets. An important instance of 
the former being the institution of sharecropping, which despite the 
general decline of tenancy in India since the 1950s, is still significant 
62 See, for instance, Bardhan (1979b, 1984a,b) . Bardhan (1984a) indeed offers the 
conclusion that " market agricultural supply seems to be primarily determined by 
other economic, social and demographic constraints, and not by the wage rate. The 
labour supply function looks more like a vertical like than the horizontal one 
commonly assumed in the development literature" (p.28). 
63 Reports documenting this are numerous. To mention a single source, see The 
Economic and Political Weekly, various issues over the last few years. 
64 Ravallion (1987, chapter 5) analyses agricultural wages in Bangladesh on these 
lines. 
65 See, for instance, Bhaduri (1973, 1977), Bharadwaj (1974, 1985), Bardhan (1980), 
Islam and Rahman (1985) and Hart (1986b). 
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in many parts of the country (see Bhalla, 1983; Rudra 1982b; and 
Omvedt, 1983). However, more pertinent66 in the present context is 
the labour-credit linkage, which often takes the form of employers 
giving wage advances to labourers that are repaid, with or without 
interest, through wage deductions later. 
The theoretical literature on the subject draws out several 
implications of interlinked transactions. Thus, for the labour-credit 
case, it is shown that interlinkage may explain inter-village 
differences67 in both wage and interest rates, while also accounting 
for the village-level isolation of the labour market (see Basu, 1983). It 
is also shown that interlinkage can be an effective means of 
countervailing conventional or other bounds on prices in any single 
market. 
However, the empirical significance of labour-credit 
interlinkage appears to be limited for casual agricultural labour 
markets in India, 68 though there are some regional variations. 
66 It can be argued that the sharecroppers are perhaps best studied as an analytical 
category distinct from agricultural labourers. The forces governing sharecropping and 
wage labour contracts may be quite different is (at least partly) suggested by the fact 
that while broadly uniform wage rates apply to all village labourers (with the usual 
qualification of same gender and task), terms and conditions of sharecropping often 
differ for the same crop in the same village. See Bardhan and Rudra ( 1980) and Jodha 
(1984). 
67 By allowing for heterogeneity among labourers, the formal models are easily 
adapted to explain intra-village variations as well. Most versions of these models, 
however, preseive a certain 'utility equivalence' of the joint wage-interest contracts. 
68 The phenomenon is important for attached labourers, current consumption credit 
often being the basis of attachment (see Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Rudra, 1982b). For 
some villages in India's semi-arid tropics, Binswanger et. aL (1984) reported that 
labour-credit links are limited to regular farm seivant contracts. However, the 
attached or regular farm labourers are only a small proportion of all agricultural 
labourers. See section 2.3. 
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Bardhan and Rudra's (1978) survey of villages in Eastern India for 
1975-76 reported the following: 
West Bengal 
Bihar 
East UP 
East India 
Percentage of Casual Labourers 
taking advance against working at lower than 
future commitment of labour market wage for repayment 
68 60 
33 
5.3 
41 
16 
5.3 
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From the above, it appears that labour-credit linkage is significant in 
West Bengal, where it has been noted to exist in the particular 
institutional form of the dad.an system. Yet, another survey by Bardhan 
and Rudra (1981) of the same set of villages in West Bengal during 
1979 (also using the same sample design) reported different results: 
Semi-attached labourers69 
Casual labourers with land 
Casual labourers without land 
Number of Respondents 
In the 
sample 
67 
109 
109 
Who have taken Who report that 
loan against loan will be repaid 
commitment of by labour at 
labour lower than market wage 
44 
6 
27 
20 
4 
12 
Even if semi-attached labourers are included among casual labourers, 
these latter figures imply a much lower incidence of labour-credit 
linkage in West Bengal. It is not obvious how the two sets of figures 
can be reconciled. 70 In any case, it is worth noting that (i) there exist 
significant variations even within West Bengal (see Rudra, 1982a, 
chapter 10), and (ii) even where a significant proportion of labourers 
69 A labourer was defmed as semi-attached if (a) he had or was expected to have some 
continuity of association with a particular employer (or employers), (b) the contract 
duration was more than just a few days, and (c) had the freedom to work for other 
employers for the major part of the year. See Bardhan and Rudra (1981), p. 98. 
70 It may well be that the former set of figures (for 1975-76) actually refer to what have 
been termed semi-attached labourers in the latter survey (for 1979). 
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take loans from their employers, the principal occupation of 
employers in most cases is self-cultivation (with hired labour) rather 
than moneylending (Bardhan and Rudra, 1978). 
A somewhat stronger indication of the limited significance 
of labour-credit linkage is provided by the evidence summarized in 
Table 2.5, which shows that employers are a relatively minor source 
of credit for agricultural labourers in most parts of India. Only in 3 of 
the 20 states, do employers account for more than one-fifth of the 
average debt per indebted agricultural labour household. 
Furthermore, over the ten year period, from 1964-65 to 1974-75, 
even as the percentage of indebted households increased from 60.6 
to 66.4, and the average debt per indebted household more than 
doubled (in nominal terms), the share of this debt raised from 
employers has rapidly declined in most states. Of course, since 
labourers' indebtedness to employers does not necessarily imply 
labour-credit interlinkage, the latter phenomenon would account for 
even smaller proportions of agricultural labourers' debt than those 
reported in Table 2.5. 
On the theoretical side, it needs to be realized that the idea 
of interlinkage does not itself constitute a complete theory of wage 
determination in the sense that interlinkage models determine 
wages and other 'interlinked' prices by way of introducing a 
primitive, viz., the reservation utility of workers, where the latter 
itself (viewed as some kind of a composite price) could be 
determined in a number of analytically distinct ways: within a 
competitive market-clearance or an efficiency-wage framework, or by 
reference to some subsistence norms (see Braverman and Stiglitz, 
1982). The notion that transactions are interlinked does not give us 
any clues as to which of these analytical constructs is more 
appropriate in a given context. 
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Table 2.5: Loans From Employers as a Proportion of Average Debt per 
Indebted Agricultural Labour Household. 
{~ercent) 
State 1964-65 1974-75 
Punjab 24.0 29.5 
Gujarat 16.3 20.3 
Madhya Pradesh 25.2 20.1 
West Bengal 34.3 15.0 
Harayana * 14.6 
Rajasthan 14.5 13.9 
Bihar 33.5 12.3 
Meghalaya ** 11.2 
Uttar Pradesh 17.5 10.2 
Himachal Pradesh na 9.5 
Karnataka 7.1 6.9 
Tamil Nadu 12.9 6.3 
Kerala 7.1 5.9 
Assam 1.7 5.7 
Andhra Pradesh 20.4 5.6 
Maharashtra 12.0 4.7 
Orissa 21.9 3.3 
Manipur na 1.7 
Tripura 0.8 1.0 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.4 0.6 
All India 19. 7 10.1 
* included under Punjab. 
** included under Assam. 
na not available. 
SOURCE: Final Report on Indebtedness Among Rural Labour Households, 
Rural Labour Enquiry, 1974-75. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
It may be instructive, at this stage, to briefly recount the key 
features of agricultural labour markets in India which have been the 
main planks of the foregoing critique of various labour market and 
wage theories. 
1. Casual (daily-rated) labour is by far the most common 
form of agricultural wage labour in India. Over the last two decades or 
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so, there has been a significant trend towards increasing casualization 
of wage labour. 
2. The spatial domain of the agricultural labour market is 
essentially the village. Intra-rural movement of labour is mostly such 
as reinforces rather than mitigates village isolation. 
3. Within the village, their is a striking uniformity of the 
agricultural wage rate (for a given operation) for casual labourers of 
the same sex inspite of well-known differences in their productive 
abilities. 
4. There exists considerable spatial and temporal variation 
of agricultural wages, a large part of which seems attributable to 
parametric shifts in labour demand or supply functions. 
5. The village market for (casual) agricultural labour is 
typically characterized by conditions of excess supply. Involuntary 
unemployment among agricultural labourers is both persistent and 
high. 
6. Inspite of unemployment, labourers are rarely observed to 
undercut wages. 
7. Some regional exceptions apart, the incidence of 
interlinked transactions in labour and credit (at least for casual labour 
contracts) is quite limited in India. 
To the extent the above-stated features are taken seriously, 
the need for an alternative theory of agricultural wage formation in 
India cannot be ignored. It is notable here that feature (1) above 
strongly suggests that the wage formation process may be largely 
village-specific. Features (3) and (6), in addition, indicate that the 
forces governing the village wage rate are of a collective rather than 
individualistic nature. In this context, a theoretical approach which 
deserves much closer attention is that of collective wage bargaining. 
It is striking that a number of researchers have concluded their 
studies with remarks alluding to this approach without formally 
proposing it.71 A notable example is Rudra (1984): 
71 The only exception to this, to my knowledge, is the recent paper by Osmani (1988). 
This work is further discussed in chapter 3. 
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In our view the process [of wage formation in Indian villages] has to 
be understood in terms of countervailing power of the labourers 
exercised over the property owners... Even when labourers are not 
organized in unions they have a sense of community and an 
understanding of collective self-interest which is an integral part of 
the ethos of the village society. (pp. 264-265)72 
The principal reason for the relative neglect of collective 
bargaining models seems to be the general absence of formal unions 
of employers or employees in the present setting. Nevertheless, 
there are several theoretical and empirical considerations which 
suggest that quasi-cooperative forms of behaviour can, and often do, 
emerge in typical village labour market situations. This issue is the 
main theme of the next chapter. 
72 Similar considerations have been articulated, among others, by Bardhan (1978), 
Bliss and Stern (1982, p. 301), Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984, p. 36). 
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CHAPTERS 
Village-Level Markets for Agricultural Labour and Tacit Collective 
Wage Bargaining 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 concluded by putting together (section 2. 7) an 
inventory of the features of agricultural labour markets in India 
which, it was argued in sections 2.2-2.6, individually or severally 
called into question the contextual validity of extant theories of 
agrarian wage determination. An alternative perspective of a 
collectively-bargained wage rate was also briefly suggested. In the 
present chapter, this perspective is developed at greater length. 
The chapter also introduces the particular area of the 
present study, namely, ten villages in India's semi-arid tropics. These 
villages, located in central, south and west India, define the 
immediate empirical focus of the current research. I An important 
reason for focussing research at the level of the village is simply that 
many of the key features of agricultural labour markets in India (such 
as intra-village uniformity of the wage rate) can only be studied at this 
level. 
Given the centrality of the forestated features (vide section 
2. 7) to the suggested perspective of collective bargaining, I first 
examine the extent to which these features also obtain in the 
agricultural labour markets of the ten study villages. This is done in 
section 3.3-3.6. (Section 3.2 gives a brief introduction to the study 
villages.) The rest of the chapter (sections 3. 7-3.9) deals with the 
implications of these (stylized) features for a collective-bargaining 
1 My reasons for selecting this area of study, which mainly have to do with the 
availability of a detailed village-level data set collected by the International Crop 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). Hyderabad, are stated in 
chapter 1. 
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interpretation of the agrarian wage formation process in India. My 
observations (in sections 3.3-3.6) are based on both an analysis of the 
data pertaining to the study villages collected by ICRISAT, as well as 
an informal field survey that I undertook in the two Madhya Pradesh 
villages (Papda and Rampura Kalan) during March 1987. 
3.2 The Study Villages 
The ten study villages are located in five districts of four 
different states in India: Aurepalle and Dokur in Mahbubnagar district 
of Andhra Pradesh, Shirapur and Kalman in Sholapur district of 
Maharashtra, Kanzara and Kinkheda in Akola district of Maharashtra, 
Boriya and Rampura in Sabarkantha district of Gujarat, and Papda and 
Rampura Kalan in Raisen district of Madhya Pradesh. The five 
districts represent distinct agroeconomic zones in the semi-arid 
tropics in India. Some general characteristics of the villages are 
summarized in Table 3.1. 
It is worth noting the following: (i) Relatively assured rainfall 
conditions obtain only in the Akola and Raisen villages. The Sholapur 
villages are particularly drought-prone. (ii) The extent of irrigation is 
quite limited in these villages, the only important exception being 
Dokur, though Rampura in Sabarkantha district and Aurepalle in 
Mahbubnagar also have moderate amounts of irrigation facilities.2 
(iii) Soil conditions are relatively poorer in the Mahbubnagar (shallow 
soils) and Sabarkantha (sandy soils) villages. (iv) The incidence of 
double-cropping is very limited. Only in the Gujarat villages is 
one-fifth or more of the net sown area double-cropped. Kharif 
(rainy-season) fallowing is a common practice in the Sholapur and 
Raisen villages.3 
2 Except the Mahbubnagar villages, where there is also some irrigation from tanks, in 
all the other villages whatever irrigation that does exist is entirely based on wells. 
3 For further details on these villages, see Jodha, Asokan and Ryan (1977), Singh and 
Singh (1982), Bhende (1983), Kshirsagar (1983) and Singh, Jain and Rao (1984). 
Table 3.1: Some General Characteristics of the Study Villages 
State 
District 
Village 
Populationa 
No. of householdsa 
Labour households (as% of all households)b 
Avg. size of operational holding (ha)c 
Annual rainfall (mm)d 
Irrigated area (as% of gross cropped area)e 
Cropping intensitye.f 
Important crops 
Andhra Pradesh 
( Mahbubnagar) 
Aurepalle 
2711 
476 
30.7 
5.6 
682 
21 
114 
sorghum, 
castor, 
pearl 
millet, 
paddy, 
pigeonpea. 
Dokur 
1783 
313 
24.3 
3.7 
762 
60 
113 
paddy, 
ground-
nut, 
castor, 
pigeonpea, 
sorghum. 
Maharashtra 
(Sholapur) 
Shirapur Kalman 
1615 2368 
'297 423 
32.7 36.9 
6.5 8.5 
597 569 
11 10 
114 108 
rabi rabi 
sorghum, sorghum, 
pigeonpea, wheat, 
wheat, pigeonpea, 
minor minor 
pulses, pulses, 
chickpea. chickpea. 
Maharashtra 
(A kola) 
Kanzara 
930 
169 
32.0 
6.5 
995 
4 
103 
cotton, 
sorghum, 
mungbean, 
groundnut, 
wheat. 
Kinkheda 
687 
143 
38.5 
6.7 
946 
3 
106 
cotton, 
sorghum, 
mungbean, 
wheat, 
groundnut. 
Gujarat 
(Sabarkantha) 
Boriya 
1630 
178 
36.0 
1.6 
739 
13 
120 
pearl 
millet, 
castor, 
paddy. 
Rampura 
1090 
1'29 
31.0 
3.9 
739 
38 
146 
groundnut, 
pearl 
millet, 
castor, 
wheat. 
Madhya Pradesh 
(Raisen) 
Papda 
611 
108 
36.1 
5.4 
1430 
2 
101 
chickpea, 
lentil, 
wheat, 
linseed. 
Rampura Kalan 
1069 
172 
26.7 
5.1 
1430 
0 
108 
wheat, 
chickpea, 
lentil, 
linseed, 
pigeon pea, 
paddy. 
a Based on village-wide census for the following years: 1975 for the Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra villages: 1980 for the Gujarat villages: and 
1981 for the Madhya Pradesh villages. 
b Labour households are defined as those operating below 0.2 hectares of land and depending on wage labour as their main source of income. The 
figures are based on village census and relate to the same years as in note a. 
C Operational holding is defmed as (owned area)+ (area leased in) - (area leased out). The figures are based on a sample of 30 cultivator households in 
each village and relate to the following years: average for 1975-76 to 1977-78 for Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra villages; 1980-81 for Gujarat 
villages: and 1981-82 for Madhya Pradesh villages. 
d The figures pertain to the following years: 1976 for Andhra Pradesh villages, average for 1976-80 for Maharashtra villages, average for 1972-7 4 for 
Gujarat villages (at Prantij taluka level). and 1981 for Madhya Pradesh villages (at Gairatganj taluka level). 
e Based on the same sample and for the same years as in note c. 
f Cropping intensity is defined as (gross cropped area/net sown area) x 100. 
SOURCE: Compiled from Jodha, Asokan and Ryan (1977), Jodha (1980), Singh and Singh (1982), Bhende (1983), Kshirsagar (1983), 
Singh, Jain and Rao (1984). 
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The proportion of labour households (defined as those 
operating below 0.2 hectares of land and depending on wage labour 
as their main occupation) in the study villages ranges between 24 
percent in Dokur to over 38 percent in Kinkheda. A considerably 
larger proportion of households in these villages depend on wage 
labour as their first or second source of income. The percentages for 
different villages were as follows4: 
Aurepalle (1975) 43.4 Kinkheda (1975) 
Dokur (1975) 45.8 Boriya ( 1980) 
Shirapur (1975) 67.9 Rampura (1980) 
Kalman (1975) 58.6 Papda (1981) 
Kanzara (1975) 59.4 Rampura Kalan (1981) 
The importance of labour market outcomes for the village 
distribution of income is obvious. It should be noted that these 
villages are marked by a high incidence of absolute poverty. 
67.1 
38.1 
44.2 
63.0 
59.9 
According to the estimates of Singh, Asokan and Walker (1982). 
about three-fourths of the households in the Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra villages were below the poverty line (of Rs. 15 per capita 
monthly expenditure at 1960-61 prices) in terms of their average 
consumption during 1975-76 to 1977-78. This may be compared 
with the national rural poverty ratio (based on the same poverty line) 
of about 40 percent in 1977-78 (Ahluwalia, 1985). 
The ICRISAT data set for these villages5 relates to a sample 
of 40 households from each village, consisting of 10 labour 
households and 30 cultivator households. For labour households, a 
random selection was made amongst those who operated less than 
0.2 hectares of land and hired out as labourers as their main 
occupation and source of income. In the case of cultivator households 
(operating more than 0.2 hectares), they were first equally divided 
4 Based on census (covering all households) in each village for the year indicated in 
parenthesis. 
5 Apart from a household census undertaken at the beginning of the study period in 
each village. See note 4 above. 
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into three landsize strata, viz., small, medium and large farm groups. 
Then from each group, 10 households were randomly selected. The 
procedure implies equal sampling fractions for each size group of 
cultivator households. 6 
3.3 Significance of the Casual Labour Market 
Table 3.2 shows the average composition of annual farm 
labour use in the ten study villages, based on a sample of 30 (small, 
medium and large) cultivator households in each village. Two main 
categories of hired agricultural labourers were distinguished: regular 
farm labourers and casual labourers. The regular farm labourers refer 
to those hired on a monthly or longer term basis; others hired for 
Table 3.2: Average Composition of Annual (Hours of) Farm 
Labour Use 
Village Average for the perioda Percentage share of 
hired labour in casual labour 
total labour used in hired labour 
Aurepalle 1981-82 to 1984-85 66.1 74.1 
Dokur 1983-84 68.5 1 oo.ob 
Shirapur 1981-82 to 1984-85 36.9 95.4 
Kalman 1983-84 51.4 89.7 
Kanzara 1981-82 to 1984-85 68.9 83.9 
Kinkheda 1983-84 79.0 87.5 
Boriya 1981-82 to 1984-85 22.3 96.9 
Rampura 1981-82 to 1984-85 57.1 83.5 
Papda 1981-82 to 1984-85 25.8 75.2 
Ram:Qura Kalan 1981-82 to 1984-85 43.8 68.3 
a Simple averages of percentage shares for the years indicated. 
b In Dokur, the regular farm labour market has been virtually eliminated by the 
possibilities of temporary migration to work on government projects. The temporary 
migration is organized through an extensive system of labour subcontractors in the 
Dokur area. 
6 The sampling fractions and farm size classifications for cultivator households in 
the ten villages are given in appendix Tables 3A. l and 3A.2 respectively. 
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shorter periods, usually a single day, are termed casual. Thus, while 
the category of 'casual labour' mostly refers to wage work by 
daily-rated labourers, it also presently includes piece-rated 
contractual work common for harvesting and post-harvesting 
operations. 
The main (and obvious) inference to be drawn from Table 
3.2 (which parallels the evidence presented in Table 2.2) is that 
casual labour is the predominant mode of hired (agricultural) labour 
use in these villages. It is remarkable that the proportion of casual 
labour in total hired labour is very high in all the villages inspite of 
significant inter-village differences in the relative use of family and 
hired farm labour. 
Given the overwhelming importance of the casual labour 
form, a study of agricultural labour in this setting must, of necessity, 
be predominantly a study of casual agricultural labour. Henceforth, 
the latter will be taken to define the 'universe of discourse' of the 
present study. 
3.4 Incidence of Involuntary Market Unemployment 
An attempt is made to quantify the extent of involuntary 
market unemployment 7 among casual labourers in the ten study 
villages. The labour utilization data used for this purpose were 
collected by ICRISAT investigators at 2-4 weeks' intervals from 40 
sample households in each village over a number of years. In order to 
focus on unemployment among casual labourers, the unemployment 
7 The term market is used to indicate that unemployment is measured with respect to 
the labour market only, i.e. the unemployment rates refer to the number of days wage 
employment was not available as a proportion of the number of days such wage 
employment was sought. Thus, the days worked on own farm by a labourer (when wage 
employment was not sought) are not included in the denominator. 
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rates (as reported in Table 3.3) are calculated for the members of 20 
labour and small farm households only.8 
Table 3.3: Incidence of Involuntary Market Unemployment Among 
Labour and Small Farm Households 
{Figures in eercent) 
Village Average for the Rates of involuntaQ! market unemglo~mentb 
eerioda Total Male Female 
Aurepalle 1975-76 to 1984-85 25.5 20.7 27.0 
Dokur 1975-76 to 1976-77 12.2 12.3 12.1 
Shirapur 1975-76 to 1984-85 20.0 16.4 25.2 
Kalman 1975-76 to 1976-77 16.1 10.2 23.7 
Kanzara 1975-76 to 1984-85 17.0 15.2 18.7 
Kinkheda 1975-76 to 1976-77 7.1 7.1 6.9 
Boriya 1980-81 to 1984-85 20.9 17.3 41.8 
Rampura 1980-81 to 1984-85 23.8 21.7 29.2 
Papda 1981-82 to 1984-85 9.2 8.1 12.0 
Rampura Kalan 1981-82 to 1984-85 7.6 7.8 7.5 
Simple average for all villages 15.9 13. 7 20.4 
a Simple averages of unemployment rates for the years mentioned. 
b Involuntary unemployment includes days spent on gathering and processing (for 
own consumption or sale) of dung, neem seeds, food/fruit or firewood. 
The measurement of involuntary unemployment being a 
generally contested issue, it is worth spelling out the data collection 
procedure used by ICRISAT and the notion of involuntary 
unemployment adopted therein. In each round, data were collected 
on days of wage employment (both farm and nonfarm9) and days of 
involuntary unemployment for each member of the sample 
households who participated in the labour market. Separate 
8 Wage labour is an important source of income for small farm households. Together 
with the labour households, they provide the bulk of labour supply in these villages. 
Also see section 3.2 for figures on the proportion of village households with wage 
labour as the first or second source of income. 
9 Nonfarm wage employment includes wage work for private nonfarm employers as 
well as on public projects. 
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questions were asked for wage employment and involuntary 
unemployment. The information on involuntary unemployment was 
based on responses to the following question: 
On how many days since the last visit (interview) did you try to find a 
job and failed to find one at the usual wage rates during this season? 
(ICRISAT, 1987). 
The ICRISAT manual further explains 
If such a person after failing to get a job goes back to his/her field 
and tries to do some of his/her own work, he/she is still treated as 
involuntarily unemployed. For example, a person tries to get a day's 
employment with some landlord or at rural worksite but fails to get 
it. As he/she is unemployed (against his/her wish) he/she tries to 
keep himself/herself busy with some other work (e.g. mending the 
fence or doing some nonessential activity in his farm or at his house). 
This work would not have been done had he/she got the job, or it 
would have been done in non-working hours or on another day. Thus, 
for all practical purposes, he/she is involuntarily unemployed. 
It is this notion of involuntary unemployment that underlies the 
unemployment rates reported in Table 3.3. The involuntary market 
unemployment rate for any village during any given year was 
calculated as 
LU x 100 
L (E + U) 
where U= total days of involuntary unemployment for a respondent 
during the given year, 
E= total days of wage employment (both farm and nonfarm) 
for a respondent during the given year, and the summation 
is over all working members of the sample households in 
the village. 
The figures in Table 3.3 strongly underline the failure of the 
village labour markets to clear as manifest in the high (though 
varying) rates of unemployment in the ten villages. Market 
unemployment rates are upwards of 10 percent in seven of the ten 
villages, being 20 percent or more in four of them. These 
unemployment rates are comparable with those reported in section 
2.5 above. Involuntary unemployment is generally more acute for 
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female labourers.10 The main message of Table 3.4, which reports 
unemployment rates for different years, is that unemployment is not 
an occasional bad-year phenomenon. Even as the annual rates of 
unemployment fluctuate a fair deal in these villages, high rates 
eventuate far too frequently to be considered isolated one-off 
occurrences. 
Table 3.4: Rates of Involuntary Market Unemployment Among Labour 
and Small Farm Households in Different Years 
{Figures in ~ercent) 
Village 1975-76 76-77 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Aurepalle 32.1 25.7 26.7 38.8 21.7 25.3 18.4 22.3 24.9 19.3 
Dokur 12.3 12.1 
Shirapur 34.8 32.2 19.1 9.6 7.3 22.6 31.5 '21.7 11.4 3.3 
Kalman 24.0 8.3 
Kanzara 24.0 15.9 22.3 13.9 27.3 20.4 15.9 8.6 7.9 14.1 
Kinkheda 5.1 9.1 
Boriya 29.0 23.6 13.2 16.7 21.8 
Rampura 29.6 '21.9 25.5 19.0 16.7 
Papda 18.6 5.3 8.8 4.0 
Ram~ura Kalan 11.0 7.4 6.0 5.8 
3.5 Intra-village Uniformity of the Wage Rate 
As noted in chapter 2 (section 2.3), a number of researchers 
have observed this phenomenon in different parts of India. It refers 
to the situation where within a village, for a given season and/or 
operation, a nearly unifonn wage rate applies to all casual labourers of 
the same sex. In other words, nearly all of the intra-village wage 
variation is on account of seasonal, task- or sex-wise variation; 
differences in individual worker attributes, despite their being 
well-known within the village, have little or no bearing on wages 
received by individual workers. 
10 Also noted by Ryan and Ghodke (1984). Also see section 2.5 above. 
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This phenomenon is examined at some length for the ten 
study villages. A qualificatory comment may be made at the outset. 
While wage uniformity refers to similar time-rates of payment to 
hired labourers, some operations, particularly harvesting and 
post-harvesting operations, are often paid on a piece-rate basis.11 For 
these operations, the same piece-rate may well imply different wages 
per unit of time for different labourers. Hence, a distinction will be 
made between the pre-harvesting operations and harvesting and 
post-harvesting operations.12 The notion of daily or hourly wage 
uniformity is more meaningful for the pre-harvesting operations 
which are mostly time-rated. 
The data used to examine this issue cover the sample of 30 
small, medium and large households (10 from each group) in each 
village. For all hirings of labour during the crop year by a farm 
household, the data provide information on (i) the type of labour, viz., 
male or female hired labour, (ii) the crop season, viz., kharif (rainy) 
or rabi (post-rainy) season, (iii) the agricultural operation for which 
labour was hired, (iv) the hours of employment, and (v) the wages 
paid. 
The following methodology was used: 
(1) For each season-sex-operation category, total hours of 
employment contracted at wage rates within a ± 10% interval of the 
modal wage rate13 were calculated. 
(2) For male and female hired labour separately, the modal 
hours (calculated in the first step) were summed over pre-harvesting 
operations in both the kharif and rabi seasons, and expressed as 
11 For instance, payment for harvesting frequently takes the form of a share of 
harvested output. In the two Madhya Pradesh villages, I found it was common for 
labourers to receive one of every twenty 'bundles' of wheat they harvested. 
12 Though this is not exactly coterrninus with the distinction between time and piece-
rated operations. 
13 Defined as the (hourly) wage rate accounting for the maximum hours of hired 
labour in the given category. 
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percentage of total employment for those operations in the two crop 
seasons. (The same was also done for harvesting and post-harvesting 
operations.) The percentages thus obtained may, for brevity (though 
with a minor abuse of terminology), be called modal percentages. 
(3) For any village, a simple average of modal percentages 
for different years was obtained. 
The resulting figures, reported in Table 3.5, indicate the 
degree of intra-village uniformity of the wage rate for pre-harvesting 
(and other) operations for male and female hired labour. The first 
column of figures reports the share of pre-harvesting operations in 
total wage employment which ranges between about one-third and 
two-thirds14, the simple average for all villages being nearly one-half. 
Thus, far from being insignificant, pre-harvesting operations account 
for nearly as much of total hired labour use as the harvesting and 
post-harvesting operations. 
With the exception of Kinkheda and female hired labour in 
Dokur, the degree of intra-village wage uniformity for pre-harvesting 
operations is quite impressive: some 60-90 percent of employment is 
contracted at wages within a close neighbourhood of the modal wage 
rates. Even including Dokur and Kinkheda, the overall proportion of 
employment at nearly uniform wages (i.e. within 10% of the 
respective modal wages) for the ten villages is 78 percent for male 
and 70 percent for female hired labour (last row of Table 3.5). 
A closer look at the underlying wage-employment 
distributions for Kinkheda and Dokur (females) suggests that the 
procedure currently used for determining wage uniformity infact 
understates the degree of such uniformity. This has to do with the 
bimodal nature of wage distributions for some operations, where the 
larger-frequency modal wage is more than 10 percent away from 
(higher or lower than) the smaller-frequency modal wage. Yet in most 
such cases, one can find an observed wage rate (itself not a mode) 
14 An important determinant of this share is the cropping pattern. For instance, the 
high shares for the Akola villages (Kanzara and Kinkheda) reflect high labour 
requirements of hoeing, weeding and thinning for the cotton crop. 
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Table 3.5: Within-village Uniformity of the Hourly Wage Rate for 
Pre-harvest (and Harvest and Post-harvest) Operations 
{Figures in ~ercent~ 
Share of pre-harvest Proportion of hired labour for 
operations in pre-harvest operations within 
Village Average for total hired th~ mQdal wag~+ 1 Q0!Q 
the ~earsa labour use Male Female 
Aurepalle 1978-79to1984-85 48.0 76.3 63.1 
(64.1 )b (58.5) 
Dokur 1978-79, 1979-80, 1983-84 51.6 89.2 45.4 
(47.3) (54.1) 
Shirapur 1978-79 to 1984-85 40.3 78.0 80.4 
(43.0) (43.6) 
Kalman 1978-79, 1979-80, 1983-84 37.4 69.7 70.8 
(37.1) (38.0) 
Kanzara 1978-79to1984-85 59.6 61.8 62.7 
(50.8) (47.4) 
Kinkheda 1978-79, 1979-80, 1983-84 65.6 55.5 54.9 
(53.5) (51.1) 
Boriya 1980-81 to 1984-85 59.9 87.3 86.4 
(68.2) (67.9) 
Rampura 1980-81 to 1984-85 54.1 82.1 84.4 
(73.4) (70.5) 
Papda 1981-82 to 1984-85 35.8 89.4 66.2 
(66.8) (61.5) 
Rampura Kalan 1981-82 to 1984-85 32.6 92.1 86.4 
(57.5) (43.2) 
Simple average for all villages 48.5 78.l 70.1 
(56.2) (53.6) 
a Simple average of percentages for the years mentioned. 
b Figures in parenthesis show the corresponding average modal percentages for 
harvesting and post-haivesting operations. 
lying between the two modes such that a ± 10 % interval around it 
would include both the modes. It seems reasonable to argue that such 
a wage rate provides a better reference point in these situations for 
the calculation of modal percentages. When evaluated on this basis, 
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the modal percentages would be even higher than the figures 
reported in Table 3.5. 
As may have been expected, the degree of time-wage 
uniformity for harvesting and post-harvesting operations is less than 
that for pre-harvesting operations. It is, nevertheless, notable that 
even for the former group of operations, modal percentages are often 
fairly high: more than 50 percent in 7 villages for male hired labour, 
in 6 villages for female hired labour. The simple average for all 
villages being 56 and 53 percent for males and females respectively. 
3.5.1 Operation- and Sex-specific Wage Functions 
The phenomenon of intra-village uniformity of the wage rate 
is further evidenced by the estimates of operation- and sex-specific 
wage equations reported in Appendix 3B. If the evidence presented 
above shows that for a given village, season, operation there is very 
little variation of the wage rate among casual labourers of the same 
sex, the wage functions estimated separately for individual 
agricultural operations suggest that of the small amount of 
inter-worker wage variation that does exist in these villages, very 
little is attributable to differences in the worker characteristics, such 
as age, years of schooling, main occupation and landholding class. 
Only in 7 of the 20 wage equations for male labourers and 6 of the 45 
wage equations for female labourers is the hypothesis that all 
parameters except the intercept are zero, rejected at the 5 percent 
level of significance. In other words, in 80 percent of the cases, the 
overall relation between wages and worker attributes is statistically 
insignificant.15 
To be sure, there may be some omitted worker 
characteristics, notably those relating to nutritional and health 
status.16 These characteristics have not always been found to be 
15 See Appendix 3B and Tables 3B. l and 3B.2 for further details. 
16 These characteristics were not included in the wage equations because of non-
availability of data on the relevant variables. 
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significant in wage equations estimated for the some of the study 
villages. For instance, Ryan and Wallace (1987) found a weight-for-age 
variable to be significant in the male wage function, but insignificant 
in the female wage function. Similarly, Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1986) included calorie intake and weight-for-height index as 
explanatory variables in male and female wage equations, but found 
only weight-for-height to be significant for males, while both variables 
were found insignificant for females.17 In any case, it should be noted 
that both these studies estimate wage functions for all agricultural 
operations and pool data across villages. Hence, the relevance of their 
results for examining intra-village uniformity of the wage rate for a 
given operation and sex seems rather limited. 
3.6 Domain of the Labour Market and the Absence of Undercutting 
An informal survey was undertaken in Papda and Rampura 
Kalan villages of Madhya Pradesh 18 focussing on the two issues of 
(i) the spatial domain of agricultural labour market, and (ii) the 
incidence of wage-undercutting (by the labourers) and wage-
overbidding (by the employers). Information was collected through 
discussions with both the labourers and employers in the two villages. 
I initially planned a more or less formal questionnaire for 
the survey (reported in Appendix 3C). However, once in the villages I 
found it very hard (as also unproductive) to closely follow the 
structured format of the questionnaire. Eventually, the questions 
listed in this questionnaire did provide an essential backdrop to all 
discussions, though all questions were not always posed to everyone 
and sometimes additional inquiries naturally arose from a particular 
l7 Also see section 2.3 for further discussion of Behrman and Deolalikar's study. 
18 The Madhya Pradesh villages were chosen for this smvey mainly because of my 
familiarity with the Hindi language spoken in these villages. 
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discussion. The following is a summary account of the main findings 
for the two villages.19 
3. 6.1 Rampura Kalan: 
Most employers said that they do not employ labour from 
outside the village, not even at peak harvest time.20 When asked why, 
most of them replied that there was no need as there was enough 
labour available within the village. At least periodic surplus of labour 
was also indicated by the labourers who said they could be 
unemployed for a week or a month during some parts of the year. 
The labourers, on their part, reported that they do not 
generally go out to nearby villages for farm work. Occasionally, 
however, they do take up well-digging work in nearby areas or work 
on public projects21 like road construction, depending upon the 
availability of such work. 
Both the labourers and employers were emphatic that the 
same wage rate applies to everyone (i.e. all labourers of the same sex). 
though the rate itself could be a daily wage rate or a piece-rate as 
applying to a large part of harvesting work. Regarding the incidence 
of wage undercutting or overbidding,22 the almost universal response 
was that it does happen but rarely, and only in situations where a 
labourer or an employer is in desperate need. These relatively rare 
19 Even though the findings for the two villages are quite similar in many respects, I 
prefer to give separate accounts below (at the cost of some repetition) mainly with a 
view to retaining as far as possible the original flavor of the discussions. 
20 Though some labourers and one employer pointed out that occasionally in the past 
few years, some labourers from outside the village have come to the village for work at 
harvest time. 
21 Though often hired through private contractors. 
22 Inquiries on this were phrased as questions 6(a) and 6(b) of Appendix 3C, though in 
both villages they often had to be further elaborated to get the basic idea across. 
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departures from the ruling wage rate also had no effect on the ruling 
wage itself. 
When asked about the wage formation process, the initial 
response was often that whatever rate gets established in the village, 
it continues to prevail and everyone abides by it. When pressed 
further about how the wage changes take place,23 one large employer 
said it begins with the labourers complaining about higher prices. 
This acts as some kind of pressure on employers to raise wages. The 
labourers clearly stated that wage changes take place collectively, 
through mutual consultation among the important landowners. Even 
employers acknowledged that the wage rates get set in consultation 
with one another, though they denied that big farmers take the lead 
in altering wages. 
More than one employer said that if they do not pay the 
prevailing wage no one will work for them and they would suffer 
heavy losses. They also said that if one landowner pays a higher wage 
rate, the labourers cite it as a precedent in demanding higher wages. 
Referring to the same phenomenon, the labourers pointed out that if 
a farmer pays a higher wage rate (without consultation with others). 
the other landowners object to it as they feel this puts some pressure 
on them to follow suit. 
3.6.2 Papda: 
As in Rampura Kalan, the labourers do not usually go to 
nearby villages for farm work. However, they reported going out for 
nonfarm work such as well-digging, road-building and recently at a 
jail construction site. 
Most of the employers reported hiring village labour only. 
An important exception to this being some of the biggest landowners 
in the village who hire significant quantities of outside labour at 
harvest time, altogether about 100-150 labourers for a period of 2-3 
23 There has been some increase in the nominal wage rates in Rampura Kalan over the 
last four years. 
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weeks. Most of the outside labourers come from very far-off areas. 
However, the landowners are able to recruit them from Gairatganj, a 
small town about 15 km from the village, where the latter assemble 
before being brought to work in different villages. However, given the 
short duration of their stay in the village, the involvement of outside 
labourers in the village labour market appeared to have little overall 
effect on the latter. 
The labourers pointed out that the daily wage rates in many 
of the nearby villages (within a radius of 2-3 miles) were upto 2 or 3 
rupees higher than that in Papda. The labourers said (and some 
employers acknowledged it) that the wage rates in other villages have 
no influence on the wages here. When asked further on why these 
(inter-village) wage differences prevailed, they simply stated that 
every village has its own "system" or "custom". 
With regard to the incidence of wage undercutting or 
overbidding, almost everyone we talked to said that it happened very 
rarely, only in situations of emergency or urgent need. The labourers 
pointed out that overbidding by employers was mostly unnecessary 
since there was rarely a shortage of labour. They asserted that the big 
landowners never paid more than the going rate. The obverse to this 
virtual absence of undercutting or overbidding was the oft-reported 
prevalence of uniform wage rates for all labourers (of the same sex) 
within the village. The discussions with employers and labourers 
clarified that, as in Rampura Kalan, the isolated occurrences of 
undercutting or overbidding left the ruling wage undisturbed. 
Questioned about how the going wage is determined, the 
labourers as well as many of the smaller employers of labour stated 
emphatically that the large landowners act collectively in deciding 
the wage rate. One large landowner, who is also the village pradhan 
(headman), while denying mutual consultation among employers on 
wage fixation, nevertheless stated that the wage paid by the 'regular' 
employers of labour has to be paid by the other employers. The 
labourers said that they have little choice in the matter and typically 
face 'take it or leave it' offers. One labourer said, "The rich are 
together and decide collectively not to pay a higher wage. If the poor 
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were united, we could get a higher wage rate". However, it was also 
mentioned (by the labourers) that (exceptions apart) notwithstanding 
unemployment in the village, the labourers do refuse to work for less 
than some minimum wage. 
3. 7 Theoretical Implications 
Thus, to summarize briefly the main thrust of the empirical 
evidence presented in sections 3.3-3.6, the following may be noted. 
Casual, mostly daily-rated, labour is the dominant mode of 
employment in the agricultural labour markets of this region. The 
territorial domain of these labour markets is essentially the village: as 
a rule, the labourers do not go to other villages for farm work, and 
the employers, but for very brief periods in certain cases, do not hire 
outside labour. (Even for the brief spells when outside labourers are 
hired, the latter mostly come from far-off areas.) This village-level 
isolation of the agricultural labour market is reflected in 
contemporaneous wage differences (for similar work) even among 
villages within walking distance of each other. However, within a 
village for a given season and operation, the same wage rate applies to 
nearly all casual labourers of the same sex. This within-village wage 
uniformity is particularly striking for pre-harvesting operations. 
Further, the village market for agricultural labour typically fails to 
clear: far from being an (self-correcting) aberration, involuntary 
unemployment is the usual state of the market. However, inspite of 
unemployment, rarely do the labourers undercut wages. Exceptions 
to this, which occur only when a labourer is in very desperate need, 
have virtually no effect on the ruling wage rate. Equally rare is the 
incidence of overbidding on the part of employers although in their 
case the existence of excess supply of labour (during most of, if not 
throughout, the year) largely obviates the need for such action. 
It needs to be emphasized that the features summarized 
above are not unique to the current area of study. That a greater 
measure of generality can be claimed for them (at least in the Indian 
context) should be clear enough from the discussion in chapter 2.24 
24 See, in particular, sections 2.2-2.5 and the evidence cited therein. 
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Also following from this is the obvious corollary that the empirical 
critique of the different theories of agricultural wage determination 
essayed in chapter 2 applies equally to the present study area as well. 
On the more constructive side, I wish to argue that the 
features stated above provide the basis for an alternative (and arguably 
better) theoretical perspective on agrarian wage formation in India, 
viz., that of collective wage bargaining. The case for this perspective 
is elaborated in section 3.8. The following remarks are intended to 
motivate that discussion. 
First, once the village is admitted as the territorial domain 
of the agricultural labour market, it is no longer possible to ignore 
the sociological reality of the village insofar as it impinges directly or 
otherwise on the outcomes in the local labour market. Many 
sociologists, for instance Srinivas (1987), have emphasized that the 
Indian villages are sociological entities and not mere 'architectural 
and demographic' facts. Further, it has been argued, among others by 
Beteille (1974), that the sociological reality of the village is not 
exhausted by the category of caste, even if one follows the general 
methodological approach of social anthropology of studying societies 
through their own native categories. For another important set of 
native categories derives from the local patterns of ownership, 
control and use of land. 
Who owns how much land and what use he makes of it to control or 
provide for others are important questions for those who live by 
agriculture. To be preoccupied by these questions is natural in a 
society where land is highly concentrated among some and in short 
supply among others. Most people are aware that wealth, power and 
privilege are associated with landownership and that landowners and 
landless (or big and small landowners) often have different interests. 
One cannot live very long in an Indian village without encountering 
situations in which questions concerning land over-ride all other 
questions. (Beteille, 1974, p.49). 
The point to be made is simply that whatever be the limits to open 
collective action in any given village situation, it can hardly be denied 
that landowners and labourers do have a certain basic everyday 
awareness of their respective (economic) interests. 
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Second, the phenomenon of intra-village uniformity of the 
wage rate is not easily explained without supposing some form of 
tacit collusion. Interpreting it as the outcome of competitive price 
equalization is problematic since wage uniformity coexists with 
significant and well-known differences in the productive abilities of 
different labourers. Also. one would expect that if competitive forces 
could bring about wage equalization, then the same forces would also 
operate to clear the village labour market. But this is precisely what 
does not seem to happen. As suggested by Rudra (1982a), the 
observed phenomenon may nevertheless be understood in terms of a 
sociological factor having to do with the "social consciousness of the 
labouring members of the Village Society", viz .• that "the labourers 
simply do not accept different wages". 
It is probably native wisdom of the labouring people that it would 
prove dangerous for them should they permit the employers to pay 
different amounts to different labourers. depending on their 
assessment of skill, capacity to work. etc .. of individual labourers. 
They probably legitimately fear that if this were permitted the wage 
rate could be driven down to zero. They also know that different 
wages offered to different labourers would cause disunity and 
disaffection among them. (Rudra. 1984, p. 265). 
Third. it can be argued that in refusing to undercut wages in 
a situation of unemployment. the labourers give expression to some 
collective understanding. 25 It is notable that the few reported 
instances of undercutting in the two Madhya Pradesh villages 
occurred only in the attenuating circumstances of a labourer being in 
desperate need (see section 3.6). This also suggests the obverse that 
under normal everyday circumstances resorting to undercutting 
would not be an acceptable form of behaviour. 
3.8 Social Sanctions and Tacit Collective Bargaining in the Village 
Labour Market 
As noted in section 2. 7. the main reason for the relative 
disregard of collective bargaining models in the economic literature 
25 A similar statement applies to the employers in so far as they eschew overbidding, 
though with lesser force since situations of labour shortage are relatively infrequent. 
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on rural labour markets in India appears to be the conspicuous 
absence of formal unions or other forms of overt collusion amongst 
both the labourers and the landowners hiring them, particularly the 
former. Thus, according to the Rural Labour Enquiry (1974-75), only 
1.02 percent of agricultural labourers in India were members of trade 
unions.26 If one were to include other non-trade-union forms of 
political organization, such as those documented in Desai (1986, 
Part II), the organized fraction of agricultural labour in the country 
would be somewhat higher. However, the point remains that what we 
are dealing with is a typically unorganized agricultural labour market 
situation. 27 
Given this context, it could be argued that the organizational 
means for ensuring the kind of cooperative behaviour that is needed 
to support collective bargaining are typically non-existent, 
particularly on the supply side of the market.28 In the following, I will 
first elaborate this argument (using a Prisoners' Dilemma 
representation) and then show why it is generally invalid given the 
presence of certain types of social sanctions in the current setting. In 
particular, I will attempt to show that cooperative behaviour is 
realizable as a decentralized equilibrium through the operation of 
these social sanctions. First, some preliminaries. 
26 This proportion was the highest in the state of Kerala at 9.83 percent, followed by 
Tamil Nadu at 3. 70 percent. See Final Report on Employment and Unemployment of 
Rural Labour Households (Part I), Rural Labour Enquiry 1974-75, Table 2.11, p. 95. 
27 None of the ten study villages have any collective organizations of either the 
employers or the labourers. 
28 Explicit (or even tacit) collusion by employers has also been denied in some recent 
literature reviews, for instance, Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), and Dreze and 
Mukherjee (1987). However, the empirical basis of such denials appears to be rather 
weak in the Indian context. The Binswanger et. al. (1984) type of evidence, that 
attempts by employers to collude are common but unsuccessful, and that the pool of 
employers is large, needs to be interpreted more carefully, as its implications for 
collusive behaviour are not unequivocal. 
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Consider the village labour market situation where at the 
going wage w there exists unemployment. At this wage, an individual 
labourer i faces the probability of employment Pi , where Pi has the 
following properties: 
(Pl) For all i, 0 <Pi< 1. Pi is less than unity given the existence of 
unemployment; it is assumed to be greater than zero in view of the 
stylized fact in the Indian context that the incidence of usual status 
(or long-period) unemployment is very low.29 
(P2) Pi need not be the same for all labourers in the village. There is 
evidence to suggest that the probability of employment is not only 
different for labourers of different sex, but it also varies with other 
worker attributes.30 
(P3) Pi is inelastic with respect to the going wage rate.31 This 
appears plausible given the widely-reported wage inelasticity of 
agricultural labour demand in India.32 
29 This is a well known feature of rural unemployment in India. See for instance, 
Visaria (1981), Ahuja (1986), Sundaram and Tendulkar (1988), Paul (1988). Thus, for 
1983, the usual status unemployment rate in rural India was 1.9 percent only (based 
on NSS 38th Round data (Report No. 341, June 1987) cited in Paul (1988). 
30 See, for instance, Mencher and Sardamoni (1982), Rudra (1982a, chapter 6), 
Agarwal (1984). Rudra indeed suggests that employing better workers on a priority 
basis may operate as a substitute for inter-worker wage variation. Also see Dreze and 
Mukherjee (1987, p. 18). 
3l Notice that what are being compared here are two levels of the going uniform wage 
in the village. In so far as labourer i departs from the uniform wage, Pi may well take 
the extreme values of 0 or 1. 
32 Most studies of labour demand in Indian agriculture, with the exception of those 
assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, bear this out. See Sidhu and Baanante (1981), 
Bardhan (1984a, b), Evenson and Binswanger (1984) among others. (The assumption of 
Cobb-Douglas technology, however, forces the own-price input demand elasticities to 
be greater than unity in absolute terms.) 
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Now the problem of decentralized cooperation among the 
village labourers can be formulated in terms of each labourer facing 
the binary choice33 between the following courses of action: (A) to 
undercut the wage rate by a small amount, or (B) not to undercut. 
The payoff to each labourer depends on the actions of other 
labourers. For any labourer i the strategic choice between A and B is 
governed by the following conditions: 
(1) If others are doing B (not undercutting) for some or all j.;ei, then 
labourer i would prefer to do A (undercut) since (s)he can thereby 
increase his/her Pi to unity, assuming of course that the employers 
will prefer to hire the cheaper labourers first. 
(2) If others are doing A (undercutting) for all j;ei, then it is still 
preferable for labourer i to do A (undercut). For otherwise, (s)he 
would be priced out of the market with Pi driven to zero. 
(3) Each labourer i prefers everyone doing B (not undercutting) to 
everyone doing A (undercutting). This is obvious from (P3) above: 
with everyone undercutting the wage rate, Pi increases only less than 
proportionately, or in other words, the payoff wpi falls. 
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) define a Prisoners' Dilemma for 
the village labour market. The properties of the Prisoners' Dilemma 
are well-known. In the present context, they imply: (i) Each labourer 
has a strictly dominant strategy, viz., A, to undercut. This simply 
follows from the fact that each labourer prefers A given the actions of 
others, no matter what they are (conditions (1) and (2) above). 
(ii) Each labourer following his/her dominant strategy leads to the 
non-cooperative equilibrium of everyone undercutting, which is the 
only Nash equilibrium in the game. (iii) Though there exists a 
Pareto-superior outcome associated with everyone doing B (not 
undercutting), it is not realizable non-cooperatively. For even if 
33 The underlying problem is, of course, a continuous choice problem. However, the 
use of binary framework, though not central to the current argument, simplifies its 
presentation considerably. 
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everyone else were somehow doing B (not undercutting), it will still 
be in the interest of any individual labourer to do A (undercut). 
Hence, it is arguable that since there exist in the given 
context no external agencies to enforce compulsorily everyone doing 
B, rational (self-seeking) behaviour on the part of the labourers will 
infact direct them all to opt for undercutting, which carried far 
enough would result in the conventional (labour market) equilibrium, 
competitive or monopsonistic depending on what assumptions are 
made on the other side of the market. 
The above constitutes the crux of the theoretical argument 
against the absence of undercutting in a situation of unemployment, 
and by implication against the admissibility of collective bargaining.34 
This theoretical argument is presently rejected. What is rejected is 
not the empirical premise that in the typical situation there exists no 
formal agencies to enforce cooperation among labourers, but the 
proposition that formal organization is the only means of sustaining 
such cooperation. On the contrary, it needs to be argued that the 
presence of certain informal social sanctions (against particular types 
of behaviour) can be quite sufficient to generate the same result. 
Loosely speaking, social sanctions are a set of Uointly-
effected) punishments against behaviour considered 'deviant'. They 
derive their social force (or effectivity) from the attribute that anyone 
refusing to punish a 'deviant' is also considered a 'deviant'. Let deviant 
behaviour in the village labour market be then defined as follows: 
34 The theoretical argument may prompt some to repudiate the absence of 
undercutting even as an empirical fact. However, the logical absurdity of this position 
is well-illustrated by Solow's (1980) comment though in a somewhat different context: 
I remember reading once that it is still not understood how the giraffe manages to 
pump an adequate blood supply all the way up to its head; it is hard to believe that 
anyone would therefore conclude that giraffes do not have long necks. (p.7). 
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(R) an individual labourer i doing A (undercutting) when everyone 
else is doing B (not undercutting),35 or 
(S) an individual labourer j not punishing i who does R.36 
It is assumed that in these circumstances social sanctions apply with 
sufficient severity to make labourer i prefer doing B when all others 
are doing B. 
Before considering the effects of such social sanctions on 
the equilibrium outcomes in the labour market, it is worth noting 
that in the Prisoners' Dilemma representation above, there was no 
room for these social sanctions because it was (implicitly) assumed 
that (a) the wage-employment or labour market outcomes are all that 
is relevant for defining the payoffs of the players, and (b) the 
Prisoners' Dilemma is a single-period (or once-over) game. Neither of 
these is a realistic assumption in the context of village-level labour 
markets. Instead, it is now being argued that there exists an arena of 
social existence apart from the labour market where social sanctions 
can extract their punitive toll from 'deviants'. Plain gossip, public 
shunning and disapprobation, non-inclusion in social events can be 
quite effective in making deviance unattractive in a closed village 
environment where there is absolutely no anonymity and intra-village 
social interactions are an indispensable part of everyday 
35 Notice that deviant behaviour is being defined minimally: undercutting is 
considered deviant only when all the others not undercutting, i.e. when more than one 
labourer is undercutting it is not considered to be deviant behaviour. 
36 Such a concept of deviant behaviour is similar to Basu's (1986) definition of 
'disloyalty' in his model of power in 'triadic' relationships. He also provides a more 
formal defmition. The argument pursued here is also similar to Akerlofs (1976) 
model of 'caste equilibrium'. 
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existence,37,38 It is also notable that the existence of such sanctions 
presupposes the repeated-nature of the original labour market 
situation. They would be inconceivable if the village labour market 
game had a zero probability of repetition. 
In terms of the Prisoners' Dilemma formulation, social 
sanctions involve a reordering of the payoffs of the labourers. In view 
of sanctions against behaviour R or S above, the following 
modification is implied. Conditions (2) and (3) remain unchanged, 
but (1) is replaced by (1.1) and (1.2) as follows: 
(1.1) If everyone else is doing B (not undercutting) for all j:t:i, then 
labourer i prefers doing B (not undercutting) to doing A 
(undercutting). 
(1.2) If not everyone is doing B (i.e. one or more j:;t:i is undercutting) 
then social sanctions do not apply and as earlier labourer i prefers to 
do A (undercut). 
(1.1), (1.2), (2) and (3) constitute what has been called an Assurance 
Game (Sen 1967, 1982, chapter 3). Despite apparent similarity with 
the Prisoners' Dilemma, the Assurance Game generates quite 
different results: (i) Undercutting is no longer a strictly dominant 
strategy for each labourer. (ii) Though everyone undercutting (doing 
A) is still a non-cooperative equilibrium, it is not the only one. 
Another non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium is given by everyone not 
undercutting (doing B). (iii) The Pareto-superior outcome of everyone 
not undercutting, being a possible Nash equilibrium, does not require 
formal enforcement. All that is required for this equilibrium to be 
realized is an assurance (hence the name Assurance Game) that 
37 It is hard to observe these sanctions in actual operation because deviance rarely 
occurs (see section 3.6). Nevertheless, that they exist as credible threats is suggested by 
some researchers, for instance, Rudra (1982a, 1984) and Bliss and Stern (1982, p. 301). 
38 These social sanctions may even extend to the employers who agree to hire a 
labourer willing to undercut. In that case the following argument will hold afortiorL 
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everyone else will be doing the 'right' thing, viz., B. Given that 
assurance, it is in each labourer's interest to also do B. 
The crucial question then is: will an expectation of others 
doing the 'right' thing (B) be forthcoming? (What is shown above is 
that if this expectation exists, it will be self-fulfilling.) Here, it is 
important to note that of the two Nash equilibria in the Assurance 
Game, the one involving everyone doing B Pareto-dominates the 
other involving everyone doing A. Given common knowledge that 
(a) everyone doing B is an equilibrium (i.e. best reply against itself), 
and (b) everyone doing Bis preferred by each labourer to the other 
possible equilibrium of everyone doing A, each labourer can indeed 
expect everyone to opt for B. In particular, it is the sequence 
'everyone knows that everyone knows that ... (a) and (b) are true', 
which generates the common expectation that everyone will do B. 
Hence, everyone not undercutting is indeed realizable as a 
decentralized, though social-sanction-assisted, equilibrium in the 
village labour market. There exists thus a sort of "trade unionism 
without trade unions".39 
At this stage, it is useful to recall the binary choice 
framework that was artificially imposed on the problem. Having 
shown above that social sanctions enable realization of equilibria 
where no one undercuts the wage rate, it may be supposed that the 
labourers can thereby achieve as high a wage as they desire. This 
supposition is, however, unwarranted because it cannot be assumed 
that the employers simply sit back and watch the show. Indeed, once 
a cooperative equilibrium amongst the labourers becomes a credible 
possibility, it provides an added incentive for the employers to 
cooperate amongst themselves. For it is obvious that by acting 
individualistically they cannot force down whatever wage rate is 
39 The phrase is James Scott's, who provides an excellent documentation of the 
phenomenon discussed here in the context of a Malaysian village. See Scott (1985). 
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supported by cooperative behaviour among the labourers.40 The only 
way that they can do this is by collectively refusing to pay the 
'demanded' wage. And that is precisely how we arrive at a collective-
bargaining formulation of the village wage determination problem. 
3.9 Some Further Observations 
Several comments on the analysis of section 3.8 are in 
order. First, though I have presented above a sequential account 
where collusion among employers occurs in response to implicit 
cooperation amongst the labourers, it is not suggested that this also 
conforms to the chronological sequence of events. The employers 
may well be colluding with each other to start with. But even in that 
case, the incentives for collusion are certainly enhanced by the 
possibility of cooperation on the labourers' side. 
Second, while the idea of social sanctions is certainly used 
as a primitive in the argument of section 3.8, it is not being used as a 
deux ex machina. Surely, no more than the usual notion of rationality 
underlying much of economic analysis. Also, the argument of the 
previous section suggests at least a functionalist explanation of the 
existence of social sanctions, viz., social sanctions (against wage 
cutting) exist or evolve because they render possible the realization 
of an outcome in the Assurance Game which each labourer would 
have preferred even in terms of the original Prisoners' Dilemma 
preferences. 
Third, it is not as if the deviant behaviour of wage cutting is 
altogether precluded by social sanctions. Occasionally, a labourer's 
need for wage work may be compelling enough to prevail over 
existing social sanctions. The rare instances of undercutting in the 
two Madhya Pradesh villages (which were reported to occur 
invariably in situations of desperate need) may be interpreted in such 
40 Notice that in both the Madhya Pradesh villages. the employers reported that if 
anyone offered less than the going wage, no labourer would work for him and he would 
suffer heavy losses. See section 3.6. 
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terms.41 However, the fact that this does not bring down the 
standard wage indicates that the conditions under which social 
sanctions apply may well allow for such exceptional circumstances. 
Nevertheless, this also suggests that cooperative equilibria (built on 
social sanctions) may be somewhat fragile, being vulnerable to major 
shocks, for instance, in case of a severe drought, when the economic 
circumstances facing a large proportion of village labourers may verge 
on absolute desperation. 
Fourth, the case for tacit cooperation amongst the labourers 
can also be argued somewhat differently by considering the village 
labour market as a repeated noncooperative game, or in alternative 
terminology, as a noncooperative supergame. Several recent results 
from game theory show that noncooperative equilibria of a supergame 
may involve choices that do not form equilibria of the underlying 
one-shot game, including, in particular, mutually beneficial choices 
which in the one-shot game can only be supported by binding 
agreements. Substantively, the problem of tacit cooperation can be 
posed in terms of the difficulty of enforcing 'punishments' on 
individual self-seeking behaviour which may nevertheless work to 
everyone's disadvantage. The existence of social sanctions, which 
operate on a payoff domain 'external' (and additional) to labour 
market outcomes, represents one mode of effecting such 
punishments. Alternatively, in a supergame context, punishments can 
be meted out in future plays of the noncooperative game. The basic 
idea is that attempts by any one player to secure short-term gains can 
be stalled by threats of retaliatory actions by the other players in later 
rounds of the game. The retaliatory threats would be credible if, for 
instance, the other players revert to the single period equilibrium 
strategies. The important thing to note is that, unlike social 
sanctions, the 'punishments' here are constituted in terms of 
strategies 'internal' to the original one-shot game. 
A simple class of supergame strategies which can thus 
41 See section 3.6. Also see Dreze and Mukherjee (1987). 
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support cooperative outcomes are what have been termed as trigger 
strategies. In the village labour market context, a trigger strategy may 
be formulated as each labourer adopting the following course of 
action: "I will not undercut so long as others do not undercut; but if 
others undercut so will I". It has been shown that (under certain 
conditions on the discount rate of the players) a trigger strategy, of 
which the above is an example, is an equilibrium (i.e. best reply to 
itself) in the noncooperative supergame. 42 This notion of a trigger-
strategy equilibrium has been recently used by Osmani (1988) to 
argue for implicit cooperation among the workers in rural casual 
labour markets.43 
However, I wish to suggest that the repeated-game 
approach to explaining cooperation is complementary to the social 
sanctions-based approach argued in section 3.8 above. The similarity 
between the trigger strategy mentioned in the previous paragraph 
and the preference structure in the Assurance Game (conditions 
(1.1) and (1.2) in section 3.8) is noteworthy. Thus, at least in the 
present context, supergame equilibrium strategies and social 
sanctions seem to be equivalent means of achieving the same 
(cooperative) behavioural outcomes. It is indeed arguable that 
supergame equilibria provide an explanation of the existence or 
evolution of social sanctions. 
42 For infinite horizon games, this is proved by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). 
Friedman (1985) proved an analogous result for fmitely repeated games with multiple 
single-period equilibria. However, for a finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, which 
has a unique single-period Nash equilibrium, there do not exist any trigger-strategy 
equilibria. But for this class of games, several other approaches have been suggested to 
explain cooperative realizations. See for instance, Radner (1980), Kreps et. al. (1982), 
Basu ( 1987b), Harrington ( 1987). For two recent smveys of the theory of repeated 
noncooperatlve games, see Friedman (1986, chapter 3), van Damme (1987, chapter 8). 
43 Osmani's (1988) formulation, however, seems to suffer from two inadequacies: 
(i) the interior equilibrium wage in his formulation implies an absolute wage 
elasticity of labour demand of greater than unity, which seems empirically 
implausible, and (ii) cooperative behaviour is restricted only to the supply side of the 
labour market. 
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Finally. what has been shown above is that a collective 
bargaining framework can reasonably approximate the process of 
wage formation in village-level labour markets in India. How the 
collective bargain is resolved is by no means an obvious issue. This is 
what I address in the following chapter. 
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Appendix 3A 
Sampling Fractions and Farm Size Categories in the Study Villages 
Table 3A. l: Sampling Fractions in the Ten Study Villages 
Village No. of sampled households as percentage of all households in the category 
Labour households Cultivator households Total 
Aurepalle 6.85 9.32 8.40 
Dokur 13.16 13.27 12.78 
Shirapur 10.31 16.39 13.47 
Kalman 6.41 14.22 9.46 
Kanzara 18.52 27.52 23.67 
Kinkheda 18.18 36.14 27.97 
Boriya 15.63 28.30 22.47 
Rampura 25.00 38.96 31.00 
Pa pd a 25.64 47.62 37.03 
Rampura Kalan 21.74 24.59 23.26 
SOURCE: Manual of Instructions for Economic Investigators in ICRISAT's Village-
Level Studies, 1987. 
Table 3A.2: Farm Size Classification Based on Operational Land Holdingsa 
in the Study Villages 
Village Farm size class (hectares) 
Small Medium Large 
Aurepalle 0.20-2.50 2.51-5.26 >5.26 
Dokur 0.20-1.01 1.02-3.04 >3.04 
Shirapur 0.20-2.50 2.41-5.87 >5.27 
Kalman 0.20-6.07 6.08-10.77 >10.77 
Kanzara 0.20-2.26 2.27-5.59 >5.59 
Kinkheda 0.20-3.00 3.01-5.60 >5.60 
Boriya 0.20-0.97 0.98-1.98 >1.98 
Rampura 0.20-2.37 2.38-4.53 >4.53 
Papda 0.20-2.50 2.51-5.00 >5.00 
Rampura Kalan 0.20-3.64 3.65-6.10 >6.10 
a Operational holdings is defined as: owned land minus land leased-out/sharecropped-out 
plus land leased-in/ sharecropped-in. 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 3A.1. 
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Appendix 3B 
Village-, Operation- and Sex-specific Wage Functions 
Reported in Tables 3B. l and 3B.2 are the estimates of semilog 
wage functions for male and female (casual) labourers respectively. In 
contrast to the usual practice of specifying a single wage equation for all 
agricultural operations (for instance, Rosenzweig, 1978; Bardhan, 1979a; 
Ryan, 1982; Rajaraman, 1986), in the present exercise wage functions 
were estimated separately for individual agricultural operations. The 
dependent variable was defined as the natural logarithm of the hourly 
wage rate. The following explanatory variables representing individual 
worker characteristics were considered: 
1. Age in years. 
2. A quadratic term on age. 
3. Main occupation dummy =l if the worker's main occupation 
(defined as the occupation accounting for the highest proportion of the 
worker's income) was cultivation or agricultural labour, =0 otherwise. I 
4. Landholding class of the household to which the worker 
belongs, taking the values 0, 1, 2 and 3 for labour, small farm, medium 
farm and large farm households respectively.2 
5. Education years, i.e. the number of years of schooling. 
Data on operation-wise wage rates and the above individual 
worker attributes were available for only 6 of the 10 study villages and for 
a limited number of years (altogether 19 village years).3 Wage functions 
were estimated for all operations for which 30 or more observations were 
1 Other occupations include various types of norifann activities. 
2 See section 3.2 and Appendix 3A for definitions of different landholding classes. 
3 The 19 village years are: Aurepalle, 1975-76 to 1978-79; Dokur, 1975-76 to 1977-78; 
Shirapur, 1975-76 to 1978-79; Kalman, 1975-76 and 1976-77; Kanzara, 1975-76 to 1978-79; 
and Kinkheda, 1975-76 and 1976-77. 
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available in any village year. Thus, altogether 20 wage functions were 
estimated for male labourers and 45 for female labourers.4 
Table SB.I: Operation-specific Wage Functions: Male Hired Labour 
Operation/Vi I I age/Year Explanatory variables 
R2 Intercept (Age) (Age~2 Main Land Education N 
x103 x1 O occupation class ~ears 
Field Preparation 
1. Dokur, 1975-76 -1.231 2.74 -2.81 0.208* 0.025 -0.009 78 0.097 
(6.15) (0.27) (0.21) (2.11) (1.15) (0.63) 
2. Dokur, 1976-77 -1.146 -19.0 14.4 0.585* 0.090* 0.002 42 0.469* 
(4.18) (1.36) (0.90) (5.01) (3.07) (0.08) 
3. Kalman, 1975-76 -1.038 0.979 -4.56 0.133 -0.004 0.028 30 0.155 
(3.48) (0.07) (0.27) (0.60) (0.10) (1.29) 
4. Kanzara, 1975-76 -0.638 8.84 -15.8 -0.150 -0.005 0.001 37 0.159 
(1.92) (0.61) (0.92) (0.97) (0.24) (0.11) 
5. Kanzara, 1976-77 -0.799 -1.57 -4.76 0.179 -0.033 -0.004 59 0.213* 
(3.21) (0.15) (0.39) (1.91) (1.13) (0.33) 
6. Kanzara, 1977-78 -0.985 28.0* -36.9* -0.075 0.044* -0.004 49 0.251* 
(3.24) (2.23) (2.46) (0.50) (2.09) (0.46) 
7. Kinkheda, 1976-77 -1.243 12.75 -16.58 0.021 -0.002 31 0.185 
(9.83) (1.57) (1.36) (1.56) (0.38) 
Sowing 
8. Kanzara, 1976-77 -0.759 9.72 -1.37 -0.065 0.026 -0.002 38 0.080 
(2.75) (0.74) (0.94) (0.54) (0.63) (0.19) 
lnterculturing 
9. Shirapur, 1975-76 -0.682 -2.62 4.02 -0.079 -0.001 47 0.115 
(2.46) (0.17) (0.18) (1.66) (0.12) 
10. Kanzara, 1975-76 -0.402 2.49 -13.0 -0.219 0.108* -0.035* 31 0.375* 
(1.05) (0.12) (0.49) (0.98) (2.73) (2.47) 
11. Kanzara, 1976-77 -1.365 24.0* -30.4* 0.124* -0.011 0.020* 53 0.361 * 
(9.48) (3.67) (3.93) (2.35) (0.75) (3.09) 
12. Kanzara, 1977-78 -0.789 12.0 -18.9* 0.059 -0.006 -0.001 60 0.204* 
{5.62} {1.91) {2.37) p .84) {0.37) {0.23) 
4nie much larger total number of wage functions estimated for females (45 against 20 for 
males) simply reflects the fact that females dominate the hired casual labour markets in 
these Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra villages. Thus, for a large number of operations in 
the case of male labourers, there were fewer than 30 observations for a village-year. 
75 
13. Kinkheda, 1975-76 -1.108 7.43 -10.7 0.013 -0.009 0.002 75 0.062 
(12.18) (1.87) (1.92) (0.27) (0.98) (0.68) 
Harvesting 
14. Kanzara, 1975-76 -1.132 40.0* -66.9* 0.013 0.033 -0.006 37 0.396* 
(2.69) (2.21) (2.93) (0.06) (0.73) (0.42) 
15. Kanzara, 1976-77 -0.715 -7.26 6.41 0.049 -0.022 -0.007 61 0.070 
(3.70) (0.79) (0.57) (0.80) (1.12) (0.99) 
16. Kanzara, 1977-78 -0.775 13.0 -15.5 -0.057 0.024 0.005 43 0.067 
(3.26) (1.20) (1.18) (0.57) (0.95) (0.50) 
Harvest Processing 
17. Dokur, 1975-76 -0.512 -9.49 8.31 -0.153 -0.014 -0.005 78 0.097 
(0.94) (0.30) (0.19) (1.22) (0.50) (0.38) 
18. Dokur, 1976-77 -1.193 12.0 -18.8 0.105 0.094 -0.023 30 0.136 
(2.14) (0.37) (0.45) (0.58) (1.41) (0.75) 
19. Kanzara, 1975-76 -1.038 21.0 -24.0 -0.150 0.039 0.020 30 0.165 
(1.34) (0.46) (0.35) (1.23) (0.82) (1.10) 
20. Kanzara, 1976-77 -0.888 2.45 -6.32 0.101 -0.034 -0.008 40 0.116 
{2.57} {0.14} {0.29} {0.93} {0.95} {0.88~ 
Note: Figures in parentheses give absolute t-ratios. N= number of obseJ:Vations. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. (A * on the estimates for the intercept is omitted, but 
these are almost always significant.) Significance of R2 is based on the F-test for the null 
hypothesis that all parameters except the intercept a:re zero. 
Table 3B.2: Operation-specific Wage Functions: Female Hired Labour 
Operation/Village/Year Explanatory variables 
Intercept (Age) (Age~2 Main Land Education N R2 
x103 x1 O occupation class ~ears 
Field Preparation 
1 . Kanzara, 1976-77 -1.359 -25.0* 36.3* 0.011 0.050 0.044* 45 0.337* 
(8.30) (2.67) (2.74) (0.21) (1.50) (3.39) 
2. Kanzara, 1977-78 -1.404 11.0 -16.4 -0.048 -0.062 -0.020 34 0.182 
(7.25) (1.04) (1.17) (0.69) (1.84) (1.36) 
3. Kinkheda, 1975-76 -1.799 -8.72 10.7 -0.039 -0.008 0.009 45 0.110 
(13.24) (1.09) (1.36) (1.22) (1.48) (0.36) 
4. Kinkheda, 1976-77 -1.305 -5.00 6.83 0.038 -0.040 0.010 46 0.066 
(8.70) (0.66) (0.72) (0.31) (1.33) (0.29) 
Sowing 
5. Kanzara, 1976-77 -1.394 7.87 -8.45 0.044 -0.078* -0.007 63 0.217* 
(9.09) (1.01) (0.90) (1.05) (3.56) (0.33) 
6. Kinkheda, 1976-77 -1.593 8.18 -5.62 0.060 O.D16 0.029 35 0.292 
{13.73} {1.25} {0.61} {0.73} {0.87} {1.76} 
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Transplanting 
7. Aurepalle, 1975-76 -1.369 3.25 1.09 -0.084 0.029 78 0.062 
(9.97) (0.004) (0.19) (1.49) (0.94) 
8. Aurepalle, 1977-78 -1.196 -3.49 4.73 0.009 -0.0001 42 0.012 
(12.60) (0.60) (0.62) (0.13) (0.002) 
9. Aurepalle, 1978-79 -1.284 4.71 -5.33 -0.019 -0.016 43 0.017 
(10.19) (0.59) (0.51) (0.21) (0.40) 
10. Dokur, 1975-76 -1.336 3.79 -6.24 -0.035 0.007 0.031 136 0.087* 
(21.25) (1.28) (1.88) (1.46) (0.72) (1.08) 
11. Dokur, 1976-77 -1.300 -1.81 2.95 0.147 O.Q15 0.088 48 0.072 
(5.00) (0.14) (0.20) (1.51) (0.42) (0.76) 
12. Dokur, 1977-78 -0.647 -1.44 1.35 -0.066 0.013 -0.031 67 0.076 
(6.35) (0.30) (0.25) (1.53) (1.00) (0.85) 
Weeding and Thinning 
13. Aurepalle, 1976-77 -1.307 -13.0 15.4 0.023 0.027 33 0.101 
(8.75) (1.41) (1.33) (0.27) (0.83) 
14. Aurepalle, 1978-79 -1.259 -2.87 2.22 0.020 -0.055* 35 0.190 
(15.07) (0.59) (0.34) (0.30) (2.26) 
15. Dokur, 1975-76 -1.246 -0.23 -026 -0.002 -0.031 * 0.004 265 0.083* 
(29.98) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (4.74) (0.47) 
16. Dokur, 1976-77 -1.254 -4.49 3.35 0.018 0.038* 0.032 116 0.091 
(10.33) (0.85) (0.59) (0.43) (2.37) (0.67) 
17. Dokur, 1977-78 -1.033 5.47 -7.46 -0.027 -0.010 0.007 72 0.024 
(6.36) (0.72) (0.89) (0.51) (0.34) (0.22) 
18. Shirapur, 1975-76 -1.782 -6.36 10.1 -0.101 0.042 -0.008 48 0.157 
(9.37) (0.72) (0.97) (1.20) (1.58) (0.38) 
19. Shirapur, 1976-77 -2.013 17.0 -19.3 -0.004 -0.078 0.005 41 0.134 
(8.50) (1.44) (1.42) (0.04) (1.96) (0.29) 
20. Shirapur, 1978-79 -1.025 -14.0 18.2 -0.049 -0.017 -0.008 33 0.151 
(2.13) (0.36) (0.33) (0.24) (0.59) (0.51) 
21. Kalman, 1975-76 -1.735 -9.58 18.3 0.118 0.039 0.021 48 0.079 
(8.29) (0.66) (0.84) (1.46) (0.87) (1.00) 
22. Kalman, 1976-77 -1.730 -0.528 1.67 0.098 0.006 -0.002 47 0.109 
(11.74) (0.06) (0.12) (1.30) (0.18) (0.15) 
23. Kanzara, 1975-76 -1.324 -6.02 9.85 0.042 -0.020 0.009 87 0.126* 
(13.42) (1.23) (1.64) (1.31) (1.20) (1.18) 
24. Kanzara, 1976-77 -1.235 -10.0* 12.4 -0.030 -0.006 -0.003 134 0.038 
(13.19) (2.11) (1.94) (0.92) (0.31) (0.46) 
25. Kanzara, 1977-78 -1.067 -0.444 1.48 0.046 -0.004 -0.005 175 0.021 
(11.77) (0.09) (0.24) (1.41) (0.25) (0.62) 
26. Kanzara, 1978-79 -0.875 -8.72 10.7 -0.039 -0.008 0.009 43 0.028 
(4.13) (0.82) (0.82) (0.56) (0.19) (0.50) 
27. Kinkheda, 1975-76 -1.865 0.875 -417 -0.121 0.013 -0.002 00 0.028 
{13.67} {0.12} {0.41} {1.08} {0.58} {0.17} 
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28. Kinkheda, 1976-77 -1.52.7 0.00003 0.259 0.066 0.003 -0.004 65 0.028 
(17.19) (0.00) (0.04) (0.92) (0.21) (0.35) 
Harvesting 
29. Aurepalle, 1975-76 -1.559 -4.04 0.886 -0.101 0.917* 50 0.271* 
(8.21) (0.40) (0.07) (1.37) (3.74) 
30. Aurepalle, 1976-77 -1.423 4.48 -9.65 -1.121 -0.032 43 0.122 
(9.76) (0.55) (0.96) (1.39) (0.83) 
31. Aurepalle, 1977-78 -1.339 0.008 0.053 0.009 -0.025 51 0.079 
(22.71) (0.003) (0.01) (0.27) (1.95) 
32. Dokur, 1975-76 -1.152 -2.90 2.95 0.013 -0.015 0.024 102 0.027 
(12.47) (0.61) (0.51) (0.37) (1.12) (0.65) 
33. Dokur, 1976-77 -1.330 0.819 -1.34 0.053 0.030 0.021 200 0.025 
(10.50) (0.13) (0.19) (1.04) (1.63) (0.42) 
34. Dokur, 1977-78 -0.798 -12.0 11.3 0.056 0.036 0.139 103 0.070 
(3.96) (1.33) (0.95) (0.75) (1.35) (1.48) 
35. Shirapur, 1976-77 -2.391 64.0 -82.2 -0.301 0.001 -0.005 33 0.138 
(3.12) (1.18) (1.03) (1.32) (0.01) (0.15) 
36. Kalman, 1976-77 -1.473 9.83 -18.3 -0.078 -0.077 -0.029 52. 0.090 
(4.93) (0.49) (0.61) (0.52) (1.09) (0.95) 
37. Kanzara, 1975-76 -1.605 11.0 -13.3 -0.050 0.046 0.026* 120 0.089 
(11.35) (1.40) (1.29) (0.97) (1.42) (2.01) 
38. Kanzara, 1976-77 -1.532 -0.46 1.20 -0.002 0.022 0.019 115 0.022 
(11.19) (0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (0.81) (1.28) 
39. Kanzara, 1977-78 -1.017 -10.0 7.55 -0.056 0.012 -0.011 58 0.059 
(4.42) (0.84) (0.51) (0.76) (0.29) (0.48) 
40. Kanzara, 1978-79 -1.462 13.0 -0.156 0.020 0.001 0.004 54 0.030 
(6.57) (1.18) (1.10) (0.31) (0.02) (0.18) 
41. Kinkheda, 1975-76 -1.476 4.19 -8.14 -0.026 -0.011 0.028 143 0.036 
(11.14) (0.57) (0.80) (0.21) (0.44) (1.46) 
42. Kinkheda, 1976-77 -1.511 6.28 -5.60 -0.059 0.014 0.009 116 0.035 
(14.23) (1.07) (0.72) (0.56) (0.66) (0.60) 
Harvest Processing 
43. Aurepalle, 1975-76 -1.701 9.82 -0.113 -0.158 -0.022 43 0.065 
(5.86) (0.57) (0.54) (1.61) (0.36) 
44. Aurepalle, 1977-78 -1.401 2.26 -3.00 0.008 -0.003 49 0.048 
(28.53) (0.92) (1.02) (0.33) (0.31) 
45. Dokur, 1975-76 -1.277 6.31 -9.51 -0.013 -0.024 -0.019 42 0.060 
{8.36} {0.71} {0.73} {0.33} {1.17} {0.41} 
Note: Figures in parentheses give absolute t-ratios. N= number of observations. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. (A * on the estimates for the intercept is omitted, but 
these are almost always significant.) Significance of R2 is based on the F-test for the null 
hypothesis that aU parameters except the intercept are zero. 
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The notion of intra-village wage uniformity (as stated in the 
opening paragraph of section 3.5) can be formulated as the hypothesis of 
the joint nonsignificance of all the explanatory variables in the estimated 
(operation-specific) wage equations. As shown in Tables 3B. l and 3B.2, 
this hypothesis is rejected (at 5 per cent level of significance) for only 7 
of the 20 wage equations for male labourers, and 6 of the 45 wage 
equations for female labourers. As for the different worker characteristics, 
they were significant in even fewer number of cases: 
Worker characteristic Number of cases where the worker characteristic 
was found significant at the 5% level 
Male Female 
Age {linear or quadratic term) 4 2 
Main occupation 
Landholding class 
Education years 
3 0 
3 5 
2 2 
It is notable that the intercept is significant in almost every wage 
equation. 
Appendix 3C 
Labour Market Questionnaire 
Village: Household No. 
Name: Sex: 
Landholding Class: Date of interview: 
1. (a)l Have you been employing labour from 
outside the village during the last two years? 
and/or 
(b) 
2. (a) 
(b) 
3. (a) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Have you been going out to work in villages 
outside your own during the last two years? 
If 'Yes' to l(a), is it during the slack or the 
peak season or both? 
and/ or 
If 'yes' to 1 {b), is it during the slack or the 
peak season or both? 
If 'Yes' to l(a), is it from far-off or 
nei,ghbourin,g villa,ges or both? 
N F 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
If both, where does the larger share come from? 
and/or 
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Yes. ___ .No __ _ 
Yes No 
s P __ B_ 
s P __ B_ 
N __ F __ 
1 Note that part (a) of questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 is addressed to the employers. Part (b) of these 
same questions is addressed to the labourers. 
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(b) If 'Yes' to l(b), is it from far-off or 
hb nei~ ouring villages or both? 
N F 
A a 
B b 
c c 
D d 
E e 
If both, where do you go more often? N __ F __ 
4. What is /was the going wage-rate for the harvesting operation 
(in this village) for the current/last crop? 
Cash --~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Kind 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
5. What do you think is/was the going rate (for the harvesting 
operation) in the nei~hbourin~ villa~e for the current/last crop? 
Cash Kind Don't know 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
6.(a) Have there been instances during the last Yes No __ _ 
two years of an unemployed agricultural labourer 
coming and offering to work at less than the 
going wage-rate? If 'Yes', how many times has this 
happened with you in the last two years? 
7. 
8. 
8 1 
(b) At times when there is a lot of work in the Yes No 
village (say, at harvest time) does any landowner 
give higher wages than others to retain your 
services? If 'Yes', how many times has it happened 
with you in the last two years? 
---
Have there been any wage changes in the last 
four years? 
Yes No 
---- ---
If Yes, how did these changes come about? 
If No, who determines the wage rate? 
Has the tendency to hire in labour from nearby Yes __ _.N o __ _ 
villages (A to E) or go out to work in nearby 
villages increased or decreased in last five years? 
Why do you think this has happened? 
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CHAPTER4 
A Bargain-theoretic Analysis of Agricultural Labour Markets 
4.1 Introduction 
It was the main argument of the chapter 3 that the 
transactional outcomes of village-level agricultural labour markets in 
India can be meaningfully characterized within a framework of 
collective bargaining, even in a setting where formal unions of either 
employers or labourers are largely absent. Furthermore, it has also 
often been suggested that inequalities in the bargaining powers of 
actors on the two sides of the market may often be a significant 
influence on the realized outcomes of the transactions they engage 
in.I In this chapter, this particular stylization of the market 
environment is made the basis of a bargain-theoretic model of the 
village-level market for casual agricultural labour, which 
simultaneously determines farm profits, the level of employment and 
the agricultural wage rate. Two versions of the model are presented: 
(1) the basic model which analyses the village wage determination 
problem as a bargaining game between the groups of village 
employers and labourers, and (2) the extended model which 
introduces male and female labourers as separate bargaining entities. 
The key assumption of the theoretical analysis of this 
chapter is that the collectively~bargained outcomes in the agricultural 
labour market can be characterized in terms of the asymmetric 
version of the Nash bargaining solution. This assumption has been 
used in some recent econometric analyses of labour markets in 
1 See, for instance, Bharadwaj (1974), K Bardhan (1977), Bardhan (1978). However, 
the most notable example is Rudra (1982a, 1984, 1988). His notion of 'unequal mutual 
dependence' between the labourers and property owners iii the village is substantively 
similar to the idea of inequalities in bargaining power mentioned above. 
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developed countries.2 However, it has not to my knowledge, been 
applied to the present context, largely because the bargaining 
approach itself has been generally considered irrelevant to the study 
of unorganized rural labour markets in less developed countries (see 
chapter 3). 
Of course, admitting the relevance of collective bargaining 
in the present context does not automatically justify the Nash 
bargaining approach. In adopting the Nash solution we are indeed 
selecting from a number of possible contenders. This issue is 
discussed at some length in the following section. It is argued that 
the Nash solution can claim a degree of generality not shared by 
other solution concepts. This discussion may, however, be prefaced 
with some general remarks. 
First, it is emphasized that the Nash bargaining solution is 
viewed here as a game-theoretic concept. This is to be distinguished 
from an ethical approach concerned with 'fair' arbitration in 
situations of conflict of interests among individuals or groups. It has 
been sometimes suggested that the Nash bargaining solution 
represents such an arbitration scheme.3 Following Harsanyi (1977) 
and Binmore (1987a), this interpretation is presently rejected. It 
may well be that from some particular ethical standpoint, the Nash 
solution has certain appealing prescriptive properties. However, 
whether such is indeed the case or not, is for the present purposes, 
an irrelevant question. As argued by Binmore (1987a), in proposing a 
2Two notable examples are Nickell and Andrews (1983) and Svejnar (1986). Nickell 
and Andrews estimate a bargaining model for British labour market in reduced form. 
Svejnar estimates the bargaining coefficient for U.S. Labour markets and finds 
significant asymmetry, though making some restrictive assumptions on production 
technology (namely Cobb-Douglas). In related work, Bell and Zusman (1976) used the 
asymmetric Nash solution to determine sharecropping rentals in rural India. 
3 This view can be traced back to the classic work of Luce and Raiffa ( 195 7). It has 
persisted in more recent times. Rapoport, Guyer and Gorden (1976), for instance, put 
the Nash bargaining solution in the same class as Braithwaite's (1955) solution for 
the arbitration problem. 
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solution to the bargaining problem, John Nash was not addressing 
this question either. 
Second, while adopting the Nash solution it is not my 
intention to focus on the details of actual bargaining processes. These 
processes have not been adequately studied for Indian rural labour 
markets. Nevertheless, it will hardly be contested that evolving from 
very different historical and location-specific conditions, these 
processes are likely to be highly diverse, possibly differing even 
among neighbouring villages. One will be hard put to come up with a 
single bargaining model in extensive form4 that is sufficiently general 
to capture this diversity. However, it does not seem unreasonable to 
assume that whatever be the actual process of bargaining in the 
village labour market, its results in terms of wage and employment 
outcomes can be approximated by the asymmetric version of the 
Nash bargaining solution. This point is referred to again in the next 
section. 
4.2 Nash and Other Bargaining Solutions 
The multiplicity of bargaining solutions has grown apace 
with the bargaining literature itself. Broadly, two approaches can be 
distinguished: the axiomatic or the cooperative, and the strategic or 
the non-cooperative. Recent work in bargaining and game theory has 
shown that the two approaches are essentially complementary to 
each other, and I will refer to both these approaches in the following 
discussion. I begin by considering alternative solutions to the two-
person bargaining problem proposed in an axiomatic setting. The 
scope of this brief discussion is limited to three well-recognized 
4 The extensive form (of a game) may be defmed as "the representation which 
explicitly displays the rules of the game, i.e., it specifies the following data: (i) the 
order of the moves in the game, (ii) for every decision point, which player has to make 
a move there, (iii) the information a player has whenever it is his turn to move, (iv) the 
choices available to a player when he has to move, (v) the payoffs for all players." (van 
Damme, 1987, p. 100). 
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solution concepts that fall in the category of what have been termed 
as 'scale-invariant solutions'.5 
Formally, a two-person bargaining game Bis described by a 
pair (S,d) where ScR2 is a compact, convex set of feasible agreement 
payoffs and d e S is the disagreement point giving payoffs for the 
players if they fail to reach an agreement. Let as be the Pareto 
2 
boundary of S in R2 . A solution refers to a function f: B~R such that 
d $ f(S,d) e S. In an axiomatic framework, alternative solutions are 
simply defined by particular sets of conditions (axioms) imposed on f. 
The following is a list of axioms relevant for the three solution 
concepts proposed by Nash (1950), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), 
and Perles and Maschler (1981). 
Axiom 1: Pareto optimality 
t (S, d) e as. 
It should not be possible to increase one players' payoff from the 
solution without decreasing the other's. 
Axiom 2: Invariance to affine transformation 
If a.: a.(x1,x2)=(a1x 1+b1, a 2x2+b2), 
then f(a.S, a.d)= a.f(S,d). 
The solution of the bargaining problem obtained by an affine 
transformation of the payoffs of one (or both) players should be the 
same as the affine transformation of the solution to the original 
(untransformed) bargaining problem. 
5 These ref er to solutions that do not depend on the scales of (or more precisely, are 
independent of linear transformations of) the players' payoff functions. The main 
motivation for 'scale-invariance' (as a desirable property of bargaining solutions) is 
the idea that a bargaining solution should not involve interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. A more comprehensive discussion of bargaining solutions, including scale-
dependent solutions, can be found in Roth (1979), Shubik (1982) and Kalai (1985). 
86 
Axiom 3: Symmetry 
Given the set of feasible payoffs and the disagreement point, the 
solution should not depend on the identity of the players. 
Axiom 4: Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
If f(T,d) e. S and ScT, then f(T,d) = f(S,d). 
If the solution of a bargaining problem with a set of alternatives T is 
also feasible for a subset S of these alternatives, then it is also the 
solution to the bargaining problem with alternatives in S. 
Axiom 5: Individual monotonicity 
If (S,d) and (T,d): are such that for every xj >dj, 
xi E ()T;::: xi E as, then fi(T,d) ;::: fi(S,d). 
If the bargaining problem is altered such that for every given payoff of 
player j, player i's feasible payoff is increased, then solution payoff of 
the player i in the altered problem should be no less than i's solution 
payoff in the original problem. 
Axiom 6: Superadditivity 
For (S,d) and (T,d) if (S+T,d) = {(x+y),d; x e S, y eT} 
then f(S+T,d) ;::: f(S,d)+f(T,d). 
This may be explained as follows. The players may know that 
tomorrow the feasible set may be either S or T with probabilities p 
and 1-p; thus, S+T =pS + (1-p)T. Superadditivity axiom insures 
against the possibility that some of the players will want to reach on 
immediate agreement, while others will prefer to wait till it is known 
whether S or Tis the 'true' game (Perles, 1982). 
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Axioms I, 2, 3 and 4 uniquely define the Nash solution given by6 
f (S,d)=xN such that xN maximizes (x1-d1)(x2-d2) 
for (X1 ,X2) E as. 
Axioms I, 2, 3 and 5 uniquely define the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
(hereafter K-S) solution given by 
f 8 (S,d)=xK such that xk satisfies 
(x1-d1)/(x2 -d2)=(I 1-d1)/(I2-d2 ) for (x1,x2) E as 
where I, the so-called ideal point, is given by 
Ii= max {xi: (x1 ,x2) e S and (x1 ,x2) ;;::: d}. 
For bargaining games B0 cB, axioms I, 2, 3, 6 and a continuity 
requirement uniquely define the Maschler-Perles (hereafter M-P) 
solution given by7 
x q 
fP(S,d) = xM such that xM satisfies JJ-dx1dx2 = J J-dx1d~ 
p x 
The Nash and K-S solutions are shown in Figure 4.1 by 
points N and K respectively. (The M-P solution does not permit any 
straightforward geometric representation.) 
6 If the symmetry axiom is deleted, then the maximand is given by 
(x1-d1) ~ (x2 -d2) 1-~. 
7 The subclass B0 refers to games (S,d) such that (i) if x E S and d ~ y ~. 
then y E S, and (ii) if d< u E S, then :3 v,w ES such that v1 >u1 and w2>u2 .. 
/ , 
d q 
0 
, 
, 
Figure 4.1: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions 
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In one sense, the issue of choice among the three solution 
concepts is essentially one of a comparison between the underlying 
axioms 4, 5 and 6. Indeed, the question has been debated as such in 
most of the literature. However, the problem remains that in purely 
abstract terms, a heuristic rationalization can be provided for any one 
of the axioms. Equally, examples of bargaining games are easily 
constructed where following a particular axiom leads to counter-
intuitive results. Yet, the three solutions coincide only for a game 
with a symmetric bargaining set 
In general, the three axioms are mutually incompatible.8 
One could possibly take up Thomson's (1981) suggestion of 
discriminating among solutions on the basis of some additional 
criteria. In particular, the following three have been considered in 
the literature: (i) continuity of the solutions in (S,d); (ii) monotonicity 
of the solutions with respect to the disagreement point; and 
(iii) generalizability to n ( >2) players. Jansen and Tijs (1983) 
considered the continuity property. Their results show that for the 
8 See, for instance. the discussion in Roth (1979, Part II, section D). 
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subclass of bargaining games, B0 (as defined in note 7), all three 
solutions are continuous in (S,d). Thomson (1987) did not analyze 
the M-P solution, but proved that both the Nash and K-S solutions 
satisfy the weak monotonicity requirement.9 Both the Nash and the 
K-S solutions have been generalized ton-person situations (see, for 
instance, Roth (1979) and Imai (1983)). However, Perles (1982) 
showed that the M-P solution cannot be generalized to n=3. Thus, 
even accepting the notion that bargaining solutions satisfy the above 
criteria, we are unable to select any single solution concept as the 
preferred one. 
However, a certain measure of generality can be claimed for 
the Nash solution from a different source, viz., approaches to the 
bargaining problem which (unlike the axiomatic framework) 
explicitly consider the bargaining process. It is noteworthy that a 
number of solution concepts emerging from this literature either 
coincide with or converge to the Nash bargaining solution. This 
includes non-game-theoretic solutions proposed by Zeuthen (see 
Harsanyi, 1956) and Foldes (1964), following Hicks (1963, 
chapter 7), as well as solution concepts derived from formulations of 
the bargaining problem as a non-cooperative dynamic-strategic 
game.IO Thus, following the classic approach of Rubinstein (1982), 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) showed that the unique 
(sub game) perfect equilibrium 11 of a strategic bargaining model with 
9 See note 32 below. 
10 The first attempt in this direction was made by Nash himself (Nash, 1953), who 
emphasized the need to root cooperative solution concepts in non-cooperative theory. 
As a general approach to cooperative game theory, this viewpoint has been strongly 
endorsed by Harsanyi, Selten and Binmore. The study of cooperative games from this 
perspective has come to be known as the 'Nash program' (see Binmore and Dasgupta, 
1987). 
11 Subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept, and 
is defined by a set of (behavioural) strategies which induce a Nash equilibrium in 
every subgame of the original game. For further discussion and a formal definition of 
subgame perfect equilibria, see van Damme (1987). 
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time preference or a risk of breakdown converges in the limit to the 
axiomatic Nash solution as the length of the bargaining period 
(defined as the time interval separating an offer and a counter-offer) 
approaches zero. 
One may also ref er to the closely related work of Shaked 
and Sutton (1984), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Binmore 
(1987b) where very similar results are obtained showing that the 
Nash bargaining solution can arise as limiting perfect equilibria of 
non-cooperative games under a variety of circumstances.12 
More recently, a case for the Nash solution has been argued 
somewhat differently (see van Damme, 1986). It is shown that if the 
players are restricted to propose risk-sensitive solutions13 (demands) 
and if whenever their demands are not compatible they continue 
bargaining over the set of payoffs not exceeding their previous 
demands, then they will eventually agree on payoffs as proposed by 
the Nash solution. The conclusion is, of course, contingent on the 
assumption that when a player i proposes the solution f1 (S), he/she is 
thereby acknowledging that in subsequent bargaining he/she should 
not get more than what this solution promises him/her. 
The foregoing discussion may, thus, be summed up with the 
observation that in adopting the Nash bargaining solution, one is not 
necessarily confined to an axiomatic justification, which admittedly 
remains a contentious area. Various non-cooperative models which 
arrive at the Nash solution prove this point. However, in referring to 
different models of non-cooperative implementation, it is not 
suggested that actual bargaining processes in village-level labour-
market situations closely resemble the bargaining procedures of 
these models. Rather the fact that a variety of non-cooperative 
procedures are consistent with the Nash bargaining solution 
12 Also see Moulin (1984) who proposes a bargaining game which non-cooperatively 
implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
13 A bargaining solution is called risk-sensitive if the payoff assigned to the player 
does not decrease when his/her opponent becomes more risk-averse. 
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strengthens the belief that the latter can reasonably approximate 
wage-employment outcomes in such situations. 
Finally, it should be noted that only games of complete 
information have been considered in this section, as they seem 
particularly suited to the village labour market environment where 
there is no anonymity and all participants have been known to each 
other over long periods. 
4.3 Symmetry versus asymmetry 
It is well-known that the symmetry requirement is not 
necessary to the axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution.14 In 
the theoretical model of the next section, the asymmetric version of 
the Nash solution is used to analyze the problem of village wage 
determination. The simplest argument for using the asymmetric 
version is that symmetry is a special case of asymmetry. Rather than 
assume symmetry to start with, it is infact turned into a testable 
proposition in the proposed model. 
To get a better grasp of what is involved, it is useful to refer 
to the original Nash bargaining theorem based on the four axioms of 
invariance to a.ffme transformation, Pareto optimality, symmetry and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. In the proof of the theorem, 
the Pareto and the symmetry axioms select a (unique) solution 
outcome for a game with a normalized symmetric bargaining set, 
while the other two axioms permit every game to be treated as a 
game with a normalized symmetric bargaining set. In particular, the 
symmetry axiom in a normalized symmetric game assigns an equal 
payoff of (0.5, 0.5) to each party. In other words, the implication of 
the symmetry axiom is that all the relevant differences between the 
two parties have already been taken into account in the specification 
of the original (non-normalized) bargaining set and the disagreement 
payoffs. 
14 See, for instance Roth (1979), Binmore (1984, 1987a). 
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However, if there is reason to believe that the modeled 
situation contains additional sources of asymmetry not simply 
captured by the bargaining set or the disagreement payoffs, then the 
symmetry axiom needs to be purged from the axiomatization of the 
Nash solution and replaced with one of asymmetry, which, for a 
normalized symmetric bargaining set, assigns unequal payoffs of 
(~. 1-~) to the two players. As suggested earlier, in the context of 
agricultural labour markets in India, these additional asymmetries 
reflecting unequal power of landowners relative to labourers, may be 
an important influence on the bargained outcomes. I will later 
attempt to empirically quantify the extent of such asymmetry of 
power in the agricultural labour markets of the ten study villages. In 
any case, to rule it out by imposing the symmetry axiom is to pre-
judge the issue. 
A further explanatory comment derives from the non-
cooperative bargaining models referred to in section 4.2 where 
solutions of the asymmetric Nash type are shown to arise as perfect 
equilibria of strategic games under a variety of circumstances, for 
instance, if the two players face different probabilities of being the 
proposer in each bargaining period or if they have different rates of 
time preference.IS It is only plausible to expect that these conditions 
reflect (stylistically) some of the 'additional' asymmetries of our 
modeled situation. 
4.4 The Basic Model 
In the following model of the village-level agricultural labour 
market, the wage determination problem is analyzed as a highly 
stylized two person cooperative game between the village employers 
and labourers, which is resolved using the asymmetric Nash 
bargaining solution. There are three basic ingredients of the 
asymmetric Nash bargaining model: (1) the agreement payoffs, (2) 
the disagreement payoffs, and (3) the asymmetric bargaining power 
coefficient. In the present context, the agreement payoff to 
employers is simply their realized profit. Their disagreement payoff 
15 See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Binmore (1987a). 
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is taken to be at zero profit. This is based on the premise that in the 
event of non-agreement in the village labour market, the employers 
would forgo cultivation during a crop season. The possibility that 
employers may invest funds in some alternative non-agricultural 
activity is better treated as an 'outside option', i.e., the best 
alternative they can command if they withdraw unilaterally from the 
bargaining process. It is theoretically reasonable to identify the 
outside option with the disagreement point only if credible threats 
can be based on the outside option. Otherwise, the outside option 
simply serves as a reference point which become relevant only if, at 
least, one of the parties prefers such a point to the equilibrium 
outcome in the absence of outside options.16 In the village labour 
market context, non-cultivation is arguably the most credible threat 
the employers can issue to the labourers. 
The agreement payoff to the labourers is given by their 
realized earnings at the agreed wage. Their disagreement payoff is 
whatever they can earn from some alternative employment, which 
may include such nonfarm wage work as is locally available, or 
dependence on some common property resources (e.g. collecting 
firewood). The coefficient of asymmetric bargaining power is 
assumed to be exogenously given. (An attempt is later made to 
estimate this coefficient econometrically.) 
It may also be noted that both parties are assumed to be 
risk-neutral.17 This assumption anticipates the empirical results of 
chapter 5 where the hypothesis of risk-neutrality is tested and found 
to be statistically acceptable (see section 5.8.2 below). However, it 
could also be supposed that the differences in relative risk aversion of 
the two parties are subsumed under the asymmetric bargaining 
16 See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Sutton (1986), and Sutton, Shaked 
and Binmore (1985). 
17 This is implied by the above procedure of taking the agreement and disagreement 
payoffs as simply the realized magnitudes (of profits or wage earnings) rather than 
risk-sensitive utility functions defined on these magnitudes. 
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power coefficient (see section 5.6 below for further discussion of this 
point). 
It is assumed that the bargaining process leaves employers 
free to choose employment levels. It is taken as a stylized fact that 
employment is rarely on the bargaining agenda. This, of course, 
implies that the bargained outcomes will not in general be efficient 
(McDonald and Solow, 1981). It has been suggested that wage-only 
bargaining can be rationalized if the employers find it prohibitively 
costly to continually renegotiate employment levels (Nickell and 
Andrews, 1983).18 However, in the context of agricultural labour 
markets in India, wage-only bargaining may simply be a particular 
consequence of the absence of formal unions in these markets. While 
there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that labourers in 
these markets generally follow the convention of refusing to work at 
less than the going village wage rate19 (which itself may be 
determined through some sort of collective bargaining), there is no 
comparable evidence suggesting the existence of a parallel 
convention with regard to the aggregate employment level in the 
village. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize how such a convention could 
be implemented except possibly within a formalized union structure. 
Even though employment is not on the bargaining agenda, it 
is not implied that the labourers are unconcerned with the level of 
employment. If the latter were the case, their agreement would need 
to be identified simply with the wage rate, rather than wage earnings 
as has been done above. Representing the labourers' agreement payoff 
in terms of their wage earnings infact implies that the labourers are 
equally concerned with the wage rate and the level of employment. 
18 Whether the scope of bargaining encompasses employment as well, or in other 
words, whether the bargained outcome lies on the contract curve (rather than the 
labour demand curve) has been the subject of some empirical testing in the developed 
countries, e.g. Macurdy and Pencavel (1986), and Brown and Ashenfelter (1986). The 
two studies favoured opposite conclusions. 
19 See the discussion on intra-village wage uniformity in chapters 2 and 3. 
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The two parties thus bargain over the wage rate, leaving the 
employers free to determine employment at the bargained wage. 
Using the Rubinstein (1982) extensive form interpretation of the 
bargaining problem, one can suppose that the employers and 
labourers alternate in making wage offers which are replied with 
either acceptance or rejection and counteroffer by the other party. As 
the time interval between successive proposals becomes vanishingly 
small, there exists a unique wage offer which is the (subgame) 
perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. This unique perfect 
equilibrium wage is given by the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining 
solution. 
The Nash solution to the wage bargaining problem both with 
and without inequalities in bargaining power is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. The bargaining set is the shaded area, bounded below by 
the labourers' reservation income and the employers' break-even 
point. The Pareto-boundary of the bargaining set (BB') is negatively 
sloped as long as the demand for labour is not wage elastic. The slope 
of the boundary is given by (-E-1) where E = wLw/L, and w, L refer to 
the wage rate and employment level in the village labour market. It is 
assumed that the wage rates exist at which the absolute wage 
elasticity of labour demand is less than unity. Otherwise, the 
bargaining problem itself is not defined.20 It can be shown that the 
bargaining set will be strictly convex from above if the labour demand 
function is linear.21 If bargaining power is evenly distributed, then 
the contours representing the product of the gains from agreement 
will be rectangular hyperbolas symmetric about the 450 line through 
the disagreement point v (the disagreement point is given by the 
labourers' reservation income and zero profits for the employers). 
The bargaining equilibrium in this case is at S. However, if employers 
20 For, in that case there is no conflict of interests: both the employers and labourers 
benefit from lower wage rates. 
21 The upper boundary will be linear for an iso-elastic labour demand function, and 
strictly convex as long as 1 +11 > e where 11 is the wage elasticity of the slope of the 
labour demand function. This condition is sufficient for a unique interior Nash 
solution. 
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have greater bargaining power, then the equilibrium will be at a point 
such as A, below and to the right of S, implying higher profits and 
lower wage earnings. 
0 1t 
Figure 4.2: Symmetric and Asymmetric Nash Solutions for the Village 
Labour Market 
The agricultural labour market model is thus specified as 
follows. The employers' agreement payoff is given by the profit 
function 
1t = 1t (w, p, z) (4.1) 
where w is the bargained wage rate, p is a n-vector of the prices of 
output and non-labour variable inputs, and z is a k-vector of the 
quantities of fixed inputs. The level of employment is given by 
L = L(w, p, z) (4.2) 
If employers determine the level of employment to maximize profits 
at the bargained wage, then by Hotelling's Lemma, L = -1tw. 22 The 
labourers' agreement payoff is specified as 
22 In later estimation of the basic model (chapter 5). the cross-equation restrictions 
implied by this condition are statistically tested. 
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u(w,p,z) = wL(w,p,z) (4.3) 
Under these conditions, the bargained wage outcome is 
~ 1-~ w(p,z,v,~) = argmax [n(w,p,z)] [wL(w,p,z)-v] (4.4) 
where vis the labourers' disagreement payoff and ~ in [0, l] is the 
coefficient of employers' bargaining power. It may be noted that the 
Nash product is maximized with respect tow only (and not wand L), 
which reflects the assumption that employment is not a bargaining 
variable.23 The first-order condition for this problem is written 
~(wL-v)nw+ (1-~)n(L+wLw) = 0 (4.5) 
The second-order condition for an interior maximum turns 
out to be 
(4.6) 
where rt = w:Lww/Lw is the elasticity of the slope of the labour demand 
curve with respect to the wage rate. Sufficient (though not necessary) 
conditions for the second-order condition to hold are (i) E > -1, and 
(ii) 1-E+rt > 0. Note that (i) has already been assumed in order to 
define the wage bargaining problem. It will be additionally assumed 
that (ii) also holds. 24 
23 In terms of the sequential bargaining framework proposed by Manning (1987), this 
corresponds to the so-called 'right to manage' model, where the first-stage bargain 
over w is resolved with bargaining powers of employers and labourers given as (p, 1-Pl 
where 0 ~ p ~ 1, and the second-stage bargain over Lis determined with bargaining 
powers ( 1,0) respectively. 
24 Notice that given (i), the second order condition is always satisfied for a linear 
labour demand function implying 11=0. See also note 2labove. 
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Thus, (4.1), (4.2) and (4.5) together define the bargaining 
model which jointly determines the profits of the employers, the 
level of employment and the bargained wage rate in the village 
agricultural labour market. It may be noted that (4.5) may be 
rewritten as 
wl-v 1-(3 
-1t- =T (1+e) (4.7) 
which shows that for a constant wage elasticity of labour demand, the 
relative net gains from bargaining are directly proportional to relative 
bargaining powers. 
Equation (4.7) can also be used to draw a distinction 
between relative bargaining power and the more general notion of 
relative bargaini\,~ position. The latter may be identified with factors 
which determin~ ~e labourers' wage earnings relative to the 
employers' profits.'! Thus conceptualized, the relative bargaining 
position depends c/>n (i) the relative bargaining powers, viz., the ratio 
of (1-(3) to (3, (ii) t~e labourers' disagreement payoffs, namely v, and 
(iii) the bargain~g set whose influence is parametrically captured by 
the wage el~tlcity of labour demand (e). Thus, the greater the 
labourers' relative bargaining power, the larger their disagreement 
payoff, and lower the absolute wage elasticity of labour demand, 
correspondingly stronger is the labourers' relative bargaining 
position. It is particularly noteworthy that a high (low) absolute wage 
elasticity of labour demand works to the bargaining advantage of the 
employers (labourers). The wage elasticity of labour demand, which 
partly reflects the degree of substitutability between hired labour and 
other inputs, defines how far can the employers profitably use their 
labour hiring decisions to influence the bargained wage outcomes. 
The obverse is that insofar as the labourers are concerned with their 
wage earnings, and not just the wage rate, the elasticity of labour 
demand puts a limit on how far the wage rate can be bargained 
upward without an adverse effect on their total wage earnings. 
Some comparative static results of the basic bargaining 
model are considered in the next section. 
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4.5 Comparative Statics: Basic Model 
Let E = [n L w]' and F = [p z v ~]' define the vectors of 
endogenous and exogenous variables respectively. To work out the 
comparative static results, the system (4.1), (4.2) and (4.5) is 
differentiated totally to obtain 
J (dE) = r (dF) 
where J is the Jacobian matrix with respect to the endogenous 
variables and r is the matrix of partial derivatives with respect to the 
exogenous variables. The Jacobian J is given by 
1 0 L 
J = 0 1 -~ 
A1 A2 A3 
where A1 = - (1-~)(l+E)L <0 
Ai = ~wL + (1-~)en 
2 
A3 = ~L - (1-~) (1 +ri)nLw 
As usual, the second-order condition can be used to sign IJI. In 
particular, 
I JI=~ + ~ - IA1 
2 
= ~L - (1- ~)(l + rilnLw + ~wL.Lw 
2 
+ (1- ~)enLw + (1- ~)(l + E) L 
2 
= (l+e)L - (l-~)(l-E+T1)1tLw > 0 
by the second-order condition (4.6). The comparative static effects of 
changes in exogenous variables are obtained as follows. 
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4.5.1 Change in employers' bargaining power ({3) 
2 d1t L [(l+e)n + (wL-v)] 
a~ - IJ I > o (4.8) 
()L -LLw[(l +e)n + (wL-v)] 
a~= IJ I > o (4.9) 
-L[(l+e)n + (wL-v)] 
IJ I <O (4.10) 
The direction of the above effects is as might be expected. 
An increase in employers' bargaining power leads to an increase in 
their profits, a fall in the bargained wage rate and an increase in the 
level of employment. Even though employment increases in this case, 
it is easily checked from equations (4.9) and (4.10) that ()(wL)/()~ < 0, 
i.e. the labourers' total wage earnings decline with an increase in the 
employers' bargaining power. 
4.5.2 Change in labourers' alternative earnings (v} 
2 
an -~L 
av=IJT<O 
aw ~L 
av=IJT > o 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
( 4.13) 
The effects of an increase in the labourers' disagreement 
payoff operate in the same direction as those induced by an increase 
in their bargaining power (1-~). Thus, with an increase in v, the 
labourers' wage rate increases, their employment decreases and the 
employers' profits fall. However, since demand for labour is wage-
inelastic, the reduction in employment is proportionately less than 
the rise in the bargained wage. The labourers' wage earnings, 
therefore, increase (()(wL)/()v > 0). 
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4.5.3 Change in fixed inputs (z) 
an 1tz [A3 + lwA2] + Llz A2-(1-~)nwLLwz 
az = IJ I (4.14) 
(4.15) 
( 4.16) 
An increase in the quantity of a fixed input represents an 
increase in the size of the cake to be bargained, and therefore holds 
possibilities of potential gains for both parties. It is a somewhat 
surprising feature of the bargaining model that the direction of fixed 
input effects cannot be unambiguously determined25, even if we 
ignore (third-order) terms involving Lwz· It is, however, noteworthy 
that ()(wL)/()z > 0, if the Lwz terms are ignored. Whether profits will 
also increase with an increase in fixed factors depends on the values 
of the model's parameters. 
In equation (4.14), while (A3 + ~) is positive, the sign of 
~ is indeterminate. Thus, if we ignore the lwz term, a sufficient 
condition for ()n/()z > 0 is ~ ;;::1/(l-wL/En). It, however, seems 
reasonable to generally expect a positive effect on profits. For, even if 
the above sufficient condition is not met, ()n/()z can still be positive on 
the strength of the first term in the numerator of (4.14), which 
insofar as it represents the direct effect on profits may be expected 
to be dominant influence. Similarly, a sufficient condition for ()w/()z>O 
is (1- ~) ;;::1/(1-En/wl). 
As for employment, there are two effects working in 
opposite directions: (i) the direct positive effect due to increase in 
25 It is assumed here that both 1tz, Lz are positive. However, Lz need not always be 
positive. 
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the availability of a fixed input, and (ii) an indirect negative effect 
operative to the extent the greater availability of the fixed input has a 
positive influence on the bargained wage. If the direct effect on 
employment (the first term in the numerator of equation (4.18) is 
dominant, then for a linear labour demand function, the overall effect 
on employment (auaz) can be expected to be positive. 
4.5.4. Change in output or variable (non-labour) input prices (p) 
( 4.17) 
aL ~[A3-LA1 ]-n:Pf.vA1 + (1-(3)n:wf.vf.vp 
ap = IJ I ( 4.18) 
( 4.19) 
If p is output price (so that n:P' Lp>O), comments for the 
case of fixed input effects (section 4.5.3) apply exactly here as well. If 
pis the price of a variable input complementary to labour (n:P' Lp<O), 
similar comments are again relevant though with the signs reversed. 
Thus, in this case if the third-order effects (Lwp terms) are ignored 
(as before), then a(wL)/ap < 0, and (3 ;?: 1/1(1-wL/Em), is a sufficient 
condition for an:/ap < 0. If pis the price of a variable input 
substitutable with labour (n:p < 0, LP> 0), then the effect on wage 
earnings is of indeterminate sign, but a sufficient condition for 
an:/ap < O is (3 :::;; 1/(1-wL/en). Similarly, a sufficient condition for 
aw/ap < 0 is (1- (3):::;; 1/(1-en/wl). 
The direction of comparative static effects for the basic 
model is summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Signs of Comparative Static Effects: Basic Model 
Endogenous 
variable 
1t 
L 
w 
wL 
+ 
+ 
v 
+ 
+ 
z 
+(?) 
+(?) 
? 
+ 
Exogenous variable 
p p p 
(output) (subst. input) (com pie.input) 
+(?) -(?) -(?) 
+(?) +(?) -(?) 
? ? ? 
+ -(?) 
Note: The symbols?,+(?) and-(?) indicate an indeterminate, a likely positive and a 
. likely negative sign respectively. 
4.6 The Extended Model 
The basic model of section 4.4 is now extended to 
distinguish between two categories of labourers, viz., male and 
female. Significant differences between male and female wages have 
been very widely noted. It is hardly surprising that these differences 
are observed in the sample villages of this study as weU.26 
Explanations have usually been offered in terms of productivity 
differentials or some sort of gender-based discrimination by 
employers.27 However, the view taken here is that differences 
between male and female wages can be analyzed within a bargaining 
model of the type discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.5. In particular, 
gender disparities in wages may be at least partly attributable to 
underlying inequalities in the relative bargaining powers of male and 
female workers. 
In formulating the extended wage bargaining model, male 
and female hired labour are treated as imperfectly substitutable 
inputs on the production side. An important reason for imperfect 
substitutability in the Indian context is simply that not all agricultural 
26 See chapter 6 below (particularly appendix 6A). Also see Ryan and Ghodke (1984). 
27 See section 6.6 below for further discussion of such explanations in relation to the 
proposed model. 
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operations are performed by both male and female labourers. In 
general, there exists a fairly well-defined sex-specific allocation of 
crop-production activities, though there might be some regional 
variations.28 Similar to the spirit of the previous model, it is assumed 
that the scope of bargaining is limited to the male and female wage 
rates only, and given the bargained wage rates employers choose 
levels of employment to maximize their profits. 
The male-female wage determination problem is analyzed 
here as what may be called a three-person one-cake bargaining game. 
The bargained outcomes are determined by then-person 
generalization of the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution discussed 
earlier. It is worth distinguishing the three-person one-cake problem 
from the conceptually distinct three-person four-cake problem 
considered by Binmore (1985), where in addition to one 'large' cake 
under the control of all three players, there are also three 'small' 
cakes, each under the control of a different pair of players. However, 
under the assumption (stated in the previous paragraph) that male 
and female labour are not perfect substitutes in production, the three 
smaller cakes vanish. And the three-person four-cake problem 
collapses to the three-person one-cake problem for which the 
perfect equilibrium outcome is given by an appropriately generalized 
version of the Nash bargaining solution. 
Thus, proceeding as in section 4.4, the wage bargaining 
model is set out as follows. Denoting male and female by subscripts M 
and F respectively, the employers' agreement payoff is given by the 
following profit function 
( 4.20) 
The corresponding levels of male and female employment are 
(4.21) 
28 See, for instance, Rudra (1982b), Ryan and Walker (1988, chapter 4) and chapters 2 
and 3 above. 
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where 7tM and 7tF denote "dn(owM and "dn/"dwF respectively. The 
agreement payoffs for male and female labourers are given by 
(4.22) 
( 4.23) 
( 4.24) 
The employers' disagreement payoff is assumed to be at zero profits, 
while the disagreement payoffs of male and female labourers are 
given by their earnings in alternative employment, VM and VF 
respectively. If ~Mand ~F in the interval [0, l] denote the exogenously 
determined bargaining powers of male and female labourers 
respectively, then the bargaining equilibrium is obtained as the 
solution of 
w.r.t. wM and wF. 
The first order conditions for this problem are written 
(4.25) 
(4.26) 
where E .. = alogl. I alogw .• 
I J I J 
Assuming elasticities of labour demand to be constant in the 
neighbourhood of equilibrium, the sufficient conditions for an 
interior maximum tum out to be 
(i) (l+EMM) ~ O; 
(ii) ( 1 +EFF) ~ O; and 
(iii) [(l+EMM )(l+EFF)-EMF EFM] (l+EMM -EFM) > 0, or 
[(l+EMM ){l+EFF)-EMF EFM) (l+EFF-EMF) > O. 
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Conditions (i) and (ii) implying wage-inelastic male and female labour 
demand are empirically quite plausible. As for (iii), it turns out that 
this condition is required to define the bargaining problem itself. 
This is because the bargaining problem is defined insofar as there 
exists a conflict of interests, as implied by the negatively-sloped 
Pareto boundaries of the bargaining set. In the context of our 
problem, the slopes of the Pareto boundaries in the 7t-UM and n-uF 
spaces are evaluated as 
01t - (l+EFF-EtvF) 
OUM - (l+EMM)(l+EFF)-~ ~M and 
It is obvious that condition (iii) immediately follows if these slopes 
are to be negative. 
As in case of the basic model, it is possible to make a 
distinction between (relative) bargaining position and (relative) 
bargaining power. It may be noted that equations (4.25) and (4.26) 
above yield the following two relations 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
Thus, equation (4.27) shows that the male labourers' bargaining 
position relative to employers depends on: (a) their bargaining power 
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relative to the employers, (b) their disagreement payoff, and (c) on 
own- and cross-wage elasticities. It is easily checked that the male 
labourers' wage earnings relative to employers' profits are higher for 
(i) a higher ratio of ~M to (1- ~M- ~F), (ii) a higher vM, (iii) a lower 
absolute own-wage elasticity of male labour demand, (iv) a higher 
absolute own-wage elasticity of female labour demand, (v) a lower 
value of cross-wage elasticity eFM• and (vi) a higher value of cross-
wage elasticity eMF·29 Using equation (4.28), a parallel statement can 
be made for the bargaining position of female labourers relative to 
employers. In general, the above relations can be viewed as 
extensions of the corresponding relations already noted for the basic 
model (section 4.4), and can be interpreted on similar lines. 
4. 7 Comparative Statics: Extended Model 
Some comparative static propositions of the extended 
bargaining model as defined by (4.20) to (4.26) may now be 
considered. The comparative static results are derived on the 
assumption that wage elasticities of labour demand (both own- and 
cross-wage) are constant in the neighbourhood of equilibrium. This 
assumption has been made to simplify somewhat the calculation of 
comparative static effects.30 
Thus, the Jacobian matrix G with respect to the endogenous 
variables (1t, LM, LF, WM, WF) is written 
29 Relations (iii) to (vi) are conditional on ( 1 + eFF- eMF) or ( 1 + eMM- eFM) being 
positive. Later econometric estimation of the extended model for the ten study villages 
(chapter 6) shows these elasticity terms to be positive at the sample means. 
30 It is worth pointing out that even resorting to this simplifying assumption, the 
calculations remain very tedious. As a single example, the expression for the 
determinant of the Jacobian matrix involves a sum of 114 terms. Nickell and 
Andrews (1983) operating with a smaller model also made this assumption motivated 
by similar concerns of easing computation of comparative static effects. 
where: 
1 0 0 LM LF 
0 1 0 
-LMM -L MF 
G= 0 0 1 -LFM -LFF 
c1 c2 c3 c4 cs 
01 02 03 04 Os 
L.. = ()L./aw. for i,j = M, F ; and 
IJ I J 
c1 = ~M (wF ~-VF H1 +€MM)+ ~F (wM LM -VM )€tvF 
01 = ~M (wF ~ -vF) ~M + ~F (wM LM -vM) (1+£FF) 
C2=~F1t€MF WM - ( 1 -~M -~F )(wF ~-VF )WM ; 
0 2 = ~F 1t(1 +EFF)wM - ( 1 -~M -~F )(wF ~-VF )wM ; 
c3 = ~M1t(1 +£MM )wF - ( 1 -~M -~F )(wM LM -VM )wF 
0 3 = ~M1t€FM WF - ( 1 -~M -~F )(wM LM -VM )wF ; 
C4 =~F1t€tJF LM -( 1 -~M-~F)(wF ~-VF )LM ; 
04 =~F1t(l+EFF)LM -( 1 -~M-~F)(wF ~-VF )LM 
Cs = ~M1t(l+ €MM )LF - ( 1 -~M -~F )(wMLM-VM )LF 
Os = ~M1t€FM ~- ( 1 -~M -~F )(wMLM-VM )~ . 
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After some extremely laborious calculations, IGI turns out to be a 
rather simple expression. 
It follows from the second-order conditions that IGI >0. The 
comparative static results are presented below. 
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4. 7.1 Change in male labourers' bargaining power (/3M) 
( 4.30) 
( 4.31) 
( 4.32) 
(4.33) 
( 4.34) 
( 4.35) 
(4.36) 
An increase in ~M· with ~F remaining unchanged, implies a 
decline in the employers' bargaining power (1-~M-~F). Thus, a 
negative effect on employers' profits (equation 4.30) is as may be 
expected. 
However, the effects of an increase in male labourers' 
bargaining power on male and female wage rates and employment 
levels depend on the sign of (I + EFF - EMF). If there is only limited 
substitutability between male and female labour, then the condition 
(I + EFF - EMF) > 0 is likely to be satisfied. In that case, equations 
(4.31)-(4.34) show that there will be an increase in the male wage 
rate, a fall in male employment, a decrease in the female wage rate 
and an increase in female employment. It is obvious that the wage 
differential (wM - wF) increases in this case. 
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It is notable that even as the labourers' wage rates and 
employment levels change in opposite directions, the effects on their 
wage earnings are given unconditionally. Thus, with an increase in 
~M· the male wage earnings (wM~) unambiguously increase. And 
they do so irrespective of whether the male wage rate increases or 
decreases, which implies that there is a less than proportionate fall 
in male employment in the former case, but a more than 
proportionate increase in the latter case. The latter case appears less 
obvious.31 However, it should be noted that (i) in this case 
(1 + EFF - EMF)<O, a condition that may be satisfied if male and female 
labour are more readily substitutable, and (ii) the female wage rate 
increases in this case, which in view of the greater substitutability 
between the two labour types, may bring about a proportionately 
larger rise in the employment of male labourers (relative to the 
change in their wage rate). 
Perhaps, the most surprising of the above results is (4.36) 
which shows that a change in male labourers' bargaining power leaves 
female wage earnings unaffected, even as the female wage rate and 
employment both change, though in opposite directions. To see how 
this result arises in the present formulation, note that (4.25) and 
(4.26) above imply the following 
UM -VM = ~M (1+EMM -EFM) 
UF-VF ~F (1+EFF-EMF) ( 4.37) 
31 The former case involving a less than proportionate change in (male) employment 
seems consistent with the intuition about own-wage inelasticity of labour demand. 
Although, it should be remembered that since we are dealing with the total effect on 
male employment in a multi-equation context, inelastic male labour demand (w.r.t. 
male wage) is not a sufficient condition for a less than proportionate change in male 
employment. 
1 1 1 
i.e., for constant elasticities of labour demand, the net payoffs from 
bargaining for male and female labourers are directly proportional to 
their relative bargaining powers.32 From (4.37), it follows that 
aln(UF -VF) = aln(UM -VM) _ 1 
aln~M aln~M 
or, 
a(wF I ) . aln(uM -VM) 
""F =0 ff 1 a~M 1 a1n~M = · 
It is obvious from (4.35) that a(wF~)/a~M must be zero. 
From (4.35) and (4.36), it is also obvious that the differential 
between male and female wage earnings increases with an increase in 
male labourers' bargaining power. 
4. 7.2 Change in female labourers' bargaining power {/3F) 
(4.38) 
(4.42) 
32 Similar proportionality conditions also apply to the ratio of profits to male or 
female net earnings, as already shown by equations (4.25) and (4.26) above. These 
equations are analogous to equation (4. 7) of the basic model. 
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( 4.43) 
(4.44) 
The interpretation of these results is similar to the previous 
case involving parametric variation in the male workers' bargaining 
power. This is because the model treats male and female labour in a 
'symmetrical' fashion. A few additional points are, however, worth 
noting. First, a change in female workers' bargaining power has 
exactly the same effect on employers' profits as a change in the 
bargaining power of male workers. From the employers' point of 
view, therefore, it makes no difference where the change in the 
power relation originates. Second, the condition (l+EFF-EMF )> 0 is 
equivalent to the condition (l+EMM-EFM )> 0. This is obvious on 
noting the sufficient conditions for an interior maximum stated 
earlier. Third, combining the effects of changes in f3M and f3F, some 
interesting special cases may be noted: (i) offsetting changes f3M in 
f3F, viz. df3M = -df3F, leave the employers' profit unchanged, (ii) if both 
f3M and f3F increase, then male and female wage earnings both 
increase while the employers' profits fall. 
4. 7.3. Change in disagreement payoff of male labourers (vM) 
( 4.45) 
( 4.4 7) 
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()(wM LM) 
(1 - (3M) > 0 
dvM = 
( 4.50) 
()(wF'r) -(3M (uF-vF) 
< 0 dVM = (uM-vM) ( 4.51) 
An increase in the disagreement payoff of a player can be 
generally understood as an improvement in that players' relative 
bargaining position. One would expect that with better alternatives at 
his /her disposal, the player will be in a position to secure a better 
outcome in the bargaining contest. However, this proposition is 
strictly valid only when the bargaining set is held fixed. In such a 
case, it has indeed been shown that a large class of bargaining 
solutions (including the Nash solution) are monotonic with respect to 
the disagreement point.33 However, in the more general situation, 
considered here, changes in disagreement payoff also induce changes 
in the bargaining set, (effected through employers' choice of 
employment levels). For this more general case, the monotonicity 
property need not be satisfied. It is, therefore, quite notable that the 
present bargaining model is infact strongly monotonic with respect 
to the disagreement point. As equations (4.45), (4.50) and (4.51) 
33 See Thomson (1987). Monotonicity here implies the following. If the disagreement 
payoff of the ith player increases from di to di', while for all other players dj remains 
constant (dj' = dj for all j :;:i), then the solution f(S, .) should satisfy fi (S,d') ~fi (S,d). 
Thomson also considered a' stronger version of monotonicity requiring not only that 
player i's payoff does not decrease, but also that player i is the only one to gain. He 
shows that if the number of players is greater than two, this stronger monotonicity 
property (even for a fIXed S) is not necessarily satisfied by either the Nash or the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution. 
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show, with an increase in vM, the male labourers gain at the expense 
of both the employers and female labourers. 
The effects of an increase in vM on male and female wage 
rates and employment levels are directionally similar to those 
induced by an increase in ~M (section 4. 7.1), and depend on the sign 
of (1 + EFF - EMF). If (1 + EFF - EMF) > 0, then equations (4.46)-(4.49) 
show that the male wage rate will increase, male employment would 
fall, the female wage rate would decrease and female employment 
would rise. 
As already noted, the effects on male and female wage 
earnings are given unconditionally. This, of course, implies that the 
effects on male (and female) employment are proportionately smaller 
or larger than those on the male (and female) wage rate, depending 
upon whether (1 + EFF - EMF) is positive or negative. The different 
effects in the two cases can be interpreted in terms of the degree of 
substitutability between male and female labour, as already suggested 
in section 4. 7.1 above. 
Finally, it follows from (4.50) and (4.51) that an increase in 
male labourers' disagreement payoff unambiguously widens the 
difference between male and female wage earnings. The difference 
between male and female wage rates is also likely to be widened if 
substitutability between male and female labour is quite limited (see 
(4.48) and (4.49) above). 
4. 7.4 Change in disagreement payoff of female labourers fvF) 
~F[1tEFM+ (UM -vM)(eFM- EMM )] ~ 0 
(l + EMM - EFM)(uF -VF) WM < 
(4.52) 
( 4.53) 
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()(wMLM) -~F (UM -VM) 
CNF 
= < 0 (UF -VF) ( 4.57) 
()(wFLF) (1 - ~F ) > 0 CNF = (4.58) 
Table 4.2: Direction of Comparative Static Effects: Extended Model 
Endogenous Exogenous variable 
variable ~M ~F VM VF 
1t 
LM ~oasAF ~o ;;:::o as AM;::: O < < ~OasAF ~o ;;:::Q as AF;;::: O < < 
LF ;;:::o as AF;;::: O < < ~o as AM ~o ;;:::o as AM;::: o < < ~o as AM ~o 
WM ;;:::o as AF;;::: O < < ~OasAM~o ;;:::o as AM;::: o < < ~OasAM~o 
WF ~OasAF ~o ;;:::o as AM;::: O < < ~OasAF ~o ;;:::Q as AF;;::: O < < 
WMLM + 0 + 
WFLF 0 + + 
Note: AF= 1 + eFF- eMF and AM= 1 + eMM- eFM 
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These results are parallel to the previous case (section 
4. 7.3), and may be interpreted along the same lines. No additional 
comments are necessary. The direction of the various comparative 
static effects considered in sections 4. 7 .1-4. 7 .4 is summarized in 
Table 4.2. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The discussion of this chapter may be concluded by noting 
that the wage bargaining model developed here explains (or, at least, 
is consistent with) several widely-noted features of Indian agricultural 
labour markets. Most significantly, the model is consistent with the 
existence of involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium 
phenomenon, while at the same time explaining variability of wages. 
While I have not modeled labour supply in the above formulation, it is 
obvious that employment at the bargained wage will equal labour 
supply only by accident, or as a comer solution. Also, at the 
equilibrium wage, employment cannot exceed available labour supply, 
for such an outcome simply does not belong to the feasible set subject 
to which bargaining takes place. 
The model is also consistent with the widely observed 
phenomenon of intra-village uniformity of the wage rate (chapters 2 
and 3) despite observable differences in productive abilities of 
individual labourers. In the bargaining model, wage uniformity 
emerges as a consequence of quasi-cooperative behaviour of agents on 
either side of the market. The model, as set out above, is not detailed 
enough to determine operation-specific wages rates for casual labour 
of each sex. But it could be viewed as determining the 'standard' wage 
rate for the crop season, the rates for individual operations being 
fixed relative to the standard wage. 
The model is also consistent with the insulation of village 
labour markets, another widespread feature of the Indian situation. It 
is natural to suppose that the loosely-formed collectivities of 
employers and labourers extend essentially to the village. As argued 
in chapter 3, their emergence itself may be the consequence of 
repeated exchanges among participants personally well-known to 
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each other. For these collectivities to transcend village boundaries, a 
more formalized cooperative apparatus, or at least some active 
political organization would be required. To some extent, this is 
already happening in certain regions of India. But for the most part, 
consistent with the spirit of the wage bargaining model, agricultural 
labour markets are better understood as operating essentially at the 
level of the village. 
The (extended) model may also be used to explain the 
existence of gender disparities in wages as a possible outcome of 
differences in the bargaining powers of male and female labourers, 
though (as the model suggests) this may not be only factor involved. 
The other factors being differences in the disagreement payoffs of 
male and female labourers, and own- and cross-wage elasticities of 
demand for male and female hired labour. 
Perhaps, the most attractive feature of the proposed model 
is that by operationalizing the notion of bargaining power in an 
unambiguous fashion, it offers a particular method of empirically 
measuring unequal power in rural labour markets and assessing its 
impact on distributional outcomes. These issues are addressed as 
part of the empirical estimation undertaken in the following 
chapters. 
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CHAPTERS 
Estimation of the Basic Wage Bargaining Model for Indian Agricultural 
Labour Markets 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this and the following chapter is to implement 
empirically the bargain-theoretic model of the (village-level) 
agricultural labour market proposed in chapter 4. This chapter deals 
with the estimation of the basic model of section 4.4; the estimation 
of the extended model of section 4.6 is dealt with in chapter 6. The 
estimation is based on the ICRISAT data set pertaining to the ten 
study villages already introduced in chapter 3. 
A particular concern of the empirical investigation is to 
estimate the relative bargaining powers of agricultural labourers and 
their employers, and to test if the estimates indicate the presence of 
significant asymmetries. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2-5.6 deal 
with model specification issues. Section 5. 7 describes the data set, 
model variables and measurement procedures. The rest of the 
chapter deals with estimation of the econometric model beginning 
with the unrestricted specification in section 5.8. Data-consistent 
restrictions lead to the preferred specification of section 5.9, where 
the main results are presented and discussed. The final section 
examines the sensitivity of estimates of the bargaining power 
coefficient to alternative assumptions about the employers' 
disagreement payoff. 
5.2 Specification of Functional Forms 
The basic theoretical model of the village-level agricultural 
labour market (section 4.4) consists of a simultaneous system 
involving the following three relations: 
119 
(i) the profit function (equation (4.1)): 1t = 1t (w, p, z) 
(ii) the labour demand function (equation (4.2)): L = L(w, p, z) 
(iii) the bargained-wage function (equation (4.5)), which in general 
form may be written w = w(1t, L, v, ~; ~). 
To implement econometric estimation of the model, these 
three functions now need to be particularized. The profit and labour 
demand functions may be specified using the so-called dual approach 
to production economics. As for the wage function, it may be noted 
that its form is already determined by the (Nash) bargaining solution. 
Equation (4.5) may thus be rearranged to obtain 
~v + (1-~) 1t W=-------
~l - (1-~) ~ (1t/L) (5.1) 
The specification of the labourers' disagreement payoff (v), which 
may not be directly observable, and the slope of labour demand (~) 
are discussed later. 
Before considering functional forms for the profit and labour 
demand functions, the following should be noted. (i) Writing 1t and L 
as functions of w, p and z does not per se involve the behavioural 
assumption of profit-maximization. However, if profits are indeed 
being maximized with respect to the employment of labour (at given 
w, p, z), then 1t- and L-functions will be related by the condition 
L = -1tw (by Hotelling's Lemma, see Varian, 1984), the latter, in turn, 
implying certain restrictions across the estimating equations for 1t 
and L. Whether these restrictions are satisfied or not is of course an 
empirical issue, and will be treated as such in later estimation, where 
the restrictions will be tested rather than imposed. 
(ii) On account of the simultaneity introduced by the wage 
equation (5.1), the wage variable appearing in the 1t-function (as also 
in the labour demand function) should be considered endogenous. I 
1 While the wage rate is expected to be endogenous on theoretical grounds, its 
endogeneity in then- and L-functions may not be statistically significant. This will be 
formally tested later. 
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However, the dependence of the bargained wage on the level of 
profits does not preclude the possibility that the latter may still be 
represented by an indirect profit function in the usual manner 
(which presupposes profit-maximization at given prices of variable 
inputs).2 This is so because in the present formulation the level of 
employment is not on the bargaining agenda (see section 4.4). Thus, 
while bargaining for the wage rate, both parties presumably 
understand that labour hiring decisions would be unilaterally made by 
the employers. So, whatever the bargained wage outcome, the 
employers can take it as given in deciding how much labour to 
employ.3 As suggested in (i) above, the labour hiring decisions may or 
may not be made in accordance with profit-maximization. But neither 
possibility can be ruled out a priori. 
Various functional forms for profit functions have been 
proposed in the rather voluminous literature on the applications of 
duality theory.4 Two considerations have usually been emphasized in 
the choice of functional forms: (a) the functional form be linear in 
parameters so that linear regression methods can be readily applied, 
and (b) it provides a second-order approximation to any arbitrary 
twice-differentiable profit function satisfying the appropriate 
regularity conditions (Diewert, 1973). 
The first consideration is not particularly relevant in the 
present context since we already have a nonlinear system by virtue of 
2 I ref er here to indirect profit functions with the usual properties (see, for instance, 
Diewert, 1973, p.293), although the concept of indirect profit functions can be extended 
to situations where the assumption of parametrically given prices is relaxed. See, for 
example, Lau (1978) and Diewert (1982). 
3 Stated differently, the bargained-wage equation simply indicates a method of 
selecting a point on the labour demand cmve, while the demand for labour itself could 
possibly be derived from profit-maximizing behaviour of the employers. 
4 See, for instance, Diewert (1973), Lau (1978) and Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak 
(1978). 
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the nonlinear bargained wage equation (5.1). Going by the second 
consideration, one may choose among the following three well-
known (second-order) functional forms: the generalized Leontief, the 
normalized quadratic, and the translog. All these functional forms 
provide numerically equivalent second-order approximations to 
arbitrary functions (Lau, 1974). For the present study, the normalized 
quadratic (NQ) specification of the profit function is selected, mainly 
in the interest of reducing the degree of nonlinearity in the system.5 
Notice that a NQ profit function implies a labour demand function 
that is linear in both parameters and variables. 
Hence, fork fixed inputs (z1, z2 , ... zk), n-1 non-labour 
variable inputs with (nominal) prices (p 1, p2 , ... pn_ 1) and the output 
price (pn) used as numeraire, the normalized profit and labour 
demand functions may be written 
n-1 2 n-1 n-1 
ft= a0 + a0 w + L aipi + 0.5 (y00w +LL ~ipipi) 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
n-1 k k k k k 
+ "r. .wp. +LB .wz. + L8i'piz. + L<l>i~ +0.5 LL'l'i·ziz. 
-tr 01 I i=1 01 I i=1 J J i=1 i=1 i=1 J J (5.2) 
n-1 k 
L = - (ab+ Y~ow + ~Y~ipi + ~8~izi) (5.3) 
where ft= n/pn= normalized profits (total revenue less total variable 
costs, divided by price of output), 
5 It may be noted that the Cobb-Douglas form, used in a number of studies such as 
Yotopoulos and Lau (1974), Sidhu and Baanante (1979), Kalirajan and Shand (1982), is 
clearly inappropriate in the present context since the Cobb-Douglas profit function (as 
the self-dual to a Cobb-Douglas production function) forces own-price input demand 
elasticities to be greater than unity in absolute terms (see Chand and Kaul, 1986). 
However, as obseived in section 4.4, the proposed wage bargaining model is not 
defined if the absolute wage elasticity of labour demand is greater than unity 
Moreover, little empirical support (outside of studies using the Cobb-Douglas 
specification) can be claimed for wage-elastic demand for labour in Indian 
agriculture. See note 32 in chapter 3. 
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w = w/pn= normalized wage rate, 
Pi= P/Pn= normalized price of ith (non-labour) variable input, 
for i=l, 2 ... n-1. 
If profits are maximized with respect to labour (at given w, p, z), 
then the following restrictions should hold: 
(I 2) 'Y.'. = 'Y. . for i=O, 1, ... n-1 
• 01 01 
(I 3) 8' .=8. fori=1, 2, ... k. 
• 01 01 
The wage equation (5.1) may also be written in normalized 
form. Thus, dividing throughout by Pn= 
_ J3v + (1-J3)ft W=------
J3l - (1-J3)Lw(ft/L) (5.4) 
Further, since the labour demand curve is linear in the wage rate, Lw 
is a constant so that (5.4) may be written 
_ J3v + (1-J3)ft 
W=-------
J3l + y~~(1-J3) (ft/L) (5.5) 
If the slope of the labour demand in the bargained-wage function is 
the same as that in the labour demand equation, then the condition 
(II) 'Yd~ = 'Y~o 
should be satisfied. 
5.3 Specification of Fixed and Variable Inputs 
In order to distinguish between the fixed and variable inputs 
appearing as quantity and price arguments of the employers' profit 
function, it is important to know who the employers in question are. 
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For the same input could possibly be fixed for one category of farmer-
employers but variable for another. 
With reference to the ICRISAT data set for the ten study 
villages (and in keeping with the motivation of the wage bargaining 
model), the employers are identified with the group of medium and 
large farmers. In terms of the data collection procedures adopted by 
the ICRISAT investigators, this refers to the top two-thirds of the 
cultivator households in any village when the latter are ranked by 
descending size of their operational holdings. Thus, the definition of 
medium and large farm households is village-specific, being sensitive 
to the size-distribution of operational holdings in the village. 6 
In identifying the village employers with the large and 
medium farm households, it is not intended to deny that small 
farmers also hire agricultural labour.7 However, the reason why the 
small farm households are not included among the employers is that 
(a) the small farm households are mainly labouring households, 8 and 
(b) given the rather small amounts of farm labour hired by them, the 
small farm households as employers do not appear to have much of a 
role in the village wage formation process.9 
For the group of medium- and large-farm cultivators, the 
fixed and variable inputs may be identified as follows: 
6 See section 3.2 and Table 3A.2 for the definition of different categories of cultivator 
households and the farm-size classifications for the ten study villages. 
7 This feature of Indian agriculture is quite well-known. See, for instance, Bharadwaj 
(1974, chapter 3), Rudra and Mukhopadhya (1976), Ghodke, Ryan and Sarin (1978). 
Rudra (1982b, chapter 17). 
8 Thus, for instance, in the three study villages of Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara, 
while crop income accounted for 23, 20 and 17 percent of the mean income of small 
farm households during 1975-1976 to 1979-80, income from labour contributed 43, 47 
and 62 percent respectively. See Walker, Singh, Asokan and Binswanger (1983). 
9 See section 3.6 above. Also see Rudra (1982a, chapter 9). 
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(1) Fixed inputs: land, irrigated and unirrigated; family labour; family 
bullock labour. 
(2) Variable inputs: hired labour; hired bullock labour; seeds, 
manures, fertilizers, pesticides and machine hours. 
Thus, family and hired labour are distinguished as separate 
inputs. This is in view of the imperfect substitutability between family 
and hired labour that has been frequently emphasized in the context 
of Indian agriculture, for instance, by Bharadwaj (1974), Rudra 
(1982b, chapter 15), and more recently by Deolalikar and Vijverberg 
(1987). Further, family labour is treated as a.fixed input for the 
medium and large cultivators. As argued by Rudra (1982b), the 
application of family labour may be quite independent of the wage 
rate. It is notable that in the study villages, medium and large farm 
households' participation (as wage labourers) in the labour market is 
quite limited. Thus, in Kanzara village (1975-76), the labour market 
participation rates of medium and large farm households were 0.26, 
0.05 for males and 0.25, 0.0 for females, as against the participation 
rates of 0.61 and 0.45 for males and females from labour households 
(Subrahmanyam and Ryan, 1976). Similarly, for the six villages of 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, Ryan, Ghodke and Sarin (1980) 
found the labour market participation rates for medium and large 
farm categories to be significantly lower than those for labour or 
small farm households. IO 
Similarly, family bullock labour is considered a fixed input 
for the medium and large farmers insofar as the latter appear to take 
only limited recourse to hiring out their owned draft animal power. 
Notice in this context the findings of Vaidyanathan's (1982) study of 
bovines in Indian agriculture: 
10 The minimal participation in the labour market by the family members of larger 
landholding households possibly reflects considerations of social and economic 
status; not having to engage in wage labour being regarded an indicator of superior 
social and economic standing. 
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When we look at variations within a given region, [draft] animals of 
larger farmers are seen to be used mostly on their own farms; the 
proportion of days worked by their animals which are given out on 
hire is generally much lower than for small farmers. Interestingly, 
exchange arrangements seem to be much more widespread among 
them. On the whole, hiring of animals seems to take place largely 
among the small farmers. (Vaidyanathan, 1982, p.66).11 
The land input refers to gross cropped areas (irrigated and 
unirrigated) for the group of medium and large farm households in 
the village as a whole. Even though cultivated areas for individual 
crop may be considered as optimizing variables, it seems reasonable 
to expect that the total area cropped by medium and large farmers in 
the village is largely exogenously given. 
The classification of seeds, manures, fertilizers, pesticides 
and machine hours as variable inputs is self-explanatory. 
5.4 Specification of Disagreement Payoffs 
The disagreement payoff for the employers was assumed to 
be at zero profits in the theoretical model of section 4.4. This was 
based on the underlying premise that if in any given crop season the 
employers fail to reach an agreement on the bargained wage with the 
village labourers, they would simply forgo cultivation during that 
season. It may be thought that the employers could alternatively 
cultivate with labour hired from outside the village. This is, however, 
not a realistic alternative for most purposes. Employment of outside 
labour, even for villages where it occurs with some regularity, is a 
primarily seasonal phenomenon limited to relatively brief periods of 
peak labour use (see sections 2.5 and 3.6 above). It would be 
unrealistic to assume that the existing channels of labour movement 
are flexible enough to enable the employers to meet their labour 
requirements for the entire crop season through outside labour. And 
even if that were somehow possible, it is unlikely that the local 
village labourers would allow it to happen. In sum, therefore, 
cultivation with outside labour does not appear to constitute a 
11 A similar finding is also reported by Junankar (1982). 
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credible threat that the employers can hold out to the village 
labourers, and the former's disagreement payoff is better identified 
with the alternative of non-cultivation implying zero profits. 
As for the workers' disagreement payoff, in applications 
pertaining to developed-country labour markets, such as Brown and 
Ashenfelter (1986) and Svejnar (1986), it is commonly specified by 
reference to the wage rate in some alternative employment.12 If the 
latter is denoted wa' the net gains from agreement to the workers 
(i.e., the difference between their agreement and disagreement 
payoffs) could be written13 
u - v = (w - wa) L 
where it is, of course, presumed that wa < w. One could then simply 
replace the v appearing in the wage equation with waL. 
In the empirical context of the present study, it seemed at 
first that the above· approach was readily implementable given the 
availability of (ICRISAT) data on norifarm wage rate (denoted wn) and 
nonfarm wage-employment (denoted Ln) for the village labourers. 
Nonfarm wage employment includes (a) wage work for private 
nonfarmer employers and (b) wage work on public projects. 
However, there are a number of problems in using the nonfarm 
employment data to specify the alternative wage, wa, as in the above 
formulation. 
(i) The availability of nonfarm employment (Ln) is, in 
practice, quite limited. Hence, it cannot be assumed that anyone 
l2 The alternative wage may also take account of unemployment benefits. 
13 This may be derived from: 
u = wL + (N-L) ~.and 
v=N~ 
where N is the total supply of labour (or, in the union-firm models, the membership of 
the union). 
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failing to secure farm employment will be certain to find nonfarm 
wage work. 
(ii) For such nonfarm employment as is available, the 
nonfarm wage (wn) is often higher than the farm wage (w). Even the 
expected nonfarm wage (defined as (qwn) where q is the probability 
of finding nonfarm employment) turned out to be greater than win 
many cases, indicating that nonfarm employment rather than being a 
fallback position may frequently be the preferred form of 
employment for the village labourers. 
(iii) The data on nonfarm wage earnings (wn Ln) of the 
village labourers relate to what they are already earning besides their 
income from farm labour. That is, the data refer to a situation of 
'agreement' as far as the farm labour market is concerned, and thus 
do not indicate what the labourers would have earned (from nonfarm 
labour) had they failed to reach an agreement on the bargained farm 
wage. 
In the view of (i)-(iii) above, a somewhat different approach 
is used to identify the labourers' disagreement payoff. Accordingly, 
the labourers' agreement payoff (in normalized terms) is defined as14 
O' = wl +y 
where y (= wnln) is the normalized nonfarm wage income which the 
labourers are already earning (in a situation of 'agreement' in the 
farm labour market). 
Next, the labourers' disagreement payoff (also normalized) is 
specified as 
l4 The symbol - over a variable indicates that it is normalized by the output price, Pn-
Normalized expressions are used here to be consistent with the normalized forms 
introduced in section 5.2. The prime (') on u (and on v below) is used to distinguish it 
from u (and v) as defmed in the theoretical formulation of section 4.4. 
128 
where µ0 and µ 1 are unknown parameters to be estimated. 
Thus, (µ0 + µ1 Y) is the additional income the labourers may earn in the 
event of non-agreement in the farm labour market. Since µ0 and µ 1 
are estimable parameters, no a priori restrictions are placed on the 
exact magnitude of the additional income. It is, however, assumed 
that the latter can be approximated as a linear function of the 
labourers' existing nonfarm wage earnings. 
Hence, 
o·- v' = wL - (µ + µ y) 0 1 
- -
= u -v 
(5.6) 
One would expect µ 1 to be non-negative. Substituting (5.6) into (5.5) 
above, the following specification of the wage equation is obtained 
- f3 (µo + µ1 Y) + (1-f3)1t w = _ __.;.. _ _..;._ __ _ 
f3L + y~~ (1-f3)(1t/L) (5.7) 
It may be noted that the above specification of the labourers' 
disagreement payoff solely in terms of their nonfarm wage earnings is 
a simplification. One would expect other variables to be relevant, in 
particular, those indicating the availability of (and the labourers' 
access to) common property resources.IS However, no data were 
available on these additional variables. 
15 The importance of common property resources as income supplements for the poor 
labour and small farm households has been emphasized by Jodha (1985, 1986). Jodha 
provides many examples of activities based on common property resources, which 
include collecting and marketing products (such as firewood, fodder, various wild 
fruits, roots, honey, gum, timber, fish, small game, silt and clay from the river and 
tank beds), and processing and handicrafts based on common property products (such 
as making beedis, rope, baskets and pickle). 
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5.6 The Wage Equation Again: Relaxing Risk Neutrality 
It has thus far been assumed that the payoff functions of 
employers and labourers satisfy risk neutrality (see section 4.4). The 
latter assumption has been latent in the procedure of defining the 
agreement and disagreement payoffs simply as the absolute 
magnitudes of realized or fallback incomes of employers and 
labourers (i.e., their profits and wage earnings respectively). Since 
the imposition of risk neutrality on the payoff functions may be 
considered restrictive, an alternative formulation of the wage 
equation is derived below which nests the hypothesis of risk 
neutrality. To introduce non-neutral attitudes to risk, it is sufficient 
to define the payoffs as any nonlinear (utility) function of the absolute 
income magnitudes. It is convenient though to consider isoelastic 
functions which permit an easy parametrization of the degree of 
relative risk aversion. 
Before considering the alternative specification of the wage 
equation, it should however be noted that the methodology used thus 
far is not as restrictive as it may appear. For instance, if the attitudes 
to risk could be parameterized as isoelastic functions of the net gains 
from agreement, then the differences in the two parties' relative risk 
aversion would be fully reflected in their respective bargaining 
powers. Notice that the Nash bargaining problem in this case could 
be written 
max 
w 
where (l-p 1) and (l-p2) are the Arrow-Pratt measures of relative risk 
aversion (see Arrow, 1970, chapter 3) for the employers and 
labourers respectively. It is obvious that the higher is a party's 
aversion to risk, correspondingly lower is its bargaining power (as 
measured by the coefficient on its net gains).16 
16 Notice that this special case illustrates the risk sensitivity property of the Nash 
solution as proved by Kihlstorm, Roth and Schmeidler (1981). Also see section 4.2 
above. 
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However, if risk postures are parameterized not with 
respect to the net gains, but for agreement and disagreement payoffs 
separately, then the bargaining power of the labourers no longer 
adequately reflects the latter's relative risk aversion. (The employers' 
relative risk aversion is still incorporated in their bargaining power.) 
For this case, an alternative specification of the wage function may be 
derived from the Nash bargaining problem written as followsI7 
where 
m9x (it)~ (U - V) 1 -~ 
w 
(wL + y{ 
U= p 
and (1-p) measures the labourers' relative risk aversion. 
The first-order condition yields the following wage equation in 
implicit form 
It is easy to check that if the labourers are risk neutral (p=l), then 
(5.8) collapses to the earlier specification (5. 7). 
5. 7 Data, Variables and Measurement 
The ICRISAT data set used to estimate the wage bargaining 
model provides 112 cross-section x time-series observations on the 
model variables pertaining to the ten study villages and spanning over 
l7 Note that maximizing the normalized Nash product with respect to the normalized 
wage is identical to maximizing the nominal Nash product with respect to the 
nominal wage. 
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the period 1975-76 to 1984-85.18 However, not all years are covered 
for each village. In all, the data set relates to 56 village-years, and two 
crop seasons, viz., kharif and rabi, for each village year. (Thus, any 
single observation relates to a particular village, year and crop 
season.) Kharif and rabi refer to the rainy and post-rainy seasons of 
the agricultural year respectively.19 It should be noted that since they 
refer to distinct crop seasons, it is possible to define and measure 
farm profits for the kharif and rabi crops separately for each village-
year. 20 The 56 village-years covered by the data set are as under: 
Aurepalle 1975-76 to 1984-85 Dokur 1975-76 to 1977-78 
Shirapur 1975-76 to 1984-85 Kalman 1975-76to1977-78 
Kanzara 1975-76 to 1984-85 K.inkheda 1975-76 to 1976-77 
Boriya 1980-81 to 1984-85 Rampura 1980-81to1984-85 
Pa pd a 1981-82 to 1984-85 Rampura Kalan 1981-82 to 1984-85 
The model variables, exogenous and endogenous, are 
described below. 
Exogenous variables: 
These include the quantities of fixed inputs, the prices of non-labour 
variable inputs and labourers' nonfarm wage earnings. The following 
four fixed inputs are included:21 
18 For further details on the ten study villages and the ICRISAT data set, see chapter 3 
(particularly sections 3.2-3.5) and ICRISAT (1987). 
l9 The rabi season also includes what are classified as summer crops planted after the 
rabi season in the month of March or April. The cultivation of summer crops in the 
study villages is, however, quite limited. 
20 The minimum period over which farm profits can be defined needs to cover a full 
crop cycle (from field preparation to harvesting and harvest processing), and for this 
reason any further intra-year disaggregation of the data is not possible. 
21 See Table 5.1 for the units of measurement of model variables. 
z 1 =gross cropped unirrigated area, 
z2 = gross cropped irrigated area, 
z3 =family labour, and 
z4 = family bullock labour. 
Two non-labour variable input prices are included: 
p 1 =rental rate for bullock labour, and 
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p 2 = a composite price index for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
manures and machine hours. 
The composite price index p2 was constructed using expenditure 
weights, as: 
r p.q. l 
P2 = '_L LI L ~.~.J Pi for j = seeds, fertilizers, pesticides 
i 1 1 manures and machine hours. 
The need for aggregating these variable inputs arose on account of 
the limited degrees of freedom, particularly in view of the normalized 
quadratic form of the profit function which involves a large number of 
parameters to be estimated for each additional argument. 22 
The other exogenous variable is: 
y = nonfarm wage earnings of the labourers. 
As mentioned before, the nonfarm wage earnings of the labourers 
relate to wage work done by the latter for private nonfarm employers 
as well as on government projects. Although listed as an exogenous 
variable here, y is later excluded from the set of instruments used in 
estimation due to the possibility of some endogeneity (see section 
5.8.2 below). 
22 This is equally true of other flexible functional forms, such as the generalized 
Leontief and the translog. 
Endogenous variables: 
These include the following: 
1t = farm profits of the employers, 
L = hired (farm) labour, and 
w = the daily wage rate for hired farm labour. 
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Profits are defined as gross crop income minus all variable costs. 
Gross crop income is the value of main and byproducts produced 
during the crop season, including imputed values, at village-specific 
harvest prices, for part of the produce that may not be offered for 
sale in the market. Similarly, total variable costs also include (besides 
all paid-out costs for variable inputs) imputed values (at village-
specific prices) for such variable inputs as may be (partly) home-
produced, e.g. seeds or manures. 
The data on hired farm labour use, though originally in 
hourly units, is converted into days using seven hours of work per day 
as the norm.23 Thus, the daily wage rate also relates to a seven-hours 
day.24 The daily wage includes both wages paid in cash and kind, the 
latter converted to cash values at the prevailing local prices. With the 
exception of Aurepalle, however, the in-kind component of wages is 
quite small in the study villages (see Singh, Asokan and Walker, 
1982). 
Since the present study takes its unit of analysis as the 
village, all the model variables are measured as village-level 
aggregates or averages for the group of village employers or labourers. 
In particular, for any village-year-season: 
23 Ryan and Ghodke (1984) found the average hours worked per day by casual 
labourers to be about seven for the study villages of Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra. 
24 The daily wage rate was thus evaluated as (total wages paid /labour hours hired) x 7. 
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(i) the price variables (w, p 1, p2) are measured as average prices25 
paid by the sample of 20 medium and large farm households. 
(ii) the quantity variables (L, z 1 -z4 ) are measured as totals for the 
sample of 20 medium and large farm households, divided by the 
sampling fraction (for medium and large farm households) to arrive at 
aggregates for the village employers as a whole. 
(iii) the profits of the employers (7t) are measured as (ii) above. 
(iv) the nonfarm wage earnings of the labourers (y) are measured as 
total nonfarm wage earnings for the sample of 20 labour and small 
farm (but mainly labouring) households, divided by the sampling 
fraction for the latter, to obtain aggregates for village labourers as a 
whole. 
Since nonfarm employment data are not disaggregated by 
crop season (the latter having no special relevance for nonfarm 
employment), the values for y corresponding to the kharif and rabi 
seasons were estimated as follows: earnings over the period June to 
mid-November were taken to constitute the kharif season values, 
and those over the period mid-November to May the corresponding 
values for the rabi season. The cutoff point of mid-November roughly 
conforms to the crop calender for the study region.26 
The price of aggregate output is used to normalize the 
nominal values of the relevant variables: 7t, w, p 1, p2 , y. The aggregate 
output price (for a given village-year-season) is itself measured as the 
revenue-weighted average price of output of different crops produced 
on the village employers' farms during the crop season. Thus 
measured, it obviously depends on the crop mix which varies over 
village and crop season, and to a lesser extent, also over years. As 
25 The averages are weighted by the quantity of the variable input used by a farm 
household. 
26 See ICRISAT (1987). Also see Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (1986) Basic 
Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy, Table 7.19. 
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before, the symbol - over a variable denotes its normalized value. 
Sample means and standard deviations of the model variables along 
with their units of measurement are given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Model Variables 
{No. of observations = 112) 
Variable Descrietion Units Mean Standard Deviation 
Endogenous Variables: 
1t nominal profits Rs 294,543.31 350,423.49 
L hired labour days 15, 130.62 15,340.17 
w nominal wage rate Rs/day 3.93 1.67 
Exogenous Variables: 
P1 nominal bullock rental Rs/hr 1.74 0.67 
P2 nominal price of Rs/unit 3.31 1.10 
other variable inputs 
zl gross unirrigated area acres 765.61 756.74 
Z2 gross irrigated area acres 151.01 142.48 
Z3 family labour days 9,354.50 7,455.43 
Z4 family bullock labour hrs 27,956.29 28,224.85 
y nominal nonfarm wage Rs 27,260.15 30,964.94 
earnings of labourers 
Output price Rs/kg 1.91 0.71 
Normalized Variables: 
ft 1t/output price kg 165,463.56 178,189.55 
w w/output price kg/day 2.18 0.93 
P1 p1/output price kg/hr 1.01 0.52 
P2 Pioutput price kg/unit 1.83 1.10 
y ~/output price kg 17,257.45 21,297.05 
5.8 The Econometric Model and Estimation 
In view of the foregoing discussion, the econometric model 
can be written 
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(5.9) 
4 
L = -(ac, + Y~ow + Yo1 P1 + Yo2P2 + z}>~i~) + '\)2 (5.10) 
i=1 
p(wL + yt -p(µ0 +(1 +µ1 )y)P + p(1-P)(y0·0w - L)(wL + yt-1 (it/L) = u3 
( 5.11) 
where 8-0• a's, p, y's, O's, <j>'s, 'Jf1S and µ's are parametric and (Ul, U2, U3) 
vectors of error terms with zero mean and non-diagonal variance-
covariance matrix. The u1's are assumed to be independently 
distributed. Though the present study uses pooled cross-section x 
time-series data set, there appears little reason to be concerned 
about serial correlation given that the maximum number of years 
covered for any single village is ten. However, the possibility of 
heteroskedastic disturbances over the cross-sections is examined in 
Appendix 5A. 
I first estimate the above equations as single (non-
simultaneous) equations, using ordinary least squares for (5.9) and 
(5.10). and nonlinear least squares for (5.11). 
5.8.1 Single Equation Estimation and Testing for Endogeneity of 
Wage Variables 
The purpose of single equation estimation is two-fold: (i) to 
test for the endogeneity of regressors involving the wage variable in 
equations (5.9) and (5.10), and (ii) the single equation estimates 
provide the initial values for parameters that may be used in 
nonlinear systems estimation later (if the hypothesis of regressor 
exogeneity is rejected). 
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The results of single equation estimation of the profit, 
labour demand and wage functions are given in Tables 5.2a, 5.2b and 
5.2c respectively. The discussion of these estimates is, at present, 
Table 5.2a: Single Equation Parameter Estimates: The Profit Function 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 243949.1 803 -7.674 <l>3 0.6594 
(2.092) (-0.949) (0.041) 
a.o -92335.2 804 3.209 <l>4 7.210 
(-1.121) (1.255) (1.197) 
CX.1 -111838.0 8n 229.90 'I'll -0.2305 
(-0.588) (0.956) (-1.991) 
CX.2 -66063.9 812 1681.19 '1'12 -0.3623 
(-1.184) (1.925) (-0.748) 
Yoo 22755.0 813 25.757 '1'13 0.0177 
(0.395) (1.130) (1.965) 
'¥01 -5447.4 814 -17.163 '1'14 0.0062 
(-0.056) (-1.887) (1.776) 
'¥02 26267.6 821 -41.018 '1'22 -2.683 
(1.243) (-0.527) (-0.907) 
'Yn 35125.9 822 -451.25 '1'23 0.0236 
(0.128) (-1.510) (0.512) 
'¥12 -41080.9 823 -2.982 '1'24 0.0094 
(-0.856) (-0.340) (0.660) 
'¥22 25249.3 824 2.187 '1'33 -8.47x10-4 
(1.011) (0.684) (-0.604) 
801 -50.220 <I> 1 -89.283 '1'34 -8.71x10-s 
(-0.480) (-0.488) (-0.262) 
802 -45.177 <1>2 241.41 '1'44 -2.73x1 o-4 
{-0.153} {0.288} {-1.728} 
2 _2 
Note: R =0.7622; R =0.6577. 
Number of observations= 112. Figures in parentheses give t-ratios. 
not particularly relevant since the primary concern here is to test for 
simultaneous equation effects. Indeed, if the latter are significant, the 
single equation parameter estimates will be inconsistent and biased. 
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Table 5.2b: Single Equation Parameter Estimates: The Labour 
Demand Function 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
a.• 0 -3743.47 0~1 -0.4671 
(-2.015) (-0.331) 
'Y~o 2773.78 0~2 -42.807 
(2.924) (-6.435) 
'Y ~1 -3939.59 0~3 0.0322 
(-1.887) (0.200) 
'Y ~2 1305.74 0~4 -0.3337 
(1. 763) (-7.143) 
2 _2 
Note: R =0.8446; R =0.8341. 
Number of obseivations = 112. Figures in parentheses give t-ratios. 
Table 5.2c: Single Equation Parameter Estimates: The Wage Function 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
µo 31479.57 'Y" 00 15716 
(6.05) (3.32) 
µ1 0.8675 p 1.674 
(2.30) (7.55) 
f3 0.9089 
(75.11) 
2 Note: R = 0.6642. 
Number of observations= 112. Figures in parentheses give t-ratios. 
The endogeneity of the wage variables in (5.9) and (5.10) is 
tested using the Wu-Hausman test.27 The test is conducted by 
including as additional regressors the residuals from the regression 
of variables, suspected to be endogenous, on a set of instruments, and 
then testing for the joint significance of the added regressors (see 
Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981). The latter may be tested by means 
27 The Wu-Hausman test is based on the T2 statistic in Wu (1973), or equivalently on 
the 'computationally convenient statistic' in Hausman (1978). The two were shown to 
be identical by Nakamura and Nakamura (1981). 
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of the usual F-test. The results of the Wu-Hausman test for the profit 
and labour demand functions are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: The Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity of Wage Variables 
Variable(s) suspected Test statistic 95% 
to be endogenous critical value 
Labour demand function w F(1, 103)=5.8511 3.9355 
Profit function _2 - -w, w ' wp1 ' wp2 F(B,70)=3.6395 2.0816 
Note: Instruments used: natural logarithm of p1, p2,z 1.z 2.z 3.z 4, output price, and a crop 
season dummy. 
Since the test statistics in Table 5.3 are much higher than 
their respective 95% critical values, it may be inferred that the 
endogeneity of the wage variables in both the labour demand and 
profit functions is statistically significant. The model (5.9)-(5.11) will 
henceforth be estimated as a nonlinear simultaneous system. 
5.8.2 Simultaneous Equation Estimation and Testing for Cross-
equation Restrictions 
Consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimates of the 
structural parameters of a system of (implicit) nonlinear simultaneous 
equations may be obtained using the nonlinear three-stage least 
squares (NL3S) estimator (Gallant, 1977; Amemiya, 1985, chapter 8). 
Alternatively, it is possible to use the nonlinear full information 
maximum likelihood (NLFI) estimator. In a comparison of the two 
estimators, Amemiya ( 1977) showed that while the NLFI is 
asymptotically more efficient than the NL3S, the latter is more robust 
against non-normality because it is consistent provided the error 
term has zero mean and finite higher-order moments, whereas the 
consistency of NLFI crucially depends on the assumption of a 
normally distributed error process. Th.is latter property makes the 
NL3S estimator more attractive. Further, since it is computationally 
less demanding, the NL3S is preferred as the estimation method for 
the present study. 
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If 0 be the set of unknown structural parameters, the NL3S 
estimator of e is obtained by minimizing 
-1 
S(0) = u' (t ® Z(Z'Zf1Z') u 
where t is a consistent estimate of :E, the variance-covariance matrix 
of the error term u, and could be based on the nonlinear two-stage 
residuals. Z is a matrix of instruments. Following the suggestion of 
Jorgenson and Laffont (1974) and Gallant (1977). the instruments 
may be defined as functions of the exogenous variables.28 
For the present model, the instruments are the constructed 
as first-, second- and third-order terms in p1 , p2, z1 , z2, z3, z4 • The 
labourers' nonfarm wage earnings y, is excluded from the set of 
instrumental variables to deal with the possible measurement error 
on account of the approximate nature of its decomposition into values 
for the kharif and rabi seasons (see section 5.7). There may also be 
some endogeneity to the extent wage work for private non-farmer 
employers (which is one component of y apart from work on public 
projects) may depend on other endogenous variables of the model. 
However, it should be parenthetically noted that even the inclusion of 
y among the instruments made little difference to the results.29 
NL3S estimation was first undertaken for the model (5.9)-
(5.11) in unrestricted form, i.e., without imposing the cross-equation 
restrictions implied by conditions (I.1)-(1.3), (II) above. Next, the 
model was reparameterized incorporating these restrictions. NL3S 
28 Though this is not strictly necessary for the consistency or asymptotic normality 
of the NL3S estimator. See Gallant (1977). 
29 It may be noted that I have not discussed the problem of model identification. 
However, it is not a serious omission given that nonlinearity helps rather than 
hampers identification. For instance, in contrast to the linear case, a sufficiently 
nonlinear model is likely to be identified even if all exogenous variables appear in 
each structural equation (see.Amemiya, 1977, pp. 956-957; also see.Amemiya, 1983). 
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parameter estimates of the restricted model are given in Table 5.4. 
The estimation procedure also corrects for heteroskedasticity in the 
labour demand function. Details on testing for heteroskedasticity and 
the correction procedure are given in Appendix SA. 
The 9 cross-equation restrictions (conditions 1.1-1.3 and II) 
pertaining to the employers maximizing profits with respect to hired 
labour and the L- and w-functions sharing the same L_ coefficient, are 
w 
tested using the X2 test developed by Gallant and Jorgenson (1979). 
The test statistic To is obtained as the difference between the 
constrained and the unconstrained NL3S minimands (the same t 
being used for both, restricted and unrestricted, versions of the 
model). It is asymptotically distributed as X2 with degrees of freedom 
given by the difference between the number of freely varying 
parameters in the unrestricted and restricted models. 
The test statistic for the null hypothesis that conditions 
(I.1)-(I.3) and (II) are satisfied is To =12.785 (see Table 5.4), which is 
less than the critical value of X2 (9) =16.92 at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The restrictions are, therefore, accepted. It is also 
significant that the estimate of the labourers' relative risk aversion 
parameter is p =0.9436 with a standard error of 0.1899 (see Table 
5.4), which indicates that the hypothesis of risk neutrality on the 
part of the labourers, i.e. p =l, is statistically acceptable (t=-0.297).30 
30 Risk neutrality possibly reflects the agricultural labourers' extremely low levels of 
living, levels at which their marginal valuation of income may be roughly constant. 
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Table 5.4: Heteroskedasticity-corrected NL3S Estimates with Cross-
equation Restrictions 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 21703.3 Bn 177.86 '1'13 0.0107 
(0.14) (0.77) (0.78) 
ao -3257.7 012 1594.6 '1'14 0.0043 
(-2.24) (1.38) (0.99) 
a.1 -55113.0 013 16.884 '1'22 -1.110 
(-0.23) (0.71) (-0.26) 
a.2 34208.2 014 -16.127 '1'23 0.0039 
(0.39) (-1.54) (0.06) 
Yoo 4482.5 021 -24.295 '1'24 0.0048 
(5.71) (-0.22) (0.24) 
. 
'¥01 -6748.7 022 -412.47 '1'33 -8.07x10-4 
(-4.26) (-0.93) (-0.39) 
'¥02 680.69 023 3.4026 '1'34 9.79x1 o-s 
(1.28) (0.26) (0.20) 
Y11 41463.7 024 0.1768 '1'44 -2.84x1 o-4 
(0.19) (0.04) (-1.40) 
'¥12 -39034.0 <h -245.31 µo 20413.5 
(-0.59) (-1.12) (6.35) 
'¥22 4314.2 <1>2 -62.514 µl 0.2746 
(0.11) (-0.07) (1.12) 
001 1.573 <l>3 -14.914 0.8926 
(1.47) (-0.69) (101.08) 
002 -31.707 <l>4 17.640 p 0.9436 
(-5.97) (2.34) (4.97) 
003 -0.1081 'l'n -0.0804 
(-0. 78) (-0.54) 
004 -0.3601 '1'12 -0.0150 
-8.46 -0.02 
Note: Convergence criterion =0.0001. No. o obsetvations = 112. Asymptotic t-ratios 
are given in parentheses. 
NL3S minimand (restricted) = 128.184 
NL3S minimand (unrestricted) = 115.399 
1'°(9) = 12.785 
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5.8.3 Testing for Zero Parameter Restrictions 
The results of the previous section suggest the following 
modification of the econometric model. The profit function (5.9) 
remains as before, but the L- and w-functions can now be written 
4 
L = -(ao + Yoow + Yo1P1 + Yo2P2 + L0oi~) + u2 
i=1 
- J3(µ0 + µ1 y) + (1-J3)ft 
w = J3L + Yoo(1-J3)(ft/l) + u3 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
Note that (5.13) is a stochastic version of (5. 7) above. Table 5.5 
reports NL3S estimates of the model (5.9), (5.12), (5.13) subject to a 
number of zero parameter restrictions. 
The zero parameter restrictions were identified by first 
estimating the model (5.9), (5.12), (5.13) in unrestricted form and 
selecting parameters which had absolute t-ratios of less than unity. 
Fourteen parameters were thus marked for deletion: y01 • Yu· y12• 003• 
013. 023• 024 • <1> 1• <1>3 • 'I' 12• '1'23• '1'24• '!'33• '!'34. Zero restrictions on these 
parameters were found statistically acceptable: T°(l4)=10.512 being 
well below the 95 % critical value of X2(14)=23.685 (see Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5: NL3S Estimates with Zero Parameter Restrictions 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 100260.1 021 -13.565 
(1.61) (-0.57) 
ao -3722.3 022 -416.97 
(-1.70) (-2.46) 
a.1 -80818.0 <1>2 545.10 
(-1.59) (1 .42) 
a.2 -63042.0 <l>4 7.639 
(-1.46) (4.18) 
Yoo 1414.46 '1'11 -0.2112 
(3.64) (-4.23) 
Yo2 1167.76 '1'13 0.01 
(1.30) (4.54) 
Y22 20860.6 '1'14 0.0038 
(1.55) (2.61) 
001 -3.063 '1'22 -2.088 
(-1.62) (-1.67) 
002 -46.458 '1'44 -1.68x10-4 
(-5.54) (3.32) 
004 -0.2475 3392.48 
(-4.07) (2.63) 
811 142.14 µl 0.2389 
(2.84) (2.41) 
012 1638.94 0.8694 
(3.63) (56.12) 
014 -8.858 
~-3.64} 
Note: Convergence criterion =0.0001. Number of observations =112. Asymptotic t-
ratios are given in parentheses. 
Restricted 8(9) = 98.914. 
Unrestricted 8(9) =88.402. 
1'°(14) = 10.512. 
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5.9 The Preferred Estimates and Discussion 
Table 5.6 presents the 'preferred' estimates of the model 
parameters based on the foregoing data-consistent simplifications of 
the initial model. It may be noted that these simplifications are also 
incorporated in the estimates reported earlier in Table 5.5. However, 
the present estimates differ from the latter in being based on an 
abridged set of IVs; in particular, the third-degree terms in 
exogenous variables are dropped from the instrument set. The 
abridgement of the instrument set is motivated by two 
considerations: (i) to examine how robust are the parameter 
estimates with respect to changes in the instrument set, (ii) since IV 
estimation completely eliminates the simultaneity bias only in large 
samples, for finite samples it seems desirable to observe a large 
excess of observations over instruments.31 
A comparison of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 readily attests that the 
parameter estimates are stable with respect to the considered 
change in the IV set. To check for multiple solutions, the model was 
also estimated with (i) 10% higher starting values32 of the 
parameters of the bargained wage equation, (ii) 10% lower starting 
values of these parameters, and (iii) with a starting value of the 
bargaining power coefficient (~) equal to 0.5. The parameter 
estimates and their standard errors in these cases converged on 
virtually the same values as those reported in Table 5.6. 
As a result of the quadratic specification, there is a large 
number of parameters associated with the profit function, even under 
the restrictions introduced above. The following discussion is thus 
limited to the estimated parameters of the labour demand function 
31 Of course, for the model to be estimable the number of instruments must be at least 
as large as the maximum number of unknown parameters in any single equation in 
the model. It is for this reason that a large number of instruments were necessary for 
the earlier unrestricted specifications of the model. 
32 It may be recalled that the starting values had been based on the single equation 
estimates of section 5.8.1. 
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(all of which also appear in the profit function) and the bargained 
wage equation, which are of particular interest in the context of the 
proposed bargaining model. 
Table 5.6: The 'Preferred' NL3S Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 100680.5 021 -13.192 
(1.66) (-0.57) 
ao -3561.9 022 -427.27 
(-1.53) (-2.59) 
al -83983.0 <1>2 558.13 
(-1.70) (1.49) 
a2 -61741.0 $4 7.581 
(-1.47) (4.25) 
Yoo 1210.94 'I'll -0.2124 
(3.46) (-4.36) 
Yo2 1604.44 '1'13 0.0102 
(1.68) (4.72) 
Y22 20275.8 '1'14 0.0038 
(1.55) (2.70) 
001 -4.970 '1'22 -2.106 
(-2.46) (-1.73) 
002 -48.316 '1'44 -1.70x10-4 
(-5.39) (-3.43) 
004 -0.1918 µo 3205.97 
(-3.00) (2.48) 
Bn 145.78 µl 0.2066 
(2.99) (2.32) 
012 1654.19 f3 0.8727 
(3.75) (55.77) 
014. -9.006 
-3.79 
Note: Number of obseivations =112. Convergence criterion =0.0001. Asymptotic t-
ratios are given in parentheses. 
NL3S minimand = 59.158 
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5.9.1 The Labour Demand Function 
For the labour demand function, the following points are 
noteworthy: 
(i) The coefficient on the wage variable (-'¥00) has the 
expected negative sign and is significant. At sample means, it implies 
an estimate of wage elasticity of labour demand of -0.174 (see Table 
5. 7). This is consistent with the findings of many other studies which 
report inelastic labour demand for Indian agriculture (see for 
instance, Sidhu and Baanante, 1981; Evenson and Binswanger, 1984; 
Kalirajan and Shand, 1988). This also implies that the second-order 
condition assumed for the basic model (section 4.4), viz., the absolute 
wage elasticity of labour demand is less than unity, is consistent with 
the data.33 
(ii) The coefficient on bullock rental is not significant; zero 
parameter restriction on bullock rental was found statistically 
acceptable (see section 5.8.3). However, the significant negative 
coefficient on the composite price of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
manures and machine hours suggests that these inputs (taken 
together) are complementary with hired labour.34 
(iii) The coefficients of all fixed inputs except family labour 
are significant and have the expected positive sign indicating greater 
demand for hired labour with increased availability of these fixed 
resources. Table 5. 7 reports the relevant elasticities at sample means. 
It is notable that the elasticity of demand for hired labour with 
respect to gross irrigated area is about twice as large as that with 
respect to gross unirrigated area. 
33 This condition is satisfied not only at sample means, but for 77 percent of the data 
points. 
34 The complementary, of course, need not hold for all individual inputs. However, 
any further input disaggregation, necessary to examine this issue, could have been 
undertaken only at the expense of a rapid diminution of the degrees of freedom (see 
section 5.7). Since the issue, though important, is not a central concern of the present 
study, it was decided to eschew any further disaggregation of inputs. 
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Table 5. 7: Estimated Elasticities of Hired Labour Use 
Variable 
Wage rate 
Composite price of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides, manures, machine hours 
Gross unirrigated area 
Gross irrigated area 
Family bullock labour 
Output price 
Elasticity at Means 
-0.1743 
(3.46) 
-0.1944 
(1.68) 
0.2515 
(2.46) 
0.4822 
(5.39) 
0.3543 
(3.00) 
0.3687 
3.21 
Note: The absolute t-values in parentheses are those of the corresponding parameter 
estimate. The t-values for the output price elasticity is of the coefficient auapn which 
is estimated as a linear combination of the corresponding parameters of the labour 
demand function. 
5.9.2 The Bargained-Wage Equation 
All the coefficients of the wage equation are significant and 
of the expected sign. In particular, µ 1 is positive and significant, 
consistent with the bargaining model, viz., higher earnings in 
alternative employment for the labourers allow them to improve their 
bargained wage. 
Of special interest is the estimate of J3, as it provides a 
measure of the asymmetric bargaining power of employers relative to 
the labourers. The bargaining model presupposes that J3 is within the 
[0, l] interval.35 In particular, J3=0.5 indicates equal or symmetric 
bargaining powers of the two groups in the village-level labour 
market. 
The bargaining power parameter J3 is estimated at 0.873 
35 It is notable that while estimating the nonlinear system (5.9), (5.12), (5.13), no 
restriction was imposed on 13. Yet, in all runs of the model, estimates of 13 were obtained 
within the required interval. 
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with a standard error of 0.0156. It is significantly different to zero 
(t=55.8), 0.5 (t=23.8) and unity (t=8. l). Most notably, the null 
hypothesis of symmetric bargaining power is convincingly rejected, 
in favour of the alternative hypothesis that employers have greater 
bargaining power in village-level wage bargaining. 
It is also notable that the labourers' bargaining power though 
low, is not zero. In other words, despite the asymmetric nature of the 
wage bargain, the labourers wield enough influence to avoid being 
forced down to their disagreement payoff. Their gains (surplus over 
disagreement payoff) may nevertheless be marginal, but even 
marginal gains are of importance in the given context. Indeed, it is 
the possibility of realizing these gains that arguably provides the 
rationale for the existence of social sanctions, which support 
cooperative behaviour amongst the village labourers in the first place 
(see chapter 3). 
5.10 A Sensitivity Analysis of the Bargaining Power Coefficient 
It may be recalled that in estimating the wage bargaining 
model of the village labour market, the employers' disagreement 
payoff (hereafter denoted n0) was assumed to be at zero profits. This 
was based on the premise that the only realistic alternative to 
agreement for the employers is non-cultivation during the crop 
season (see section 5.4). It could be argued that a high estimate of~ 
has been obtained above simply because n0 is assumed to be zero, and 
that for n0 > 0 the estimates may no longer show the village 
employers to have asymmetrically greater bargaining power than the 
village labourers. 
In order to examine the possible strength of this argument, 
the following thought experiment is conducted. Suppose n0;tO, in 
which case the wage equation (5.13) may be reformulated as 
- ~ (µo + µ1 y) + (1-~)(ft- fto} 
w = ~L + y00(1-~)(ft- ft0 )/L + u3 (5.14) 
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The specification of the ft- and L-functions, however, remains 
unchanged, given as before by (5.9) and (5.12) respectively. Let 7to 
exogenously assume different values as 7t0 = 0.1 ft, 0. 2ft, .... 
The model (5.9), (5.12). (5.14) may then be estimated for 
these different (hypothetical) values of the employers' disagreement 
payoff. The experiment thus amounts to posing the following 
question: if the employers' disagreement payoff in every village-year-
season were somehow fixed at a fraction t of their agreement payoff, 
then what estimates of the model parameters (in particular, the 
employers' bargaining power parameter~) would have been obtained 
for different values of t ? 36 Table 5.8 gives the results of the 
experiment. 
The first thing to observe in Table 5.8 is that, other than ~. 
the estimated parameters of the wage function and their t-ratios are 
highly stable over different specifications of 7to/7t. (This is equally true 
of the coefficients of the profit and labour demand functions not 
reported here.) As for~ itself, the results show that an estimate not 
significantly different to 0.8 is obtained even as the employers' 
disagreement payoff is allowed to increase upto 50 percent of their 
realized profits. It is particularly noteworthy that even with 7to 
specified at as high as 80 percent of employers' realized profits, the 
hypothesis of equal bargaining power is rejected in favour of the 
alternative that employers' bargaining power is greater than that of 
the labourers (t=2.36). 
The skepticism that 7to = 0 produces a high estimate of ~ 
appears unwarranted. On the contrary, the main message of the above 
exercise seems to be that asymmetric outcomes in the village labour 
market arise not so much by way of differences in the disagreement 
payoffs of the employers and labourers, but through differences in 
their relative bargaining powers, reflecting the operation of some 
other factors. This·idea is taken up again in chapter 7. 
36 Of course, as 't ~ 1, the employers' net gains from agreement become vanishingly 
small and ~ ~ o. 
151 
Table 5.8: Estimated Parameters of the Wage Function for Different 
Values of the Employers' Disagreement Payoff 
Assumed value NL3S Estimates of 
of 7to/7t 13 µo µ1 Yoo 
0.0 0.8727 3205.97 0.2066 1210.94 
(55.77) (2.48) (2.32) (3.46) 
0.1 0.8606 3193.69 0.2064 1207.11 
(51.24) (2.49) (2.34) (3.48) 
0.2 0.8460 3180.62 0.2060 1202.89 
(46.61) (2.50) (2.36) (3.50) 
0.3 0.8280 3166.56 0.2057 1198.32 
(41.89) (2.51) (2.38) (3.52) 
0.4 0.8051 3152.59 0.2053 1193.46 
(37.07) (2.51) (2.40) (3.53) 
0.5 0.7752 3138.72 0.2049 1188.24 
(32.16) (2.51) (2.41) (3.54) 
0.6 0.7342 3125.92 0.2044 1183.18 
(27.18) (2.51) (2.42) (3.54) 
0.7 0.6747 3117.51 0.2041 1179.15 
(22.13) (2.50) (2.41) (3.53) 
0.8 0.5804 3119.53 0.2040 1178.27 
(17.02) (2.48) (2.39) (3.50) 
0.9 0.4082 3150.93 0.2045 1186.30 
p 1.86~ !2.44~ !2.33~ {3.42~ 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the asymptotic t-ratios. 
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Appendix: 5A 
Testing for Heteroskedasticity and Implications for Estimation 
The possibility that the error terms in the initial model 
specification (5.9)-(5.11) may not be identically distributed is 
examined. In particular, since the present study uses pooled cross-
section x time-series data, there exists the possibility that the error 
terms are significantly heteroskedastic over groups of observations 
for different regions and/ or crop seasons which comprise the cross-
sections of the data set. 
The presence of heteroskedasticity may be detected using 
the Breush-Pagan test procedure. The test can be applied in a 
simultaneous equation context by using maximum likelihood, or the 
asymptotically equivalent, two-stage least squares residuals37 (see 
Harvey and Phillips, 1981). Accordingly, NL2S residuals of the 
unrestricted model (5.9)-(5.11) were used to construct the Breush-
Pagan test statistic as follows. 
The squared NL2S residuals of each of the three structural 
2 
equation ( l'>it for i= 1, 2, 3) were regressed on a set of 5 dummy 
variables; 4 district dummies representing the five different 
agroeconomic zones covered by the sample data and one season 
dummy to distinguish between the kharif and rabi crop season. The 
number of observations (T) times the coefficient of determination 
(R2) from this secondary regression defines the Breush-Pagan test 
statistic. It is asymptotically distributed as X2 with degrees of 
freedom given by the number of explanatory variables in the 
secondary regression. The following test statistics were thus 
obtained: 
Profit function 
Labour demand function 
Wage function 
T 
112 
112 
112 
R2 
0.0707 
0.1513 
0.0539 
37 Instead of the usual OLS residuals in the single-equation context. 
TR2-X2(5) 
7.918 
16.946 
6.037 
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The 95% critical value of X2(5) being 11.070, the above 
results imply that the hypothesis of homoskedasticity, though 
acceptable for the profit and wage equations, is rejected for the 
labour demand function. 
The violation of homoskedasticity assumption usually implies 
a loss in estimator efficiency, and more seriously, incorrect estimates 
of standard errors that may lead to invalid inferences. Hence, a 
correction for heteroskedasticity was made by respecifying the labour 
demand function as 
(5A. l) 
where &-2t are estimated standard deviations of u2t, based on 
2 
predictions from the secondary regression of t:>2t (the squared NL2S 
residuals of the labour demand function) on the above-mentioned set 
of dummy variables. 
The parameter estimates reported in Table 5.4 (in the text) 
incorporate this heteroskedasticity correction, and are based on 
estimation of the transformed model (5.9), (5A. l), (5.11) subject to 
the cross-equation restrictions (I.1-1.3, II in the text). Table 5A. l 
below presents comparable estimates in the absence of correction for 
heteroskedasticity. 
However, a comparison of parameter estimates (and t-
values) in Tables 5.4 and 5A. l shows that correction for 
heteroskedasticity makes no appreciable difference to the results. 
Most of the model parameters (including parameters of the bargained 
wage equation which are of particular interest) have very similar 
estimated coefficients and t-ratios. It is also notable that the 9 cross-
equation restrictions are statistically accepted at approximately the 
same level of significance (compare the TO statistic in Tables 5.4 and 
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Table 5A. l: NL3S Estimates with Cross-equation Restrictions 
Uncorrected for Heteroskedasticity 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
8<> 38220.8 On 188.68 '1'13 0.0129 
(0.08) (0.24) (0.28) 
ao -5503.1 012 1677.99 '1'14 0.0045 
(-2.92) (0.43) (0.30) 
a.1 -69957.0 013 15.787 '1'22 -1.535 
(-0.09) (0.20) (-0.10) 
a.2 33998.8 014 -16.697 '1'23 0.011 
(0.11) (-0.47) (0.05) 
Yoo 4757.0 021 -31.720 '1'24 0.0071 
(5.13) (-0.08) (0.10) 
Yo1 -6696.5 022 -446.86 '1'33 -8.68x1 o-4 
(-3.23) (-0.30) (-0.12) 
Yo2 1294.2 023 4.446 '1'34 5.97x1 o-s 
(1.74) (0.10) (0.04) 
Yn 51254.6 024 0.2973 '1'44 -2.88x1 o-4 
(0.07) (0.02) (-0.42) 
Y12 -39316.0 <1> 1 -238.06 µo 20607.0 
(-0.18) (-0.32) (6.32) 
Y22 3274.3 <1>2 -1.840 µl 0.2990 
(0.03) (-0.00) (1.19) 
001 0.4954 <1>3 -17.690 0.8923 
(0.35) (-0.24) (104.76) 
002 -42.066 <1>4 17.867 p 0.9828 
(-6.32) (0.70) (5.22) 
003 0.0278 'I'll -0.0912 
(0.17) (-0.18) 
004 -0.3560 '1'12 -0.1268 
{-7.51~ {-0.06~ 
Note: Convergence criterion =0.0001. Number of obseivations = 112. Asymptotic t-
ratios are given in parentheses. 
NL3S minimand (restricted) = 129.147 
NL3S minimand (unrestricted) = 116.664 
1'°(9) = 12.483. 
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5A. l) irrespective of whether a correction for heteroskedasticity is 
made or not. Furthermore, the hypothesis of risk-neutrality on the 
part of labourers (p= 1) is acceptable at a greater than 35 % level of 
significance in both cases.38 
In view of these findings, in subsequent estimation, i.e. 
section 5.8.3 onwards, the error terms of all three structural 
equations were assumed to be identically distributed. 
38 Parameter estimates and t-values for the unrestricted model (i.e. without the cross-
equation restrictions) also remained much the same with and without correction for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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CHAPTERS 
Estimation of the Extended Wage Bargaining Model 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the estimation of the extended 
wage bargaining model of section 4.6. The extended model, it may be 
recalled, introduced male and female labourers as separate bargaining 
entities (with possibly unequal bargaining powers) in the village-level 
market for agricultural labour. The estimation of the extended model 
closely follows the approach used above for the basic model (c.j. 
chapter 5), and also uses the same data set relating to the ten study 
villages. However, in comparison with chapter 5, the distinguishing 
feature of the empirical analysis undertaken in the present chapter is 
its particular focus on gender-related dichotomies in the village 
labour markets. 
Before discussing the specification and estimation of the 
extended model, it is useful to note how the wage and employment 
outcomes differ for male and female labourers in the agricultural 
labour markets of the ten study villages. Table 6.1 gives a summary 
picture. The following points may be highlighted. 
First, the contribution of female labour to total hired labour 
use is by no means insignificant, though there are large inter-village 
variations. The proportion of female hired labour ranges from about 
one-fourth in Boriya to over four-fifths in Aurepalle and Dokur (see 
Table 6.1). For Boriya, it should however be noted that the size of the 
farm labour market is itself quite small: on average, hired labour 
constituted only about one-fifth of the annual farm labour use (see 
Table 3.2). In general, the share of female hired labour (in total hired 
labour) appears to be high in villages where the incidence of hired 
labour itself is high (the correlation coefficient for the 10 villages 
being 0.74, significant at the 2% level1). 
1 This is computed from the relevant columns of Tables 3.2 and 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Average Male-Female Wage Rates and Composition of 
Annual Hired Labour Use 
Village Male wage ratea Female wage ratea Ratio of female Share of femaleb 
(Rs. per day) (Rs. per day) to male wage hired labour in total 
rate hired labour {%) 
Aurepalle 7.38 5.42 0.73 80.4 
Dokur 7.22 5.73 0.79 82.7 
Shirapur 7.58 4.17 0.55 64.1 
Kalman 6.74 3.69 0.55 73.5 
Kanzara 6.56 3.40 0.52 70.3 
Kinkheda 6.10 3.35 0.55 74.6 
Bortya 7.44 6.52 0.88 27.8 
Rampura 6.40 5.82 0.91 30.8 
Papda 6.62 6.03 0.91 31.3 
Rampura Kalan 5.24 4.66 0.89 47.6 
a The wage rates are village averages for 1983-84, refer to a 7 hour working day, and 
include wage payments in both cash and kind. 
b Simple averages of percentage shares for the following years: 1978-79 to 1984-85 for 
Aurepalle, Shirapur, Kanzara; 1978-79, 1979-80, 1983-84 for Dokur, Kalman, 
Kinkheda; 1980-81 to 1984-85 for Boriya, Rampura; and 1981-82 to 1984-85 for Papda 
and Rampura Kalan. 
Second, the average daily wage rates for female labourers 
are lower than those for males in all the ten villages, the difference 
ranging between 10 to nearly 50 percent of the male wage rates.2 It 
may be thought that these wage differences simply reflect the varying 
rates of renumeration for different agricultural operations performed 
by male and female labourers. While there is some truth in the 
proposition that the tasks predominantly performed by women 
labourers are poorly paid relative to those predominantly performed 
by male labourers, this does not fully account for the observed wage 
2 Male-female wage differences are of course a ubiquitous feature of rural labour 
markets in India, and have been very widely noted. See Sawant and Dewan (1979), 
Mencher and Sardamoni (1982), K. Bardhan (1984), Rosenzweig (1984, 1988), Ryan and 
Ghodke (1984). Banerjee (1985), Sen (1985), Nayyar (1987), Sardamoni (1987), Jose 
(1988), Unni (1988) among many others. 
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differentials. Appendix Tables 6A. l-6A.10 report operation-specific 
modal wage rates for male and female labourers in the ten study 
villages. The wage rates relate to the main cropping season for each 
village. From the figures reported in these tables, it is evident that 
female labourers receive a lower wage than males even for the same 
operation during the same crop season. This is true of all the villages 
although the magnitude of operation-specific wage differentials varies 
across villages.3 The wage differentials are also enduring over time in 
most cases. 
Thus, gender disparities in agricultural wages seem to 
persist irrespective of whether male and female labourers perform 
the same operations or not. This suggests that the explanations of 
male-female wage differentials do not lie primarily in the nature of 
agricultural tasks performed by them. It may well be that the 
differences in operation-specific wage rates reflect the differences in 
male and female wage rates, rather than the other way around. 
As observed earlier in section 4.6, within the analytical 
framework of the extended wage bargaining model, gender-related 
differentials in agricultural wages may arise inter alia on account of 
differences in the relative bargaining powers of male and female 
labourers.4 Hence, a natural focus of the empirical estimation of the 
extended model is to obtain estimates of the relative bargaining 
power coefficients for male and female labourers, and to test if the 
estimates imply the existence of any significant differences. 
Bargaining power differences vis-a-vis the employers, as already 
shown by the estimates for the basic model (in chapter 5), may be 
expected to be also reproduced in the estimates of the extended 
model parameters. 
3 Operation-specific differences in male and female agricultural wages have also been 
noted by Mencher and Sardamoni (1982), Banerjee (1985), Nayyar (1987) among the 
studies cited earlier in note 2. 
4 They may also arise due to differences in the male and female labourers' fallback 
payoffs, or due to differences in the wage elasticities of demand for their labour. See 
section 4.6 above. 
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6.2 Econometric Specification of the Extended Model 
The structural relations of the extended wage bargaining 
model (of section 4.6) can be written, in general form, as below 
(i) the employers' profit function: n = n (wM, wF , p, z), 
(ii) the demand functions for male and female hired labour: 
Li = Li (wM ' WF ' p, z), for i = M, F, 
(iii) the male and female wage equations: 
w. = w. (1t, LM ' LF ' W. ' VM ' VF ' PM ' PF ; L.. ' L..) I I J II I J 
for i, j = M, F ; i -:/: j ; l.. = ()L.fdw .. 5 
IJ I J 
Econometric specifications of these functions are obtained using the 
same approach as followed earlier in chapter 5 for the basic model. 
Thus, the normalized quadratic form is used to specify the profit 
function, and the labour demand functions are taken to be linear in 
parameters and variables. The male and female wage equations are 
derived from the Nash bargaining solution (equations (4.25) and 
(4.26) above) as 
- (1-PM-PF)vM + PM7t - PFLFM7twF(OF-vFf 1 (vJLM) 
W=-----------------
M (1-PM -PF)LM - PMLMM (ft/LM) - PFLFMn:wF(OF-vFf 1 
(6.1) 
_ (1-PM-PF)vF + pFn: - pMLMT=n:wM(OM-vMf 1 (vF/~) 
w =---~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
F (1-PM-PF)LF - PFLFr=(ft/LF) - PMLMT=n:wM(OM-vMf 1 
(6.2) 
where 0. = w.L. and L_ = ()L/aw. for i, J. = M, F. 
I I I j j I J 
5 (i)-(iii) above correspond to equations (4.20)-(4.22), (4.25), (4.26) in section 4.6. 
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It should be noted that if L _ = L _ = 0, i.e., male and female hired MF FM 
labour are completely non-substitutable, (6.1) and (6.2) above reduce 
to analogs of the wage equation (5.4) for the basic model. 
The (normalized) disagreement payoffs of male and female 
labourers, v. , are specified as linear functions of their respective 
I 
(normalized) nonfarm wage earnings, y. :6 
I 
As earlier, µil may be expected to be positive. 
(6.3) 
Further, in view of the results obtained for the basic model 
(section 5.8.2), cross-equation restrictions pertaining to the shared 
parameters, viz., the analogs of conditions (I.1)-(I.3), (II) in chapter 
5, are incorporated in the specification of the extended model. Also, 
the payoff functions of male and female labourers are assumed to 
satisfy risk-neutrality. 
Thus, with p. and z. defined as in section 5.7 above, the 
I I 
estimating equations for the extended model can be written 
2 2 
+ o.syFFwF + YM1 wM P1 + YM2 wp2 + YF1 wFp1 + YF2wFp2 + 0·5'¥11 P1 
+ '¥12P1 P2 + 0·5'Y22P: + :±.0MiwM zi + :±.°FiwFzi + :±.01j P1 zi 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
(6.4) 
6 See section 5.4 for relevant discussion. 
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4 
LM = -(aM + 'YM MwM + 'YMFwF +'YM1 P1 + 'YM2P2 + L'}5Mi zi) + u2 <6·5) 
i=1 
4 
~ = -(aF + 'YMFwM + 'YFFwF + 'YF1P1 + 'YF2P2 + L°F?i) + u3 <6·6) 
i=1 
- ( 1 -~M-~F)vM + ~Mft + 'YMF~Fft (LF-(vF/wF)f 1 (vJLM) 
w =------------------
M ( 1 -~M-~F)LM + 'YM M(ft/LM) + 'YMF~Fft(LF - (vF/wF)f 1 (6.7) 
- ( 1 -~M - ~F)vF + ~Fft + 'YMF ~Mft(LM-(vJwM)f \vF/~) 
w =------------------- +u5 
F ( 1 -~M-~F)LF + 'YFF(ft/LF) + 'YMF~Mft(LM- (vJwM)f 1 (6.8) 
where Vi are given by (6.3) above, a0 , a's, 13's, ys, o's, 'lf1S, and µ's are the 
model parameters to be estimated, and (u1 , u2, u3 , u4, u5) are vectors of 
independently and identically distributed error terms with zero 
means and non-diagonal variance-covariance matrix. 7 
6.3 The Data Set 
The data set used to estimate the extended wage bargaining 
model is the same as that used for the basic model (as described 
above in section 5.7), except that the employment (L). wage (w) and 
nonfarm income (y) variables are now disaggregated for male and 
female labourers. Sample means and standard deviations of these 
additional variables are given in Table 6.2. 8 All model variables are 
defined and measured as before. A detailed description can be found 
in section 5.7 above. 
7 The assumption regarding the identically distributed error process is motivated by 
the results for the basic model. where correction for heteroskedasticity in the labour 
demand function led to no appreciable difference in the estimates of parameters and 
their standard errors. See Appendix 5A above. 
8 Corresponding statistics for other model variables have already been reported in 
chapter 5. See Table 5.1. 
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Table 6.2: Summary Statistics for Additional Model Variables 
(No. of observations = 112) 
Variable Descri~tion Units Mean Standard Deviation 
~ male hired labour days 5,299.52 4,602.22 
·4- female hired labour days 9,831.10 11,724.89 
WM nominal male wage rate Rs/day 4.70 1.66 
WF nominal female wage rate Rs/day 3.40 1.65 
YM nominal nonfarm wage Rs 22,675.14 24,623.98 
earnings of male labourers 
YF nominal nonfarm wage Rs 4,585.01 7,836.99 
earnings of female labourers 
Normalized Variables: 
WM wM/output price kg/day 2.70 1.28 
WF wF/output price kg/day 1.85 0.80 
YM YM/output price kg 14,226.50 16,722.18 
YF YF/output price kg 3,030.96 5,472.42 
Hence, it may be noted that, as before, the data set (for the 
ten study villages) consists of 112 observations on model variables, 
where each observation relates to a given village-year-crop season, 
and all variables are measured as village-level aggregates or averages. 
6.4 The Results and Discussion 
Structural-form estimates for the extended model (6.4)-
(6.8) are obtained using the nonlinear three stage least square (NL3S) 
estimator.9 As in the case of the basic model, the instrumental 
variables (IVs) are constructed as first-, second-, and third-order 
t . th bl - - 10 erms in e exogenous varia es p1 , p2 , z1 , z2, z3, z4 • 
9 This estimator is described in section 5.8.2 above. 
10 Initial values for the model parameters were based on SUR (seemingly unrelated) 
estimates. 
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Table 6.3 reports the preferred NL3S estimates of the 
extended model parameters after testing for 11 zero restrictions on 
the following parameters: y12, 311 , 313, 323, 324, <!>1 , <!>3, '1'1 2, '1'24, '1'33, '1'34• 
These parameters had absolute t-ratios of less than unity in the 
unrestricted estimates. The Gallant-Jorgenson test statistic 
(described' above in section 5.8.2) for the zero restrictions was 
T0 (11)=15.429 < X2 (11)=19.675 at the 0.05 level of significance. The 
acceptance of these restrictions, as it reduces the number of 
parameters to be estimated, also enables a pruning of the set of IVs. 
In particular, 11 instruments involving third-order terms in 
exogenous variables were dropped from the IV set. The estimates in 
Table 6.3 are based on the reduced set of instruments.II 
As in case of the basic model. the ensuing discussion of the 
estimates is limited to the parameters of the male and female labour 
demand functions and the bargained-wage equations. Of course, all 
parameters of the labour demand functions also appear in the profit 
function. 
6.4.1 Male and Female Labour Demand Functions 
The following points about the estimates of these functions 
should be noted: 
(i) The coefficients on own-wage variables (-yMM and -YFF) are 
significant and of the expected negative sign. At sample means, these 
estimates imply own-wage elasticities of male and female labour 
demand of -0.336 and -0.251 respectively (see Table 6.4). The 
estimates, thus, indicate that demand for both male and female hired 
labour is wage-inelastic. This is consistent with the results for the 
basic model and also with the findings of other studies for Indian 
agriculture (see section 5.9.1), though the latter typically do not 
distinguish between male and female labour. However, the male and 
female own-wage elasticities are somewhat higher (in absolute terms) 
I I The reduction in number of instruments relative to the number of observations is 
desirable from the point of view of eliminating the simultaneity bias in finite 
samples. Also see section 5.9 above. 
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Table 6.3: NL3S Estimates of the Extended Model Parameters 
Parameter · Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 190740.9 8Ml -1.7034 '1'11 -0.1771 
(2.45) (-3.55) (-3.67) 
aM -1525.8 8M2 -12.811 '1'13 0.0126 
(-2.62) (-5.45) (4.27) 
aF -637.35 8M3 0.351 '1'14 0.0041 
(-0.44) (6.17) (2.70) 
al -266575 8M4 -0.1412 '1'22 -1.2125 
(-2.62) (-8.72) (-0.69) 
<l2 -48421 8Fl 0.4956 '1'23 -0.0082 
(-1.10) (0.42) (-0.63) 
'YMM 659.91 8F2 -31.227 \j/44 -2.03xl0-4 
(7.52) (-5.40) (-3.84) 
'YMF -465.43 8F3 -0.3298 µMO 864.60 
(-7.56) (-2.35) (40.6) 
'YFF 1330.64 8F4 -0.1734 µMl 0.0608 
(4.83) (-4.35) (4. 71) 
'YMl -676.58 812 1780.59 µFO 111.89 
(-1.09) (3.85) (2.24) 
'YM2 -75.292 814 -4.6816 µFl 0.1895 
(-0.29) (-1.95) (1.61) 
'YFl -614.43 821 10.408 (3M 0.0824 
(-0.42) (0.52) (8.71) 
'YF2 1408.09 822 -577.57 f3F 0.0341 
(2.18) (-3.31) (4.4 7) 
'¥11 147994 <1>2 599.59 
(2.43) (1.50) 
'¥22 18613 $4 5.338 
p.38} {2.78} 
Note: Number of obseivations = 112. Convergence criterion = 0.001. Figures in 
parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
NL3S rninimand = 218.29. 
than the wage elasticity estimate for hired labour as a whole. The 
latter, it may be recalled, was estimated at -0.174 (see Table 5.7). 
This difference suggests that the cross-wage effects on labour 
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demand work in opposite direction to the own-wage effects, which is 
indeed borne out by the estimate of 'YMF· 
(ii) The coefficient on cross-wage variables (-YMF) is positive and 
significant, indicating that male and female hired labour are gross 
substitutes. However, the cross-wage elasticity estimates, 0.163 and 
0.128 for male and female labour respectively (see Table 6.4), suggest 
that the substitutability between the two categories of hired labour 
may be rather limited. This possibly reflects the limited substitution 
possibilities between agricultural operations predominantly 
performed by male and female labourers.12 
It is also notable that the above own- and cross-wage 
elasticity estimates also imply that the second-order (sufficient) 
conditions assumed for the extended model, viz. conditions (i). (ii) 
and (iii) in section 4.6, are consistent with the data.13 
(iii) The coefficients on other input prices are not significant, except 
for the composite price of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, manures and 
machine hours in the female labour demand equation. The significant 
negative coefficient on this composite price indicates that these 
variable inputs, taken together, are complementary with female hired 
labour.14 
12 As obseived earlier in chapter 2, the division of agricultural tasks between male 
and female labourers follows a fairly well-defmed pattern, even though the pattern 
itself may vary across regions. Such gender-based division of labour is a 
well-documented feature of Indian agriculture. See note 51 in chapter 2. 
13 Besides the sample means, these conditions are met at 4 7 percent of the data points. 
14 The positive, though non-significant, coefficients on bullock rental suggest the 
possibility of some substitutability between hired bullock and human labour. This is 
similar to the fmdings of Evenson and Binswanger (1984) who, however, also found 
the relationship to be significant. 
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Table 6.4: Estimated Elasticities of Male and Female Hired Labour 
Use 
Elasticity at means 
Variable Male hired labour Female hired labour 
Male wage rate 
Female wage rate 
Bullock rental 
Composite price of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides, manures, machine hours 
Unirrigated area 
Irrigated area 
Family labour 
Family bullock labour 
-0.3360 
(7.52) 
0.1627 
(7.56) 
0.1287 
(1.09) 
0.0260 
(0.29) 
0.2461 
(3.55) 
0.3651 
(5.45) 
-0.6196 
(6.17) 
0.7449 
(8.72) 
0.1277 
(7.56) 
-0.2507 
(4.83) 
0.0630 
(0.42) 
-0.2625 
(2.18) 
-0.0386 
(0.42) 
0.4797 
(5.40) 
0.3138 
(2.35) 
0.4931 
(4.35) 
Output price 0.0186 0.3225 
(0.21) (2.65) 
Note: The absolute t-values in parentheses are those of the corresponding parameter 
estimate. The t-values for the output price elasticities are of the coefficient aLi/apn 
which is estimated as a linear combination of the parameters of the corresponding 
labour demand function. 
(iv) All coefficients on the fIXed inputs are significant in the male 
labour demand equation. Positive coefficients on irrigated, 
unirrigated acreage and family bullock power indicate that an 
expansion of these resources with the village employers augments 
the demand for male hired labour. With the exception of unirrigated 
area, which has an insignificant coefficient (t=0.42), the same also 
applies to female hired labour. It is interesting to note that the 
coefficient on family labour input, which is significant in both the 
male and female labour demand equations, has opposite signs in the 
two equations. The estimates thus suggest that greater availability of 
family labour, while inducing greater employment of female hired 
labour, displaces the demand for male hired labour. These results are 
consistent with those obtained above for the basic model (see section 
5.9.1). 
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6.4.2 Male and Female Wage Equations 
All coefficients of the male and female wage equations are of 
the expected sign and all, apart from µFl, are significant at less than 
the 0.05 level (µFl is significant at the 11 percent level). Positive µM 1 
and µFl (analogous to the positive estimate of µ 1 for the basic model) 
indicate that increased earnings in alternative employment enable 
male and female labourers to bargain for higher wage outcomes in the 
village agricultural labour market. 
As before, the parameters of special interest are those 
pertaining to the bargaining powers of male and female labourers and 
their employers. PM and PF provide measures of the relative 
bargaining powers of male and female labourers respectively; 
( 1 - PM - PF) gives a measure of the employers' bargaining power. 
Theoretically, PM• PF and (1 - PM - PF) are presumed to be within the 
closed interval [0, l].15 Equal or symmetric bargaining powers for the 
three groups corresponds to the case where PM= PF=0.33. 
The PM parameter measuring male labourers' bargaining 
power is estimated to be 0.0824 with a standard error of 9.46xl0-3 
(see Table 6.3). It is significantly different to zero (t=S.71), 0.33 
(t=26.2) and 0.5 (t=44.l). This may be compared with the estimate of 
female labourers' bargaining power PF=0.0341, with a standard error 
of 7.63xl0-3, which is also significantly different to zero (t=4.47), 
0.33 (t=38.8) and 0.5 (t=61. l). 
With the standard error of lPM-PF) given by16 9.0lxl0-5, the 
15 As in case of the basic model, no restrictions were placed on J3M or J3F while 
estimating the nonlinear system (6.4)-(6.8). 
16 This is calculated from the following variance-covariance matrix of (J3M• J3F): 
J3M J3F 
J3M 8.95x10-5 2.88xl0-5 
J3F 2.88xlo-5 5.82x10-5 
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t-statistic for the null hypothesis that male and female labourers have 
equal bargaining powers is t(f3M-f3F)=5.09, thus implying a clear 
rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative that male 
labourers wield greater bargaining power in the village labour market 
than female labourers. 
Given the estimates of f3M and f3F, the bargaining power of 
the employers is estimated at 0.8835 with a standard error of 
0.01433.17 This is comparable with the corresponding estimate for 
the basic model, which it may be recalled was 0.873. The employers' 
bargaining power is significantly different to zero (t=61.7), 0.33 
(t=38.6), 0.5 (t=26.8) and unity (t=8.13). These results are very 
similar to those obtained for the basic model. They reinforce the 
inference drawn earlier that the bargaining power of employers is 
significantly higher than that of the labourers. One can now add that 
not only is the employers' bargaining power significantly greater than 
that of male and female labourers considered individually, it is also 
significantly greater than the sum of their bargaining powers. 
6.5 Sign Conditions for Comparative Static Effects 
On the basis of the estimates obtained above, it is possible to 
sign some of the comparative static effects for the extended model. 
As shown earlier in section 4. 7, the signs of the most of these effects 
depend on the magnitudes of own- and cross-wage elasticities of 
male and female labour demand, in particular on the signs of 
Using the estimates obtained above, at the sample means 
the above two wage elasticity terms are evaluated to be 0.536 and 
0.587 respectively (see section 6.4.1 and Table 6.4). Hence, in view 
of the positive signs of these wage elasticity terms, Table 4.2 of 
section 4. 7, which gives the direction of comparative static effects for 
the extended model, can now be rewritten as Table 6.5 below. 
17 The standard error is calculated from the covariance matrix reported in note 16 
above. 
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Table 6.5: Direction of Comparative Static Effects for the Extended 
Model on the Basis of Parameter Estimates 
Endogenous Variablea Exogenous Variable 
J3M J3F VM VF 
1t 
~ + + 
4- + + 
WM + + 
WF + + 
WM~ + 0 + 
wFLF 0 + + 
a The signs with respect to the endogenous variables 1t, WM~· wF4'· had already 
been analytically determined earlier. 
The quantitative significance of some of these effects is examined in 
the next chapter. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The question of how the results of this chapter relate to the 
issue of male-female wage inequality is briefly considered. Two 
categories of explanation have usually been offered for the existence 
of gender wage differentials: (1) those based on underlying 
productivity differentials, and (2) others based on discrimination, i.e. 
factors rationalizing the existence of different wage rates for equally 
productive work. 
It is noteworthy that 'innate' productivity differences are not 
ignored in the extended model, since (if these exist) they are already 
embedded in the profit function. However, there is no obvious 
method of disentangling the (possible) influence of productivity 
factors, and one cannot conclude from the above estimates whether 
in the given situation any (gender-related) productivity differentials 
are involved or not. But what is important to recognize is that even 
allowing for the latter, there exist significant differences in the 
bargaining powers of male and female labourers, which provide at 
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least a partial explanation of the observed gender disparity in wage 
rates. 
The other influence on gender wage differentials is on 
account of the differences in the disagreement payoff of male and 
female labourers. The estimates of section 6.4 imply the following 
sample mean values for male and female labourers: 
Rs.perday 
0.62 
0.13 
The above differences in disagreement payoffs has immediate 
implications for gender wage disparity. It may be noted that using 
equations (4.27) and (4.28), the male-female wage difference can be 
written as 
wM - wF = (vM/LM) - (vF/LF) + other terms involving the 
male-female bargaining powers and (own- and 
cross-) wage elasticities. 
As for discrimination-based explanations, there exists a very 
large theoretical literature on the subject.18 A variety of explanations 
ranging from 'tastes for discrimination', social customs, 
discriminating monopsony to 'statistical discrimination' have been 
proposed. A review of this literature is not attempted here (although 
it may be noted in passing that notions such as 'statistical 
discrimination', where the employers have imperfect information 
about workers' abilities, do not appear to have much relevance for 
village-level labour markets). 
This point to note about the above estimates for the 
extended wage-bargaining model is that it offers a different 
explanation of male-female wage disparity, viz., in terms of the 
unequal bargaining powers and fallback positions of male and female 
18 See Lundahl and Wadensjo (1984, chapter 2) and Cain (1986) for two recent surveys. 
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labourers, as noted above. This explanation differs from many of the 
discrimination-theory explanations insofar as unequal bargaining 
powers and fallback positions are sufficient to produce wage 
differentials even if employers (or workers) do not have a 'taste for 
discrimination', labour markets are not characterized by 
monopsonistic conditions and there is no statistical discrimination. 
Thus, to restate the principal finding of this chapter: 
agricultural labour markets of the study villages are characterized by 
significant asymmetries in the bargaining powers of male and female 
labourers. The results of this chapter supplement those of chapter 5. 
In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that the agricultural wage 
formation process in the present setting is conditioned by two basic 
types of power asymmetries: one operating on what could be termed 
classI9 lines and the other based on gender. 
19The term class, notwithstanding its populist overtones, seems appropriate in this 
context since the reference here is to the groups of employers and labourers, the 
primary distinction between whom consists in their ownership, control and use of the 
principal means of production in agriculture, namely land. 
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Appendix 6A 
Operation-specific Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers 
The following tables report operation-specific male and 
female modal wage rates during the main cropping season in the ten 
study villages. The wage rates refer to a 7 hour working day and 
include wage payments in both cash and kind. The main cropping 
season is determined by reference to the gross cropped areas during 
the kharif and rabi seasons in each village; the season with the larger 
cropping acreage is considered the main cropping season. For details 
on the data and how the modal wage rates are calculated for Tables 
6A.l-6A.10, see section 3.5 above. 
Table 6A. l :Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: 
Aurepalle 
{Rs. Eer day} 
0Eeration Sex 1 978-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 8.2-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparationa M 3.15 2.98 2.89 3.50 4.74 7.00 7.35 
F 1.75 1.75 2.67 
Sowing M 2.36 2.98 3.06 3.50 4.55 6.76 7.35 
F 1.58 2.19 1.84 2.84 3.33 4.61 4.90 
Transplanting M 3.15 2.63 3.06 4.90 4.60 7.00 7.09 
F 2.36 1.75 1.93 3.06 3.58 5.25 5.83 
Weeding and thinning M 3.02 
F 1.75 1.66 2.41 3.03 2.68 5.20 3.65 
lnterculturing M 3.15 2.71 2.89 3.68 5.40 7.84 7.35 
F 
HaNesting M 2.63 2.63 2.89 4.55 5.20 7.00 8.82 
F 1.75 1.75 2.52 2.73 4.20 5.25 4.90 
HaNest processing M 2.63 2.63 3.85 4.29 6.53 8.40 7.35 
F 2.28 1.75 2.52 2.73 3.92 5.25 3.68 
a Field preparation includes field cleaning, preparation of beds for irrigation, 
presowing plowing and puddling (for all villages). 
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Table 6A.2: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: Dokur 
{Rs. Eer da}'.:~ 
0Eeration Sex 1978-79 79-80 83-84 
Field preparation M 5.00 5.00 5.25 
F 
Sowing M 5.00 5.00 5.73 
F 5.00 3.50 4.38 
Transplanting M 3.00 
F 3.00 5.00 8.75 
Weeding and thinning M 2.50 
F 2.50 2.50 3.50 
lnterculturing M 5.00 5.00 12.25 
F 
Harvesting M 5.00 5.00 
F 5.00 6.00 7.20 
Harvest processing M 8.00 7.00 7.47 
F 3.00 2.50 4.38 
Table 6A.3: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: 
Shirapur 
{Rs. Eer da~~ 
0Eeration Sex 1978-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 3.50 3.50 3.50 5.25 5.25 7.00 8.75 
F 1.75 1.92 1.75 2.19 2.63 
Sowing M 3.50 4.38 4.20 4.20 5.60 8.75 8.75 
F 1.75 1.75 2.33 2.19 2.63 3.50 2.63 
Transplanting M 5.25 5.25 
F 1.75 2.63 3.00 2.63 2.19 3.50 2.63 
Weeding and thinning M 6.56 
F 1.75 1.75 2.19 2.19 2.63 2.63 2.63 
lnterculturing M 3.50 4.38 4.38 5.25 7.00 8.75 8.75 
F 1.31 1.31 2.19 3.50 
Harvesting M 4.38 6.56 3.89 5.25 5.67 8.75 7.00 
F 2.35 1.75 1.75 2.63 3.50 4.38 5.25 
Harvest processing M 4.20 5.60 4.67 7.00 10.50 8.75 10.80 
F 2.63 2.63 3.57 5.04 7.93 4.73 6.30 
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Table 6A.4: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: Kalman 
(Rs. per day) 
Operation Sex 1978-79 79-80 83-84 
Field preparation M 
F 
Sowing M 
F 
Transplanting M 
F 
Weeding and thinning M 
F 
lnterculturing M 
F 
Harvesting M 
F 
Harvest processing M 
F 
2.63 
1.75 
3.50 
1.75 
3.50 
1.75 
1.24 
2.63 
4.38 
2.63 
4.67 
2.80 
2.63 
1.31 
3.50 
1.75 
1.75 
3.50 
6.56 
4.38 
5.25 
3.08 
7.00 
2.63 
7.00 
3.50 
3.06 
2.63 
6.13 
8.75 
4.38 
7.00 
5.25 
Table 6A.5: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: Kanzara 
~Rs. per da;t} 
Operation Sex 1978-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 3.50 3.50 4.68 4.67 4.67 5.83 7.00 
F 2.63 2.50 2.00 2.33 2.92 3.50 3.50 
Sowing M 4.50 4.38 3.50 4.38 5.25 7.00 8.75 
F 2.75 2.63 2.63 2.50 2.50 3.50 4.38 
Transplanting M 3.50 5.69 5.47 6.50 8.75 
F 2.00 2.00 2.33 3.00 3.50 4.00 
Weeding and thinning M 4.28 4.00 4.38 4.17 5.00 6.00 6.00 
F 2.50 1.75 2.00 2.50 3.50 3.00 4.00 
lnterculturing M 3.67 3.50 3.50 4.38 5.25 6.00 6.00 
F 2.75 1.75 1.40 2.19 3.50 3.50 4.00 
Harvesting M 4.50 4.38 3.50 5.83 8.75 7.00 7.00 
F 2.50 2.63 2.45 6.13 5.25 5.00 5.10 
Harvest processing M 7.00 3.50 3.50 8.75 5.83 6.00 6.56 
F 2.63 1.75 1.75 2.63 3.00 3.00 4.38 
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Table 6A.6: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: 
Kinkheda 
{Rs. eer da~} 
Oeeration Sex 1978-79 79-80 83-84 
Field preparation M 4.08 4.08 5.60 
F 2.00 2.00 3.50 
Sowing M 3.50 4.38 7.00 
F 2.50 2.63 3.00 
Transplanting M 3.64 
F 2.24 1.75 4.00 
Weeding and thinning M 2.19 4.38 4.50 
F 2.19 1.75 3.00 
lnterculturing M 4.00 3.50 6.00 
F 2.19 1.75 
Harvesting M 4.00 4.38 6.56 
F 1.31 2.19 4.00 
Harvest processing M 4.50 4.38 6.56 
F 2.50 2.19 3.00 
Table 6A.7: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: Bortya 
{Rs. eer da~} 
Oeeration Sex 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 4.38 6.04 6.04 7.35 7.35 
F 3.80 3.76 4.03 6.65 3.28 
Sowing M 4.55 6.04 6.04 7.35 7.38 
F 4.03 5.34 6.65 6.65 
Transplanting M 3.06 6.04 8.31 4.20 
F 3.76 3.81 6.65 
Weeding and thinning M 4.46 4.73 4.73 5.60 7.35 
F 4.60 4.03 4.03 3.94 
lnterculturing M 4.37 6.04 6.04 7.35 7.35 
F 5.34 
Harvesting M 5.14 6.91 6.04 7.35 7.35 
F 4.44 5.34 6.21 6.65 5.00 
Harvest processing M 5.14 4.73 6.04 7.35 7.35 
F 4.03 4.03 6.65 7.53 
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Table 6A.8: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: 
Rampura 
{Rs. Eer da~~ 
0Eeration Sex 1980-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 5.25 4.81 7.44 7.44 7.88 
F 5.18 5.40 4.55 
Sowing M 5.25 4.81 7.44 7.44 7.44 
F 4.81 4.45 7.44 7.44 
Transplanting M 6.81 5.15 5.98 7.19 9.48 
F 5.25 4.50 5.80 7.19 9.48 
Weeding and thinning M 4.38 5.16 4.64 4.90 4.81 
F 3.68 4.86 4.46 4.90 4.55 
lnterculturing M 5.25 4.90 7.44 7.44 7.88 
F 4.38 4.59 
Harvesting M 3.94 4.81 4.38 5.25 4.38 
F 3.94 4.46 4.20 4.99 4.55 
Harvest processing M 5.25 4.81 4.81 5.25 4.81 
F 3.50 4.46 4.20 5.25 6.13 
Table 6A.9: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: Papda 
{Rs. Eer da~~ 
0Eeration Sex 1981-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 4.34 3.50 5.25 5.25 
F 
Sowing M 3.92 4.38 5.25 5.25 
F 3.92 3.50 5.25 
Weeding and thinning M 5.25 
F 4.38 
Harvesting M 7.00 8.75 7.00 7.00 
F 7.00 8.75 7.00 7.00 
Harvest processing M 3.28 4.38 5.25 6.13 
F 2.50 3.50 5.25 5.25 
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Table 6A.10: Modal Wage Rates for Male and Female Labourers: 
Rampura Kalan 
~Rs. ~er da~} 
O~eration Sex 1981-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Field preparation M 3.50 4.38 5.25 6.13 
F 
Sowing M 4.41 6.13 6.22 
F 
Weeding and thinning M 7.96 5.25 
F 4.38 
Harvesting M 3.78 5.44 3.97 6.56 
F 3.50 4.20 3.97 6.56 
Harvest processing M 3.92 4.20 7.00 7.00 
F 4.20 5.25 5.25 
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CHAPTER7 
Seasonality, Regional Effects and the Distributional Consequences of 
Unequal Bargaining Power: Some Extensions and Simulations 
7 .1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the empirical work of chapters 5 and 
6 to examine some further issues. This is done by way of (i) some 
econometric extensions of the basic model specified in chapter 5, 
and (ii) some simulation experiments using the parameter estimates 
for both the basic and extended models of chapter 5 and 6. Plainly 
stated, the issues examined bear upon the following questions: 
(1) Can seasonal or regional variations in labour market outcomes be 
explained within the framework of the proposed wage bargaining 
model? In particular, do there exist any significant seasonal or 
regional variations in bargaining powers? (sections 7.2, 7.3). 
(2) Do the observed inequalities in bargaining powers of employers 
and labourers have a significant quantitative influence on the 
(factoral) distribution of income? (section 7 .4). 
(3) In quantitative terms, how do the effects of changes in bargaining 
power on labour market outcomes compare with those induced by 
changes in the labourers' alternative earnings or disagreement 
payoffs? (section 7.5). 
(4) How responsive are the bargained wage rates and wage earnings 
to changes in the price of agricultural output and variations in 
cropping and irrigation intensities? (sections 7.6, 7.7). 
(5) How significant ~s the quantitative influence of inequalities in 
bargaining powers of male and female labourers on the gender 
disparities in wages and on other endogenous variables of the 
extended model? (section 7.8). 
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7.2 Seasonal Variations 
Seasonal variations in wages and employment are a well-
known feature of Indian agriculture. Such variations have been 
emphasized in a large number of studies. To mention only a few, see 
for instance, Sethuraman (1972), Rudra and Biswas (1973), 
Bharadwaj (1974), K. Bardhan (1977), Rudra (1982a, b) and Bardhan 
(1984a). Ryan and Ghodke (1984) document these seasonal variations 
for six of the ten study villages of the present study. It is of interest to 
examine whether these variations can be explained within the the 
framework of the wage bargaining model presented and estimated 
earlier. 
An attempt is made to examine this issue by identifying a 
'main' and a 'subsidiary' crop season for each village. To keep matters 
simple, the issue is discussed with reference to the basic model 
estimated in chapter 5. It may be recapitulated that the data set used 
for estimating the basic model distinguished two crop seasons, viz., 
kharif and rabi (section 5.7 above). The main crop season is 
determined by reference to the gross cropped areas during the 
kharif and rabi seasons in each village; the season with the larger 
cropping acreage is considered the main crop season. I The main and 
subsidiary crop seasons for the ten study villages are thus identified 
as follows: 
Village 
Aurepalle, Dokur, 
Kanzara, Kinkheda, 
Boriya, Rampura 
Shirapur, Kalman, 
Papda, Rampura Kalan 
Main season 
kharif 
rabi 
Subsidiary season 
rabi 
kharif 
It may be noted that common reference to seasonality in the 
1 One may alternatively use total labour use at a criterion for distinguishing between 
the main and subsidiary season. However, (not surprisingly) the main and subsidiary 
seasons identified by the two criteria are identical. 
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agricultural context also includes intra-crop season variation. 
However, with the present structure of the wage bargaining model, 
this latter aspect of seasonal variation cannot be investigated since 
farm profits, an endogenous variable in the model, cannot be defined 
for periods shorter than a crop season.2 Nevertheless, the limitation 
is not catastrophic as it can be argued that the factors responsible for 
inter-crop season variations are likely to be similar to those 
producing intra-crop season variations. 
To get an idea of the rough magnitudes of variations over 
crop seasons, the sample averages for the following variables may be 
noted:3 
Main season Subsidiary season 
{No. of observations=56~ {No. of observations=56~ 
Nominal wage rate (Rs. per day) 4.04* 3.81 
Hired labour use (days) 21112.25* 9148.99 
Unirrigated area (acres) 1240.48* 290.75 
Irrigated area (acres) 156.03 145.99 
Gross cropped area (acres) 1396.51 * 436.74 
Nominal nonfarm wage earnings (Rs.) 26562.19 27958.12 
* indicates significantly greater than the subsidiary season value at the 5% level or 
better, using paired t-tests. 
Thus, on average, the gross cropped area during the 
subsidiary season is about one-third of that for the main season 
though a larger proportion of the former is irrigated, The subsidiary 
season employment of hired agricultural labour is a little over 
two-fifths its quantum in the main season. And the average subsidiary 
season nominal wage rate is about 6 percent lower than the 
corresponding figure for the main season. 
2 Also see note 20 in chapter 5. 
3 These are based on the same data set as described in section 5. 7 above. The 56 
observations for each of the two seasons pertain to the 56 village-years covered by 
data set. The list of the village-years is also given in section 5.7. 
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The above sample averages already suggest that crop season 
variations in hired labour use may be largely attributable to changes in 
cropped (irrigated and unirrigated) areas. It is however notable that 
hired labour use per acre is roughly 15 days in the main season but 
20 days per acre in the subsidiary season. The higher intensity of 
hired labour use in the subsidiary seasons seems largely attributable 
to the higher proportion of irrigated acreage. 
A candidate for the explanation of wage variation4 is the 
possibility of a seasonal differences in the relative bargaining powers 
of employers and labourers. An examination of this possibility is also 
of independent interest as at least a preliminary enquiry into what 
the determinants of bargaining power may be. 
It should, however, be noted that within the analytical 
structure of the basic wage bargaining model. seasonal differences in 
bargaining powers are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
existence for seasonal wage differences. To see this clearly, the wage 
equation (4.5) of the basic model may be rewritten as: 
(1-f3J w = ~ + T <1+e) ~ (7 .1) 
It is obvious that a higher main-season wage may also result from a 
sufficiently lower absolute wage elasticity of labour demand during 
the main season, or a sufficiently higher main-season disagreement 
payoff for the labourers. The latter possibility, however, would be 
relevant only if the time-pattern of alternative employment for the 
labourers is broadly synchronous with the seasonality in their 
employment in the agricultural labour market. 
4 As noted earlier, the average (nominal) wage rates in the two crop seasons differ 
only by about 6 percent. However, there is significant wage variation within crop 
seasons as well (see tables in Appendix 6A). Although the following exercise attempts 
to explain what seems a small difference in wage rates, one is trying to get a handle on 
the underlying much larger intra-crop season variations. 
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To examine these possibilities, the basic model estimated in 
chapter 5 is augmented to incorporate seasonal effects for the 
following parameters: the employers' bargaining power coefficient 
(p), the slope coefficient of the labour demand function (y00), and the 
µ0 parameter associated with the labourers' disagreement payoff. The 
seasonal effects are introduced by way of main and subsidiary season 
dummy variables associated with the above parameters. 
The NL3S parameter estimates for the season-augmented 
model are given in Table 7. I. The following points ought to be noted: 
(i) The estimates of employers' bargaining power for the 
main and subsidiary seasons are 0.894 and 0.833 respectively. 
However, the seasonal difference in bargaining powers is statistically 
insignificant, t(pmain season - psubs. season)=l.55.5 In particular, the 
null hypothesis that the labourers' bargaining power is the same in 
both seasons is acceptable against the alternative that the 
main-season bargaining power of labourers is greater than their 
bargaining power during the subsidiary season (t=-1. 55 is inf act 
negative). 
(ii) Similarly, the labourers' disagreement payoff parameter 
µ0 is not significantly different for the two seasons (t=0.89). However, 
as equation (7. I) shows, it is more relevant to look at the magnitude 
(v /L) if one wants to account for wage differences. 6 But, evaluated at 
the sample mean levels of hired labour use for the two seasons, the 
magnitude (v /L) is infact lower for the main season (the values for the 
two seasons being 0.92 and 1.35 respectively). 
Thus, (i) and (ii) together imply that the relatively higher 
main-season wage rate cannot be explained in terms of either a 
higher bargaining power of the labourers during the main season 
5 This and the following t-statistics are computed from the covariance matrix of the 
estimated parameters. 
6The term (v/L) in equation (7.1) approximates to the notion of the 'alternative wage' 
discussed in section 5.4 above. 
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(relative to their bargaining power during the subsidiary season), or a 
higher main-season disagreement payoff for the labourers. 
Table 7.1: NL3S Parameter Estimates for the Season-augmented 
Model 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
3a 101133.2 021 -13.187 
(1.67) (-0.56) 
ao -3884.9 022 -424.99 
(-1.65) (-2.57) 
al -82581 <1>2 568.63 
(-1.67) (1.51) 
a2 -62359 <l>4 7.550 
(-1.48) (4.23) 
Yoo (main season) 1526.29 
'1'11 -0.2113 
(2.26) (-4.34) 
Yoo (subs. season) 1162.78 
'1'13 0.0101 
(2.82) (4.68) 
Yo2 1568.94 '1'14 0.0038 
(1.63) (2.69) 
Y22 20426.8 '1'22 -2.123 
(1.56) (-1.74) 
001 -4.710 '1'44 -1.68x10-4 
(-2.27) (-3.40) 
002 -49.589 µo (main season) 5317. 7 4 
(-5.4 7) (1.80) 
004 -0.1901 ~ (subs. season) 2336.65 
(-2.94) (1.46) 
011 145.27 µ1 0.24672 
(2.98) (2.17) 
0 12 1649.35 f3 (main season) 0.8938 
(3.74) (39.09) 
014 -9.024 f3 (subs. season) 0.8330 
{-3.80} {29.11} 
Note: Convergence criterion =0.0001. Number of observations =112. Asymptotic t-
ratios are given in parentheses. 
NL3S minimand = 56. 785 
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The explanation may, however, be found in estimates of the 
parameter 'Yoo (measuring the slope of the labour demand function). 
While the estimates of 'Yoo themselves are not significantly different 
for the two seasons (t=0.54), they do imply different estimates of the 
wage elasticity of labour demand. At sample means, the main- and 
subsidiary-season wage elasticities of labour demand are evaluated at 
-0.1434 and -0.3013 respectively. It, therefore, appears that the 
reason for a higher main-season wage rate may be found in the 
relatively lower (absolute) wage elasticity of labour demand during the 
main season. As noted above (see section 4.4), a lower (higher) 
absolute wage elasticity of labour demand works to the bargaining 
advantage of labourers (employers). 
The above argument may also be extrapolated to the more 
commonly-drawn distinction between 'peak' and 'slack' season 
operations. If, as seems plausible, the peak season demand for labour 
is relatively more wage-inelastic, then even with the same bargaining 
power for both the peak and slack seasons, the labourers will be able 
to bargain for a relatively higher wage during the peak season. 
7.3 Regional Variations 
Given the village-level isolation of the agricultural labour 
market (discussed earlier in chapter 2 and 3), it seems natural to 
expect inter-village differences in the relative bargaining powers of 
employers and labourers. Indeed, inter-village or, more generally, 
spatial wage-variation may be partly understood in these terms. In the 
results presented thus far, only a single estimate of the bargaining 
power parameter is given for all the ten study villages. This should 
really be interpreted as an approximate average for the ten villages. 
The paucity of the data precludes separate estimation of village-
specific bargaining powers. As it may be recalled, the data set 
provides altogether only 112 observations for the ten villages. 
However, a limited attempt to investigate regional 
differences is made by distinguishing five regional categories 
corresponding to the five districts covered by the data set. There are 
two villages for every district. The districts themselves represent 
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distinct agroeconomic zones within the semi-arid tropics of India 
(see section 3.2 above). Sample means of nominal wage rates and 
hired labour use in the five districts are reported below: 
District No. of Nominal wage rate Hired labour use Hired labour use 
observations (Rs. per day) (days) per acre of gross 
cropped area 
Mahbubnagar 26 3.18 (2.03) 35547.0 26.5 
Sholapur 26 3.16 (2.31) 9660.0 7.0 
Ako la 24 3.35 (1.97) 15142.9 20.6 
Sabarkantha 20 5.81 (2.44) 5141.1 14.1 
Rai6en 16 4.87 (2.18) 3302.4 7.6 
Note: Sample means of normalized wage rates are given in parentheses 
Using the same approach as in section 7.2, regional effects 
are incorporated into the specification of the basic model by 
introducing district dummy variables for the following parameters: 
'Yoo· µ0 and f3. These parameters are associated with the wage 
elasticity of labour demand, the labourers' disagreement payoff and 
the employers' bargaining power respectively. Together, these three 
parameters are the critical determinants of the overall bargaining 
position of the two parties in the village (agricultural) labour market 
(see section 4.4 above). In addition, district dummy variables are also 
introduced for the intercept term in the labour demand function.? 
The NL3S parameter for the region-augmented model are given in 
Table 7.2. 
To appreciate how these estimates bear upon (regional) 
wage variations, it is useful to focus, as before, on the implied wage 
elasticity of labour demand (E), the labourers' disagreement payoff per 
unit of employment (v/L), and the bargaining power coefficient (~).As 
7 This is in view of the large inter-district variations in the absolute size of the 
agricultural labour market, as shown by the sample means of hired labour use 
reported above. Estimation without the intercept dummies tended to converge on 
unreasonable values. 
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Table 7.2: NL3S Parameter Estimates for the Region-augmented 
Model 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
8<> 87990.5 'Y22 20849.5 '1'22 -2.101 
(1.44) (1.59) (-1.72) 
a0 Mahbubnagar -21446.0 001 -6.109 '1'44 -1.72x10-4 
(-1.44) (-1.91) (-3.46) 
a0 Sholapur -926.9 002 -42.061 µ0 Mahbubnagar 39750.58 
(-0.21) (-2.75) (2.14) 
a 0 Akola -7973.9 004 -0.0996 µ0 Sholapur -860.07 
(-2.50) (-1.01) (-0.40) 
a0 Sabarkantha -447.7 Bu 119.05 µ0 Akola 1188.65 
(-0.09) (2.42) (0.31) 
a0 Raisen 180.5 012 1646.72 µ0 Sabarkantha -2086.30 
(0.05) (3.73) (-0.34) 
a1 -61472 014 -8.890 ~ Raisen 312.07 
(-1.22)) (-3.74) (0.10) 
a2 -66207 021 -4.866 µl 0.3664 
(-1.57) (-0.21) (2.06) 
'Yoo Mahbubnagar 6005.66 022 -458.87 f3 Mahbubnagar 0.9034 
(1.06) (-2.75) (14.20) 
'Yoo Sholapur 2110.44 <1>2 654.41 f3 Sholapur 0.9048 
(2.12) (1. 71) (25.61) 
'Yoo Akola 763.89 <l>4 7.673 f3 Akola 0.8908 
(1.09) (4.29) (12.65) 
'Yoo Sabarkantha 724.75 'l'u -0.2049 f3 Sabarkantha 0.7894 
(0.83) (-4.21) (15.61) 
'Yoo Raisen 286.24 
'1'13 0.0098 f3 Raisen 0.8918 
(0.56) (4.54) (16.90) 
'Yo2 573.470 '1'14 0.0038 
~0.49) (2. 72} 
Note: Convergence criterion =0.0001. No. of observations= ll2. Asymptotic t-ratios 
are given in parentheses. 
NL3S minimand = 35.522 
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for the first two, the estimated parameters imply the following values 
at the sample means: 
District e v/L 
Mahbubnagar -0.3436 1.91 
Sholapur -0.5037 2.10 
Ako la -0.0994 0.67 
Sabarkantha -0.3444 1.07 
Raisen -0.1890 1.52 
Note: e is of course a unitless magnitude; v /Lis measured in Rs. per day. 
The results thus appear to indicate moderate to substantial variations 
in (e) and (v /L) for different districts. 
As Table 7.2 shows, the estimates of employers' bargaining 
power range from a minimum of 0.789 in the Sabarkantha villages (of 
Gujarat state) to a maximum of 0.905 in Sholapur villages (of 
Maharashtra state). The estimates for the other districts do not 
appear to be very different to the estimated value for Sholapur. Table 
7.3 reports the (paired) differences in the employers' bargaining 
power for the five districts and the t-statistics associated with these 
differences. Variance of (f3d3j) is calculated from the covariance 
matrix of the estimated parameters, as 
The results reported in Table 7.3 indicate that paired inter-
district differences in bargaining powers are mostly statistically 
insignificant, but not always so. In particular, the following three 
exceptions are noteworthy: the employers' bargaining power in 
Sholapur, Mahbubnagar and Raisen districts is each higher than that 
in Sabarkantha district, the differences being significant at 3.4, 7.5 
and 8.2 percent levels of significance respectively, using a one-tail 
t-test. It is also notable that in each of the five districts, the 
employers' bargaining power is very significantly greater than that of 
the labourers. 
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Table 7 .3: Regional Differences in Bargaining Power 
J31 J32 J33 J34 Ps 
Mahbubnagar Shola12ur Ako la Sabarkantha Raisen 
J31 0 
J32 0.0014 0 
(0.020) 
J33 -0.0126 -0.0140 0 
(0.130) (0.173) 
J34 -0.1140 -0.1154 -0.1014 0 
(1.453) (1.854) (1.133) 
Ps -0.0116 -0.0130 0.0010 0.1024 0 
(0.145) {0.202} (0.010) (1.404) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are absolute t-values of the statistic (~rl3jl for i:;!:j, where i 
refers to a row-value of ~ andj refers to a column-value of ~· 
Thus, on the whole, these results suggest that inter-regional 
wage variations are the joint outcome of regional differences in the 
wage elasticity of labour demand, the labourers' disagreement payoffs, 
and the relative bargaining powers of employers and labourers. 
7.4 Bargaining Power Asymmetry and Implications for Income 
Distribution 
The asymmetric bargaining power structure in the 
agricultural labour markets, as revealed by the empirical results of 
chapter 5 (as also 6), carries the direct implication that had 
bargaining power been symmetrically distributed, the employers' 
profits would have been lower and labourers' wage income higher 
than their observed levels. 8 While the direction of this implied 
displacement in the (factoral) distribution of income is obvious from 
the comparative static propositions presented earlier (see section 
4.5.1), it is also of interest to assess its quantitative magnitude. This 
may be done by means of a simulation exercise based on the 
8 In terms of Figure 4.1, this involves a comparison of the asymmetric Nash solution 
point A with the symmetric solution point S. 
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econometric model estimated in chapter 5 above. 
The distribution of income under symmetric power can, 
thus, be simulated as an exogenously imposed change in the value of 
the bargaining power parameter J3, with induced effects on profits, 
labour demand and the wage rate. This may then be compared with a 
base simulation using the estimated values of all parameters and the 
actual (sample) values of exogenous variables. The underlying 
assumption of such an exercise is the one common to simulation 
studies in general, namely that the other parameters and exogenous 
variables in the econometric model remain unaffected as the value(s) 
of any one (or more) of them is allowed to change. This point is of 
some importance since a fairly large parametric variation in J3 is being 
considered here. One may suspect that the main effect of changes in 
J3 would be on the endogenous variables of the model, viz. w, Land 7t. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that employers may initiate some 
counteractive measures in response to a substantially higher 
bargaining power of labourers, e.g. measures permitting greater 
substitution of hired labour with other inputs. In any case, the value of 
the simulation experiment lies in its enabling a comparison of the 
existing situation with one where the only change considered is that 
the employers and labourers have equal bargaining powers. 
The simulation exercise is undertaken for the sub-sample of 
85 observations which satisfy the second-order conditions of the 
basic model (see section 4.5 and note 35 in chapter 5). Table 7.4 
presents the results. For comparison, the table also gives the actual 
means of the endogenous variables. It is notable that the base 
simulation means are not very different to the actual means. The 
Theil inequality coefficients (measuring the predictive performance 
of the model) for the three endogenous variables ft, L, w are found to 
be satisfactorily low (0.20, 0.15 and 0.19 respectively).9 Thus, at least 
9 The Theil inequality coefficient lies between 0 and 1, a lower value indicating better 
predictive performance. See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), chapter 2. A 
decomposition of the coefficients further showed that most of simulation errors were 
attributable to the unsystematic (or the covariance). rather than the systematic (the 
bias and variance), components. The covariance proportions for the three equations 
were 0.85, 0.92 and 0.97 respectively. 
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for the sub-sample selected for simulation, the model appears to 
track the historical data fairly accurately. 
Table 7 .4: Simulated Effects of Symmetric Bargaining Power 
{No. of observations =85~ 
Actual Base simulation Simulation %change 
mean mean mean over base 
simulation 
Normalized profits (ft) 208692.75 215046.54 157287.42 -26.9 
Labour demand (L) 19451.81 18527.17 15282.91 -17.5 
Normalized wage rate (w) 2.087 1.968 4.647 + 136.1 
Normalized wage 
earnings (wl) 36996.88 31531.51 77262.22 + 145.0 
Nominal profits (1t) 368678.72 372671.79 270398.30 -27.4 
Nominal wage rate (w) 3.610 3.508 8.615 +145.6 
Nominal wage earnings {wq 62873.93 55747.62 135619.07 + 143.3 
The results presented in Table 7.4 demonstrate the critical 
influence of bargaining power on the distribution of income. The 
simulated effects of equal bargaining power are unmistakably of 
quantitative significance. Under conditions of symmetric power, the 
nominal mean wage rate increases to nearly two-and-a-half times the 
base value. Labour demand falls by about 1 7 percent. Average nominal 
wage earnings of the labourers also increase to nearly two-and-a-half 
times the base level, while nominal profits of the employers decrease 
by about 27 percent. The impact on normalized variables is of a 
similar order. 
7.5 Disagreement Payoff Effects 
This section deals with the (simulated) effects of changes in 
the labourers' disagreement payoff on the bargained farm wage rate, 
their wage earnings and employers' profits. Since the overall 
bargaining position of the labourers (relative to that of employers) 
depends on their bargaining power as well as the disagreement 
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payoff, it is of particular interest to compare the relative quantitative 
effects of changes in these two factors. 
The exercise also has some relevance for public policies 
directed at supplementing the incomes of agricultural labourers, e.g. 
employment guarantee schemes such as the one initiated by the 
Maharashtra government, the National Rural Employment 
Programme and the Rural Landless Employment Generation 
Programme.IO It is useful to know what kind of impact, if any, such 
policies may have on outcomes in village agricultural labour markets. 
As in section 7.4, the simulation exercise uses the estimates 
for the basic model (section 5.9). The effects of a 10 percent increase 
in the nominal nonfarm wage earnings of the labourers (y) are 
evaluated. The results are reported in Table 7 .5. The most notable 
feature of these results is the small magnitude of induced changes in 
the endogenous variables: on average, the nominal farm wage rate 
increases by 1 percent; demand for hired (farm) labour falls by about 
one-seventh of 1 percent; the labourers' wage earnings from 
agricultural work increase by 0.6 percent.11 The employers' profits 
decline marginally by 0.1 percent. The stimulated effects on 
normalized variables are of similar magnitude. 
10 For an evaluative discussion of some of these programmes, see Sundaram and 
Tendulkar (1985). 
11 The total (farm plus nonfarm) wage earnings of the labourers, however, increase by 
about 3.1 percent. This is calculated as k (tiwl/wl) + (1 -k) (tiy /y), where k is the share of farm 
wage earnings in total wage earnings. The mean value of k is about 0. 7 for the 
subsample of 85 observations used for simulation. 
Evaluated at the sample mean value ofy of Rs. 27358.20, this implies a total 
income multiplier d(wL + y)/dy of 1.07. Rural (wage) income effects of changes in 
nonfarm earnings through relief work have recently also been considered by 
Ravallion (1987). For plausible values of wage elasticity of demand for agricultural 
labour and shares of agricultural and urban labour force, he reports far more 
optimistic numbers on the multiplier effect of raising nonfarm earnings. However, he 
operates with a very different Harris-Todaro type of model of dual labour markets. 
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Table 7.5: Simulated Effects of a Change in Labourers' Nonfarm Wage 
Earnings (y) 
Variable 
L 
w 
wL 
1t 
w 
wl 
Base simulation 
mean 
215046.54 
18527.17 
1.968 
31531.51 
372671.79 
3.508 
55747.62 
(No. of observations =85) 
Simulation mean % change 
with 10% increase in y over base 
simulation 
214783.69 -0.12 
18500.95 -0.14 
1.990 +1.12 
31720.44 +0.60 
372247.85 -0.11 
3.543 +1.00 
56059.35 +0.56 
These results contrast sharply with the projected effects of 
symmetric bargaining power (see Table 7.4). A single comparison 
illustrates the point. Thus, for instance, to match the effects of 
symmetric bargaining power on the labourers' nominal wage earnings 
in the agricultural labour market, their nominal wage earnings from 
nonfarm work need to increase more than 26 times the base level. 
Such a huge increment in nonfarm earnings, if it could ever 
eventuate, would of course relegate the agricultural labour market to 
insignificance. This is not to suggest that a scenario of equal 
bargaining powers of employers and labourers is any more feasible. 
The point to be emphasized is simply that inequalities in bargaining 
powers are a far more decisive influence (in quantitative terms) on 
wage and employment outcomes in the agricultural labour markets of 
the study villages than the levels of alternative earnings of the 
labourers. 
However, it should be noted that a 10 percent increase in 
nominal nonfarm wage earnings of the labourers is equivalent to a 
less than 10 percent increase in their disagreement payoff. The 
increment in the latter is the latter is only µ 1, times the increase in 
nominal nonfarm wage earnings (y). Since µ 1 was earlier estimated at 
about 0.21 (see Table 5.6 above), this amounts to only about a fifth of 
the considered change in y. Table 7 .6 reports the simulated effects of 
a 10 percent increase in the labourers' disagreement payoff. As 
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expected, the induced changes in w, L, wL and 1t are larger than the 
previous case (roughly about twice as large). Nevertheless, the effects 
are still very small compared to the symmetric bargaining power 
case. For instance, matching the simulated rise in nominal wage 
earnings in the latter case would still require that the labourers' 
disagreement payoff increases to more than 12 times the base level. 
Thus, even compared with the levels of labourers' disagreement 
payoffs, the observed inequality in the relative bargaining powers of 
employers and labourers turns out be the major influence on 
distributional outcomes in the agricultural labour markets of the 
study villages. 
Table 7 .6: Simulated Effects of a Change in the Labourers' 
Disagreement Payoff 
Variable Base simulation Simulation mean 
L 
w 
wL 
1t 
w 
wl 
mean 
215046.54 
18527.17 
1.968 
31531.51 
372671.79 
3.508 
55747.62 
7.6 Output Price Effects 
with 10% increase in 
disagreement payoff 
214532.07 
18474.29 
2.012 
31917.49 
371770.94 
3.584 
56437.26 
(No. of observations =85) 
% change 
over base 
simulation 
-0.24 
-0.29 
+2.24 
+1.22 
-0.24 
+2.17 
+1.24 
Agricultural labourers are net buyers of agricultural goods, 
mainly food. Higher prices of agricultural output thus have a direct 
negative effect on their real incomes. There may be also two indirect 
effects that work in the opposite direction: (1) to the extent higher 
prices stimulate agricultural production and the demand for labour, 
the employment of agricultural labourers may increase; (2) either 
through the increase in the demand for agricultural labour, or 
through some other means depending on the mode of agricultural 
wage determination, the nominal agricultural wage rate may also 
increase. It has sometimes been argued that the two indirect effects 
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can be sufficiently strong to offset the direct effect and generate a net 
increase in the real wage rate and/ or real wage earnings of 
agricultural labourers (see, for instance, Sah and Stiglitz, 1987).12 
The plausibility of such an argument may be examined by 
simulating the effects of an increase in output price, using the same 
methodology as before. Table 7. 7 presents the simulated effects 
assuming a 10 percent increase in the average price of agricultural 
output. The results show that while the employment, nominal wage 
rate and nominal wage earnings of labourers increase (on average) by 
about 3.4, 2.6 and 8 percent respectively, the normalized wage rate 
and normalized wage earnings decline by about 7 and 2 percent 
respectively.13 The employers' profits, in contrast, increase in both 
nominal and normalized terms (by more than 18 and 6 percent 
respectively). The regressive distributional implications of higher 
output prices are obvious. 
12 It has frequently been noted that the income distributional effects of agricultural 
price changes critically depend on the assumed theory of wage determination. The 
assumptions have varied from fixed nominal wages (de Janvry and Subbarao, 1984) to 
full employment (Quizon and Barbieri, 1985), implying different effects on the real 
incomes of the rural poor. Ravallion (1988) considers welfare distributional effects of 
foodgrain price changes for Bangladesh both with and without quantity constraints 
in the labour market, although his results show that the long-run effects would be 
beneficial to the rural workers in either case. From the perspective of the proposed 
wage bargaining model, neither of the above two extreme assumptions appears 
plausible. 
13 Normalized wage is not the same as real wage, If, however, the labourers' cost of 
living varies roughly equi-proportionately with the average price of agricultural 
output, which does not appear implausible, the effects on real wages and earnings will 
not be very different. 
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Table 7. 7: Simulated Effects of a Change in the Average Price of 
Agricultural Output 
Variable 
L 
w 
wL 
7t 
w 
wl 
Base simulation 
mean 
215046.54 
18527.17 
1.968 
31531.51 
372671.79 
3.508 
55747.62 
Simulation mean 
with 10% increase 
in output price 
228804.87 
19163.62 
1.828 
30929.14 
440760.90 
3.598 
60154.52 
7. 7 Effects of Cropping and Irrigation Intensity 
(No. of observations =85) 
% change 
over base 
simulation 
+6.40 
+3.44 
-7.11 
-1.91 
+18.3 
+2.57 
+7.91 
Table 7 .8 presents the results of two simulation 
experiments. The first involves a 10 percent increase in gross 
cropped area, with equi-proportionate increases in both irrigated and 
unirrigated components. Thus, more of the same type of land is 
Table 7 .8: Simulated Effects of Changes in Cropping and Irrigation 
Intensities 
{No. of observations =85} 
Variable Base Simulation mean o/o change Simulation mean o/o change 
simulation with 10% increase over base with 1 Oo/o increase over base 
mean in cropping intensi!l'. simulation in irrigation simulation 
it 215046.54 236184.37 +9.83 223279.22 +3.83 
L 18527.17 19872.63 +7.26 19338.11 +4.38 
w 1.968 1.985 +0.86 1.963 -0.25 
wL 31531.51 34309.68 +8.81 32563.43 +3.27 
7t 372671.79 406311.84 +9.03 385974.69 +3.57 
w 3.508 3.525 +0.48 3.498 -0.29 
wl 55747.62 60318.93 +8.20 57516.38 +3.17 
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assumed to be brought under cultivation; the proportions of irrigated 
and unirrigated acreage remain unchanged.14 The second 
experiment considers a 10 percent increase in the proportion of 
irrigated area while keeping the total gross cropped area unchanged. 
Hence, this experiment involves a decrease in unirrigated acreage by 
an amount equal to 10 percent of the existing irrigated area. 
The following points are notable about the results presented 
in Table 7 .8. (i) Crop intensity effects are larger than irrigation 
intensity effects. This is not surprising since in the former case 
unirrigated acreage is allowed to increase (by 10 percent), while in 
the latter it is assumed to decline so as to keep the gross cropped 
area unchanged. Both experiments involve the same absolute increase 
in irrigated areas. 
(ii) Employers' profits increase in both experiments. The 
positive effect on profits in the second experiment indicates the 
obvious point that (at least at the margin) irrigated land is more 
profitable to the employers than unirrigated land. 
(iii) Increases in cropping and irrigation intensity both have 
positive effects on the labourers' wage earnings. However, the 
positive effects operate almost entirely through increases in 
employment; the effects on the wage rate are negligible. 
(iv) In both experiments, the effects on employers' profits 
are somewhat larger than those on labourers' earnings, though 
differences are not large. This seems to suggest that increases in 
cropping and irrigation intensities may, if at all, only marginally 
accentuate the existing levels of relative inequality in the factoral 
distribution of income. This, however, needs to be qualified insofar as 
higher cropping and irrigation intensities are typically accompanied 
with other changes in agricultural practices and technology, the 
distributional implications of which may not be neutral. 
14 For the sub-sample used for simulation used for simulation, the average 
proportion of irrigated area is 16.5 percent. The average proportion for the entire 
sample of 112 observation is about the same. 
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7.8 Gender Inequalities in Bargaining Power and Distributional 
Implications 
This final set of simulation exercises relates to the extended 
model (estimated above in chapter 6). It was argued earlier that the 
observed disparities in the wages of male and female labourers may 
be at least partly explained by the differences in their relative 
bargaining powers. The estimates for the extended model (discussed 
in section 6.4.2 above) showed the bargaining power of female 
labourers to be significantly less than that of male labourers. It is now 
examined as to what order of quantitative displacement in wages (and 
other endogenous variables) could be expected were bargaining 
powers the same for both male and female labourers. 
Two alternatives are considered: (i) ~M =~F=0.0824, and 
(ii) ~M =~F=0.3333. In the first case, the bargaining power of female 
labourers (which was estimated at 0.0341) is allowed to increase upto 
the estimate value of male labourers' bargaining power (see section 
4.2) The second case corresponds to the symmetric Nash solution 
where the bargaining powers of employers, male and female 
labourers are all assumed to be identical. As before, these simulation 
experiments can be compared with the predictions from a base 
simulation where all parameters are assumed to be at their estimated 
values. Table 7.9 reports results15 for sub-sample of 53 observations 
where the second-order conditions of the extended model were 
found to be satisfied (see section 4.6 and note 13 in chapter 6). 
The first set of simulation results (where ~M =~F=0.0824) 
clearly show the importance of gender inequalities in bargaining 
power in producing male-female wage and earnings disparities. If the 
bargaining power of female labourers were to be the same as that of 
male labourers, then compared with the existing situation (of unequal 
bargaining powers), the average female (nominal) wage rate would 
15 For brevity, the results are reported for nominal variables only; changes in 
normalized variables are very similar. 
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increase by more than 40 percent. Their average employment would 
fall by about 6 percent, but their wage earnings would increase by 
Table 7 .9: Simulated Effects of Equal Bargaining Powers for Male and 
Female Labourers 
{No. of observations =53} 
Variable Base Simulation % change Simulation % change 
simulation mean with over base mean with over base 
mean PM =PF=0.0824 simulation PM =PF=0.3333 simulation 
1t 469128.15 446848.07 -4.75 325020.74 -30.7 
~ 8077.46 8354.01 +3.42 7282.70 -9.84 
~ 17155.00 16184.01 -5.66 14215.50 -17.1 
WM 4.778 4.980 +4.23 10.318 + 115.9 
WF 3.203 4.562 +42.4 9.686 +202.4 
WM~ 34436.27 37012.65 +7.48 63279.65 +83.8 
wFLF 45692.45 62303.93 +36.4 113019.97 +147.3 
over 36 percent. Given some substitutability between male and female 
hired labour, it is not surprising that male employment increases (by 
about 3 percent) in response to higher female wage rate. The male 
wage rate and wage earnings also show moderate increases (of about 
4 and 7 percent respectively).16 As expected, the employers' profits 
decrease (by about 5 percent) as their bargaining power in effect 
declines. 
However, most notable result of this simulation relates to 
the projected effect on disparities in male and female wages: under 
the existing situation of unequal bargaining powers of male and 
16 This is an apparent contradiction with the comparative static results discussed in 
section 6.5 above, which indicated that male wage rate should fall and male wage 
earnings should remain unchanged in this case. However, the discrepancy may be 
explained by the following two factors: (i) the relevant elasticity conditions for the 
expected direction of comparative static effects are not satisfied at all observations in 
the simulation sub-sample, and (ii) while the evaluation of comparative static effects 
in section 4. 7 and 6.5 was based on the assumption of unchanging wage-elasticities of 
labour demand, the latter of course change in the simulation exercise since only the 
slope parameters of labour demand are kept fixed here. 
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female labourers, female wage rate an average is 67 percent of the 
male wage rate; under the alternative scenario where female 
bargaining power increases upto the male level, the average female 
wage rate increases to about 92 percent of the average male wage 
rate. The inference that the observed disparities in male and female 
wages are largely attributable to underlying inequalities in bargaining 
power seems reasonable. 
The second set of simulation results (with !3M =13F=0.3333) 
reinforce some of the conclusions suggested earlier. In particular, the 
results show that the observed inequalities in bargaining power have 
a very substantial quantitative effect on distributional outcomes in the 
agricultural labour market. The simulated conditions of equal 
bargaining powers for all groups induce very large increases in male 
and female labourers' wage rates and earnings, while also causing a 
sharp fall in employers' profits. This is comparable with the 
corresponding simulation results for the basic model discussed 
earlier in section 7.4. 
The other notable feature of these results is that the 
projected effects on female wage rate and earnings are much larger 
than those on male wage rate and earnings. Thus, while the average 
male wage rate and earnings increase by about 116 and 84 percent 
respectively, the corresponding figures for females are 202 and 14 7 
percent. As a consequence, the male-female wage rate disparity 
virtually tends to vanish under the projected conditions of symmetric 
bargaining power, with the average female wage rate increasing to 
about 94 percent of the male wage rate. This is comparable with the 
first set of simulation results discussed earlier in this section. 
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CHAPTERS 
Conclusion 
This study has been concerned with the problem of wage 
and employment determination in the unorganized agricultural labour 
markets of India. The main contribution of the study has been in the 
following directions: (1) in arguing for an alternative characterization 
of agricultural labour markets in India, involving a collective 
bargaining interpretation of the wage formation process, (2) in 
developing a theoretical model of agricultural labour markets based 
on that characterization, and (3) in empirically quantifying a measure 
of the relative bargaining powers of employers and labourers, and (4) 
in analyzing (quantitatively) the consequences of unequal bargaining 
power. The empirical quantification is of course based on the concept 
of bargaining power as operationalized within the proposed 
theoretical model. 
8.1 The Suggested Characterization 
The characterization of agricultural labour markets in India, 
argued for in this thesis, has the following elements: (a) the unit of 
analysis is taken to be the village, and (b) within the village, 
agricultural wage formation can be interpreted as the outcome of 
tacit collective bargaining between village employers and labourers. I 
have argued that such a characterization is (quite naturally) suggested 
by some important features of agricultural labour markets in India, 
notably those relating to their village-level isolation, the intra-village 
uniformity of the wage rate and the conspicuous absence of wage-
cutting in the face of substantial involuntary unemployment. These 
features were documented at some length for the ten study villages in 
central, south and west India (chapter 3). 
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An important reason why the suggested characterization has 
nevertheless remained largely disregarded 1 seems to have been the 
presumption that collective bargaining requires the existence of 
formal unions or some other form of expli.cit collusion. This 
presumption is shown to be theoretically unnecessary (chapter 3). 
Instead, it has been argued that implicit cooperation among village 
labourers (and by extension of the argument, among village 
employers) can often be sustained by a set of mutually-accepted social 
norms or sanctions which do not require any external enforcement 
agencies. The evolution of social norms or sanctions in this context 
could in turn be explained in terms of supergame equilibria for the 
village labour market considered as a repeated game. 
8.2 The Theoretical Model 
In the theoretical model, based on the above mentioned 
characterization, the problem of village wage determination has been 
analyzed as a cooperative bargaining game between village employers 
and labourers (chapter 4). In the symmetric version of the bargaining 
model originally proposed by Nash (1950), the bargained outcome 
(for a given feasible set) was determined solely by differences in the 
disagreement payoffs. But in the present study, an asymmetric 
version of the Nash solution is used, according to which the 
bargained outcome depends not only on the disagreement payoffs but 
also on relative bargaining powers. 
The proposed model is consistent with a wide range of 
observed features of agricultural labour markets in India (chapter 4). 
In particular, the model explains the key puzzle of agricultural wage 
determination in the Indian context, viz., the coexistence of 
substantial wage variability with involuntary unemployment. This is to 
be contrasted with the existing theoretical approaches whose 
inadequacies in relation to the stylized facts were discussed in 
chapter 2. A recapitulation of that discussion is presently 
unnecessary, but the main point is worth restating: if the stylized 
1 Although there are some notable exceptions, in particular the work of Ashok Rudra 
(1982a, 1984). 
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features listed at the end of chapter 2 are taken to constitute a 
minimal set of empirical consistency requirements that a theoretical 
model of agricultural labour markets in India should satisfy, then 
none of the existing wage theories can be considered empirically 
satisfactory; in contrast, a notable attribute of the proposed wage 
bargaining model lies precisely in its overall consistency with at least 
this minimal set of observed empirical regularities. 
Within the asymmetric Nash bargaining framework of the 
theoretical model, it has been possible to draw to a distinction 
between bargaining power and the more general notion of bargaining 
position, of which (relative) bargaining powers are only one 
constitutive element. The other two elements being the bargaining 
set (whose influence in the labour market context may be 
parametrically represented by the wage elasticity of labour demand) 
and the disagreement payoffs. A straightforward implication of 
identifying these distinct influences on bargained outcomes, which 
has particular relevance for interpretation of empirical results, is that 
not all differences in the bargaining situation can be ascribed to 
bargaining power inequalities. For instance, it was argued that 
seasonal wage variation may be primarily explained by differences in 
the wage elasticities of labour demand, rather than differences in 
relative bargaining powers or the disagreement payoffs (chapter 7). 
8.3 Empirical Quantification of Relative Bargaining Power 
A key proposition of this study has been that distributional 
outcomes in agricultural labour markets critically depend on the 
relative bargaining powers of employers of agricultural labour and its 
suppliers. There is of course nothing novel about such a proposition; 
implicitly or otherwise, it has often appeared in both casual and 
academic discussions. However, it is not enough to state this 
proposition as a general viewpoint. If it is to be persuasive, one must 
quantify it empirically. This is precisely what has been attempted in 
this study. 
Corresponding to the basic and extended versions of the 
wage bargaining models, the results of the present research have 
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revealed two important aspects of bargaining power inequalities in 
the agricultural labour markets of the ten study villages. Firstly, the 
employers' bargaining power is estimated to be 0.87. This is 
significantly greater than the value of 0.5 required by the Nash 
symmetry axiom, although it is also significantly less than unity, so 
that the labourers are not powerless in agricultural labour markets. 
Thus, while the labourers are not forced down to their disagreement 
payoff, their net gains from agreement are seriously limited by their 
lack of bargaining power. The limited surplus over their fallback 
incomes that is nevertheless possible is indeed the raison-deitre for 
the quasi-cooperative behaviour and the existence of social sanctions. 
The estimated value of the employers' bargaining power (~) 
is quite robust. Choice of different starting values (and convergence 
criteria) in the nonlinear three-stage estimation of the basic model 
invariably yielded essentially the same estimate of ~. In various 
unrestricted specifications of the basic model, much the same 
estimates of~ were obtained (within the narrow range of 0.87 to 
0.89). Finally, extending the basic model to include male and female 
labourers as separate bargaining parties once again provided an 
estimate of the employers' bargaining power of 0.88. The regularity 
with which essentially the same estimate of ~ was obtained 
strengthens the belief that the estimate is robust. 
The estimates for the extended model revealed another 
important aspect of bargaining power asymmetry in the agricultural 
labour markets of the study villages, viz., that amongst the labourers 
themselves. The male labourers' bargaining power, though itself low 
in comparison with the bargaining power of the employers, was found 
to be significantly greater than that of female labourers. The 
bargaining power coefficients were estimated to be 0.08 and 0.03 for 
males and females respectively. The hypothesis of symmetric 
bargaining powers for employers, male and female labourers 
(requiring all bargaining power coefficients to equal 0.333) is 
convincingly rejected. The results also showed that the bargaining 
power coefficients for both male and female labourers, despite their 
extremely low values, are significantly different to zero. 
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8.4 Implications of Unequal Bargaining Power 
The ultimate significance of the observed level of bargaining 
power inequality lies in its quantitative impact on the bargained 
wage, employment and profit outcomes. This issue was examined by 
simulating the comparative static displacement in factoral income 
distribution with symmetric bargaining powers. The results 
presented in chapter 7 showed that the observed levels of bargaining 
power inequality exert a decisive influence on distributional 
outcomes in the village (labour) economy. The basic model 
simulations indicated that if the labourers' bargaining power were the 
same as that of the employers, their wage earnings would increase 
nearly two-and-a-half-times and the employers' profits would decline 
by about 27 percent. Similar results were obtained for the simulated 
effects of symmetric bargaining power in the extended model. 
The simulation results also indicated that in comparison 
with the effects of changes in labourers' disagreement payoffs, 
bargaining power asymmetry is by far the more significant 
quantitative influence on labour market outcomes. Thus, for instance, 
for the labourers to be able to achieve the same increase in their 
wage earnings as they would have under conditions of symmetric 
bargaining power, their disagreement payoff would need to increase 
more than 12 times. 
The differences in the male and female labourers' bargaining 
powers provide an important explanation of the observed gender 
disparities in wage rates (and earnings). This is seen most clearly in 
the simulation results of the extended model. When the bargaining 
power of female labourers is allowed to increase upto the estimated 
value (of 0.0824) of the male workers' bargaining power, the female 
to male wage ratio increase from about two-thirds to 92 percent. 
Even as there are differences in the disagreement payoffs of male and 
female labourers, differences in their bargaining powers appear to be 
the dominant explanation of gender disparities in wages. The 
bargaining power explanation of gender wage inequality is in contrast 
to explanations based on productivity differentials (which are allowed 
for in the extended wage bargaining model) and those based on some 
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sort of discrimination. While the role of the latter type of explanation 
cannot be ruled out in the present context, the results of the present 
research indicate that bargaining power explanation is sufficient to 
account for most of the observed disparity in male-female wage rates. 
The model could also be used to examine some policy 
issues. For instance, the distributional implications of higher prices 
of agricultural output were examined in section 7.6. The results 
indicated that with the given asymmetric bargaining powers of 
agricultural labourers and employers, the distributional consequences 
of higher agricultural prices are regressive. The output-price-
normalized wage rate and wage earnings decline and employers' 
profits rise with higher output prices. This is an example where the 
predictions of the proposed wage bargaining model differ from those 
derived from alternative assumptions on agricultural wage 
determination. 
8.5 Scope for Further Work 
In the specification of the disagreement payoffs of 
employers and labourers some rather simple assumptions have been 
made in this study. For instance, the employers' disagreement payoff 
was assumed to be at zero profits, while the labourers disagreement 
payoff was specified as a linear function of their nonfarm wage 
earnings. As was noted in chapter 5, there remains scope for better 
empirical identification of the disagreement payoffs. However, the 
real problem here is that disagreement situations rarely occur in 
village labour markets. 
An attempt was made to examine the sensitivity of estimates 
of bargaining power to alternative assumed values for the employers' 
disagreement payoff. It, however, turns out that the estimates of 
bargaining power coefficients are not very sensitive to variations in 
the disagreement payoffs over a fairly wide range. Sensitivity analysis 
showed that even as the employers' disagreement profits were 
allowed tO rise upto 50 percent of their realized profits, the estimate 
of~ is not significantly different from 0.8. 
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Of course, to demonstrate the existence of bargaining power 
inequalities is not the same thing as explaining them. But this is 
precisely where the theoretical and empirical approach of this thesis 
opens up an important agenda for further research, by (hopefully) 
establishing that there is an important problem to be explained. The 
empirical question of whether there exist any significant inequalities 
of bargaining power is logically prior to the question of what explains 
these power inequalities. In view of the results pertaining to the 
former question, it is meaningful to pose the latter. 
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